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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the dilemmas that might occur when one introduces liberal strategies for 
accommodating difference in a society with deep cultural cleavages. In the last few decades 
there have been an exhaustive debate in the western democracies on multiculturalism. The 
questions addressed are whether liberal democracy not only should recognise people because 
they are, but also for who they are. Four normative theoretical thinkers are presented, who all 
seek to provide strategies for how it is possible to make the right to cultural protection 
compatible with the right to equality.  
 
The empirical analysis is an in depth study research of the South African process of 
accommodating difference. How and why did African traditional authorities become 
recognised in the new South African constitution of 1996, and to what extent was this 
recognition followed by the political action aimed at both reforming these institutions and 
clarifying their position in the democratic future?  
 
There were three dilemmas from a liberal point of view, connected with the recognition of 
traditional authorities.1) Traditional authorities were not compatible with the right to equality. 
2) Recognition of traditional customs and practices might force an identity upon members of 
rural traditional communities. 3) Traditional authorities were not compatible with democratic 
structures and principles. There were however three aspects that influenced the traditional 
leaders position in the negotiations prior to the signing of the constitution. These were the 
centre-periphery aspect, the ethical aspect and the strategic aspect.  
 
The conditioned recognition seemed difficult to implement, and the government promised to 
address the questions through official statements and initiated legislations, but few bills have 
been enacted. The prerequisites founded by the liberal perspectives applied were not present 
to a sufficient degree. The consequence of this inability to deliver on promises has caused the 
problem of ‘Two Bulls in a Kraal’1, which implies that in rural traditional communities 
double structures of both political and judicial authorities are functioning without any clear 
rules for how both democracy and traditional institutions are to coexist.  
                                                 
1The ’Two Bulls in a Kraal’ situation is presented in Oomen, Barbara, Traditions on the Move – Chiefs; 
Democracy and Change in Rural South Africa, NiZA-cahier No. 6, Amsterdam, 2000.  See 
http://www.niza.nl/nl/publications/006/intro.htm 
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1. Introduction 
 
The object of this research is to ask which dilemmas that might occur when one introduces 
liberal strategies for accommodating difference in a society with deep cultural cleavages. The 
empirical analysis is an in depth study of the process of recognising difference in the post-
Apartheid South Africa. Core empirical questions are: How and why did African traditional 
authorities become recognised in the new South African constitution of 1996, and to what 
extent was this recognition followed by political action aimed at both reforming these 
institutions and clarifying their specific position in the democratic future.  
 
At the inauguration of the National Council of Traditional Leaders in Cape Town the 18th of 
April 1997, president Nelson Mandela on behalf of the ANC addressed the traditional leaders 
and kings: “I feel truly humbled to officially open the National Council of Traditional 
Leaders; to stand before my leaders, at last to acknowledge their status and role as full 
participants in national affairs; as part of the corps of leaders in the reconstruction and 
development of our country.”2 As late as in 1988 the African National Congress (ANC) had 
declared in their constitutional principles that traditional leadership was anachronistic to their 
modernist vision and that the organisation would be abolished with the advent of democracy.3 
Why had the ANC changed their view so significantly?  
 
Few attempts have been made inside the scholars of political science to sort out the question 
regarding the role of African traditional authorities in the democracies of post-colonial Africa. 
Do we, as the ANC did, view them as feudal anachronisms ready to be swept away by the 
advent of liberal democracies? But why do they still exist in most contemporary African 
democracies? My research thus rest upon two presumptions: 1) Due to their mere existence, I 
think it is important to analyse traditional authorities role and functions in the African 
democracies, since they seem to possess more influential power than only symbolic. 2) 
Attempts to sort out the multifaceted issues regarding traditional authorities might provide for 
a broader understanding of the challenges that affect the democratisation process in Africa. I 
am not making a value judgement on these institutions, I only aim at analysing which 
dilemmas are connected to them from a liberal democratic perspective. 
 
                                                 
2 Mandela, Nelson, speech at the Inauguration of the Council of Traditional Leaders, 18th of April 1997. 
3 Jacobs, Sean The politics of traditional leadership, Epolitics Issue 11, Cape Town: Idasa, 2000:2. 
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1.1. Theoretical perspective 
 
The last ten years have marked a dramatic change in the political landscape of the world. The 
world is becoming increasingly globalised, at the same time people have sought to be 
recognised for their particularities and difference. Stressing cultural and religious distinctions 
have been regarded as important for groups trying to gain specific rights due to their 
particularities. This phenomenon has also created an exhaustive theoretical debate on 
multiculturalism and the right to also be recognised for who you are, not only that you are. 
The problem connected to accommodating these claims is that it challenges the old liberal 
vision of state neutrality in matters regarding the good. In a liberal society one must remain 
neutral to the good life, and restrict oneself to ensure that no matter how one sees things, 
different citizens ought to deal fairly with each other and the state ought to deal equally with 
all.4 The state needs to be colour-blind in regard to individuals’ particularities.  
 
But does this benign state neutrality necessarily provide justice between different cultural 
groups in a heterogeneous society?  In this thesis I will present different normative theoretical 
thinkers inside the liberal tradition who have aimed at finding strategies that challenges the 
old dichotomies of universalism and particularism in a liberal democracy. The theoretical 
questions I seek to answer are: Which suggestions do the different theories put forward to 
make difference compatible with the right to equality? How are these theories able to both 
securing the right to be equal, and at the same time protect the right to be different?  
 
1.2 Empirical perspective 
 
By analysing the empirical case of the South African process of accommodating difference I 
intend to shed some light on dilemmas that might occur when one see the importance of 
recognising traditional authorities in a newly established liberal democracy. The debate inside 
the liberal tradition regarding the accommodation of difference is challenged by the cultural 
experiences of South Africa. South Africa is a country that so ruthlessly has experienced what 
politics designed to cultivate cultural difference can be. Sometimes the line is thin between 
cherishing cultural particularity and stigmatising entire groups of people due to their 
                                                 
4 Taylor, Charles, “The Politics of Recognition” in Gutman (ed.) Multiculturalism, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994:57. 
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otherness. The new constitution of 1996 did however to some extent recognise traditional 
African authorities, both political and judicial.  
 
But, how and why did the traditional leaders’ claim of cultural recognition become entrenched 
in the constitution, and not others policies aimed at accommodating the cultural diversity of 
South Africa? What influenced the negotiators preferences due to cultural accommodation? 
This recognition of traditional authorities was conditioned, and only to take form if they 
managed to adapt in to a new political structure based on liberal notions. The ANC was 
founded as a rejection of the politics of separation engineered to discriminate the African 
majority. With a probability amounting to almost certainty they knew they were going to be 
the majority party after the first free elections. How were they going to address the rural 
communities still living under traditional authorities when they obtained political power? 
Were they able to implement the requirements established in the new constitution in regard to 
the recognition of traditional authorities, or was this recognition nothing more than a façade 
presented to gain legitimacy in rural areas? 
 
In order to answer these questions it is important to understand the specific context where the 
claims of cultural rights were introduced. In the subsequent part of this chapter, I am going to 
present the cultural mixture of the population and the historical background of the present 
political situation. In the process of accommodating difference in South Africa the legacy of 
the past was always omnipresent. Centuries of colonisation and decades of Apartheid have 
made the questions of cultural difference extremely sensitive. South Africa is a multicultural 
society, but in some regards one might argue that the vast cultural cleavages that seems to 
exist today are to a large extent constructed by earlier segregation policies. These legacies 
have two significant effects on the contemporary situation. First, it says something about 
people’s sentiments toward policies aimed at accommodating different cultures, and further 
something about the political preferences in the transition. Secondly, it says something about 
the political, cultural, legal and economic institutions already operating in society. Political 
change cannot be separated from the existing social, cultural and economic institutions of a 
society. For instance, the ability to deliver political actions to implement new policies in the 
aftermath of a transition is always influenced by the functioning institutions of the society.  
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1.3 Legacies of the past 
 
“It will not help us if we pretend that the past does not continue to define the present, 
because it does. I think a recognition of that would enable us to deal with racism 
properly”.     
        Thabo Mbeki5
 
In Cape Town until the mid 1990s: Close to the parliament of South Africa, two main 
historical museums are situated. The first one is the Museum of Cultural History, the latter the 
Museum of Natural History. In the Museum of Cultural History you can follow the South-
African history from the first Dutch settled at the Cape, until the late eighties urban life of 
Cape Town. Only the cultural histories of white population are presented, together with the 
ancient cultures of Greece and China. In the latter Museum of Natural History South Africa’s 
different “native tribes” are presented together with an impressive collection of the South 
African wild life. In neither of the museums is the urban history or life of African people 
presented, neither any signs of a modernised rural life.  
 
In Cape Town in the late 1990s: The Museum of Cultural History has recently been expanded 
with the sections of the history of the museum building and the History of District Six. The 
first uncovers the buildings history of enslavement and forced prostitution of Africans. The 
latter the history of forced movement and total levelling of a district with a mixed population 
in the city centre of Cape Town. A mixture looked upon as unsuitable by the Apartheid 
government, and forced to move from the city centre to the outskirts and townships 
surrounding the city. Since no people of African, Coloured, Indian or Muslim origin were 
allowed to live in the urban city centres. The exhibitions in the Museum of Natural History 
are kept as an illuminating example of the apartheid policy, with only a few signs to remind 
us of how one viewed difference in the past. 
 
1.3.1 A cultural mixture 
 
Most people living in South Africa regard themselves as primarily South Africans, with a 
South African identity.6 Being South African means that you have another identity than if you 
                                                 
5 Extract from a debate in Parliament on racism in The Mail & Guardian the 2. Of October 2000. 
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were a citizen of a neighboring state. It is also different from being Dutch or British. No 
matter what your origin is, you are a South African, and a part of the “rainbow nation”7, no 
matter how you view your own, or other citizen’s cultures, traditions and colors. But this does 
not mean that the mixture of cultures, traditions and colors are viewed as unproblematic. 
South Africa is the beloved country,8 but it is not a country with a history of recognition, 
accommodation and respect for difference.  
 
Normally one divides the South African population into four different groups according to 
ethnicity. These are also the four main racial categories recognized by the South African 
governments of the twentieth-century. As pointed out later, this is a simplistic stratification, 
and does not give a thorough presentation of the South African heterogeneous society. The 
first group is the Africans. This is the indigenous South African population that inhabited 
South African soil before the European settlements. The Africans are again divided into 
several language groups and cultures, which consists of the Xhosa, Zulu, Pedi, Ndebele, 
North Sotho, South Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana and the Venda people. In a census done in 
1996 by Statistics South Africa more than three quarters, 77%, of the total South African 
population of 40.58 million people, nearly 31 million people classified themselves as 
African.9
 
The second group is considered to be the population of European origin. The first group to 
settle in what is now known as South Africa, was of Dutch origin, and founded the Cape 
Colony in 1652. They soon started to view themselves as Afrikaans, and created their own 
language based on the Dutch language. They where also called the “Boers” by the English 
speaking population. The British colonists occupied the Cape peninsula in 1795 to prevent it 
from falling into the hands of the French. They later founded other ports, but the majority of 
settlements were in the Natal Province. 11% of the total population classify themselves as 
white, who in number are 4.3 million citizens.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
6  For a discussion on South African identities, see Maharaj, Gitanjali (ed.) Between Unity and Diversity – Essays 
on Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Cape Town: Idasa, David Philips Publishers, 1999: 3-72. 
7 The word “Rainbow nation” and even “Rainbowism” has been frequently used as a metaphor for the South 
African plural society in the process of nation building in the aftermaths of the Apartheid regime. See ibid:3-7.   
8 Cry, My Beloved Country by Allan Paton is one of South Africa’s most known literary novels. 
9 Statistics South Africa, Population Census ’96. New Statistics from Census 2001 are in progress. The results 
are to be published in 2003. 
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The third group is the Cape Coloured. The biological and cultural differences among the 
Coloured are immense. Many have Khoikhoi ancestors, the people that lived in the Cape 
Peninsula before the Dutch settlement. Others descend from people who were imported as 
slaves in the late seventeenth century. Only a few imported slaves were Africans, and then 
mostly from Mozambique. The rest were imported from other Dutch and British colonies like 
Indonesia, Ceylon and India. The Coloured also consist of a mixture between these groups 
and Dutch settlers. They are estimated to be 3.6 million citizens, and are counted as 9 % of the 
total population.  
 
The last group is the population of Indian and Asian origin. In the 1860s some white 
landowners started to produce sugar, and they could not attract sufficient African laborers to 
do the labor demanded. The Natal and the Indian governments made certain agreements, and 
Indians began to arrive in Natal in 1860s on a five-year labor contract. Most of them stayed in 
Natal after the contracts ran out. The Indian/Asian population group is the smallest at 3%, 
slightly more than 1 million citizens classify themselves as belonging to this group. 
 
Even though these groups are considered as the main categories of people, there are also a 
quite extensive number of Jews, of Chinese, of immigrants from other African countries like 
Nigeria, Namibia, Zimbabwe etc., and people that descend from German, Scandinavian, 
North American, Greek etc. ancestors.    
 
1.3.2 Parliamentary supremacy 
 
Until the South African 1993 interim constitution the political system was highly influenced 
by the principle of the supremacy of the Parliament. The system was influenced by 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which contained statements like “if the 
legislature positively enacts a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power in 
the ordinary forms of the constitution, which is vested with the authority to control it”10. The 
philosophy further states that the Parliament can “do everything that is not naturally 
impossible,” and that its power is “absolute and without control”.11  
 
                                                 
10 In Dugard, John, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1978:16.  
11 Ibid: 16 
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This tradition was introduced when The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 with 
the fusion of the four different colonies, Transvaal, Natal, Orange Free State and the Cape 
Colony. At the time when the idea of the union of the four British colonies in South Africa 
came to be mooted, there were several constitutional traditions upon which to draw in the 
drafting of a new constitution. First, there was the Orange Free State’s experiment with a rigid 
American-type constitution, with guaranteed rights, although largely for the population of 
European heritage. Second, there was the Transvaal history of the rejection of a rigid 
constitution in favor of Volksraad supremacy, coupled with firm adherence to the principle of 
racial inequality. Third, there was the Natal experience of British parliamentary institutions 
and racial superiority, with the Rule of Law confined largely to the white population. Fourth, 
there was the Cape liberal tradition premised on a flexible constitution, the Rule of Law for 
all, and a colorblind, but not income blind, franchise.12    
 
The liberal aspect of the Cape tradition has been severely disputed, and the rights of the 
Coloured and African population in the colony are regarded as quite ambiguous. In 1853 the 
British government provided the Cape Colony with bicameral parliament empowered to 
legislate on domestic matters subject to a British veto, while the executive branch continued 
to be filled with officials responsible to London. The parliamentary franchise was open to any 
male adult inhabitant, irrespective of race or ethnicity, who occupied property valued at £25 
or who earned either a salary of £50 or a salary of £25 if board and lodging were provided. In 
principle this constitution had been a victory for the liberal point of view, especially since the 
principle of non-racialism was incorporated. In practice, however, the white population 
always dominated Cape politics. The other groups were always handicapped by poverty and 
by white control of the press and of the machinery to register voters and conduct elections. 
Non-whites never amounted to more than 15 percent of the colonial electorate and never 
produced a member of the colonial parliament. 
 
Even though some of the Cape delegates in 1910 spoke for a liberal constitution, the final 
draft of the Constitution for the Union of South Africa became the British-Kruger notion of 
parliamentary supremacy, subject to the rights reserved to the Imperial Parliament of 
Westminster. No attention was paid to the need for a bill of rights to protect the freedoms of 
the vast non-franchised, non-white population from the whims of an all-white legislative. This 
                                                 
12 Ibid: 25. 
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also meant that the South African courts should have no power of judicial review. The four 
colonies became provinces of the union, but the central government was legally supreme over 
all local institutions. Powers were divided within the center. As in Great Britain, the executive 
was responsible to a majority in the lower house of parliament, named the House of 
Assembly, the Senate, the upper house, was indirectly elected and weaker in several respects. 
With two exceptions, simple majorities in both houses of parliament could enact laws 
amending the constitutions in the same way as other laws. The judiciary thus had scarcely any 
scope for testing the validity of acts of parliament. The system of winner take all, devoid of 
checks on the legal competence of a majority party, was to have devastating consequences 
especially for the non-white population of the union.13    
 
The two exceptions later became a subject of a bitter constitutional dispute. The first 
exception was the protection of the franchise laws in the Cape Province. Some of the Cape 
delegates, who had black as well as white constituents, proposed a uniform franchise on the 
Cape colonial model, but the other three delegations remained adamantly opposed to that 
proposal. The outcome was a compromise. Membership in parliament was confined to white 
men, but the franchise laws of the earlier colonies remained in force in each of the new 
provinces. To protect the rights of the Africans in the Cape Province, any bill altering those 
laws would require the support of two-thirds of both houses of parliament in a joint sitting. 
The other exception, which also caused high discrepancies, was Section 137 in the 
constitution, which guaranteed the equal status of English and Afrikaners. To alter this section 
also needed a two-thirds majority vote of both Houses of Parliament in joint meeting.  
 
In following the British Example, the South African constitutional drafters ignored the 
flexible character of the British Constitution, with its respect for constitutional conventions, 
political compromises and its willingness to meet the needs of the comparatively homogenous 
British people. The essence of the South African problem was an extreme heterogeneity, and 
the colour consciousness of most whites and the national exclusiveness of most Afrikaners 
were potent enough to override any feelings for conventions, for compromise, and for the 
liberties of others. Since a flexible Constitution provides no legal safeguards against arbitrary 
government, it was the very worst prescription for the South African multicultural society.14  
 
                                                 
13 Thompson, Leonard A history of South Africa, New Haven: Yale University Press, Revised Edition, 1995:150. 
14 Thompson, Leonard, The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960:174 –75. 
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Pass laws, expropriation of land, non-franchise, withdrawal of rights to business ownership 
and forced movements have been a part of South African multicultural policy since the time 
of the first settlement. The Constitution of 1910 made it possible for the majority in 
parliament to pass the legislation of its desire. When D.F Malan and his National Party 
became the majority party, elected by the Afrikaner population, and formed government in 
1948, the parliamentary supremacy made the politics of apartheid both possible and legal. 
Due to this, the racial history of South African segregation and discrimination was not merely 
socially condoned, but legally endorsed in a carefully constructed legal order premised on 
racial separation. The argument of the Apartheid Government was that it was simply a policy 
of constructive differentiation - “differentiation without inferiority” - rather than 
discrimination.  
 
1.3.3 Indirect rule  
 
White Supremacy must nevertheless be distinguished from the politics of segregation. There 
is of course disagreement about how and why the politics of segregation emerged, but a key 
problem was how the colonial powers were to answer the “Native Question”. In the beginning 
the process of developing a system of cultural cohabitation had a character of muddling 
through. The problem solving seemed like instant actions to the concrete problems that 
emerged. Only later after the South African war and the unification of the four provinces, 
there seemed to emerge a concrete ideology and an overarching plan of segregation.15 A plan 
that later has been characterized as a system of indirect rule. 
 
In the beginning of the nineteenth century it became clear that the colonial powers needed to 
have a political strategy towards the African people and their institutions and traditions. The 
British occupation of the Cape Colony in 1806 was the first sign of a distinct policy towards 
customary law and other African institutions in South Africa. Britain confirmed the system of 
Roman-Dutch law already operating in the colony as general law, since it was deemed to be a 
suitably “civilized” system, but as the application of indigenous law would have subjected a 
portion of the population to an inferior brand of justice, customary law had no official 
recognition. In one way this strategy was quite liberal, since it was supposed to view everyone 
as equal, and thus, subject to the same law. Though it is important to comment that it was not 
                                                 
15 Worden, Nigel, The Making of Modern South Africa, third edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000:82. 
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a tolerant law that recognised diverging beliefs and way of life, since customary law had no 
official recognition.16    
 
After the conquest of the Zulus in Natal in 1843, the British government changed their 
policies towards African culture and traditions. In Natal the white population was surrounded 
by a vast and increasing numbers of Africans. By 1870, the African population of the colony 
was estimated to be fifteen times as numerous as the white population. The Natal colonial 
government tried because of this to place the Africans in reserves, which they called 
locations, leaving the rest of the colony available for white settlement. A method for 
controlling the African population became a system of indirect rule, a system that later 
became applied in colonial tropical Africa. The key in this Shepstone system was the use of 
African chiefs as subordinate officials, made responsible in the last resort not to their own 
people but to the colonial government. The Natal province also imposed a dual legal system. 
Customary African law, codified by the Natal government, prevailed among the Africans. The 
colonial Roman Dutch law, taken over from the Cape Colony, applied by whites and in 
relations between Africans and Whites.17  
 
The same manner of reasoning influenced the politics towards the African population when 
the liberal Cape Colony annexed Transkeian territories. The cost of imposing alien law would 
have been high in terms of preserving the tranquillity of a potentially hostile population. 
Imposing Roman-Dutch law on the entire population would have caused tremendous practical 
problems in this area, and the Cape government, like the colonial powers in Natal, was forced 
to rethink its approach. The Transkei was geographically remote, its people had not been 
subjugated nor had they been demoralized by white rule. Furthermore, in this area settler 
immigration was restricted. While all these factors favoured applying customary law, the 
colonial conscience balked at unqualified recognition of customary law. Hence the annexation 
proclamations gave the courts authority to apply customary law only if it was compatible with 
“the general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world”.18  This 
repugnancy clause is still debated in recent politics, but nowadays the terminology has been 
changed to “compatibility with the universal Human Rights”.    
 
                                                 
16 Discussion Paper 76:5. 
17 Thompson, 1995:98. 
18 South African Law Commission “The Harmonisation of the common Law and the Indigenous Law: Conflicts 
of Law” Discussion Paper 76, Project 90, Pretoria, 1998. 
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In the drafting of the new unified constitution of 1910 one needed to develop one cohesive 
strategy towards the African population, and the question was whether to abolish African 
customary law, or to recognise it with a repugnancy act entrenched. By 1910 all different 
politics and views toward cultural diversity had caused an unintended multiple legal system 
with excessive difference between the old provinces. The most influential notion of the 
African population had been a liberal view combined with the idea of assimilation. The 
colonial powers had regarded Western law as a birthright in much the same way as Roman 
law had been the right of a Roman citizen wherever he happened to be in the Empire. Western 
law could not, however, be imposed wholesale on the local population, since it was 
considered to be far too complex and sophisticated to be understood by Africans.19 It was 
however important to make the exemption that Africans who were considered to be suitably 
“detribalised” could apply to be subjected to the common law.20 Colonial secretary Lord 
Milner uses these words when he argues for a separation of people of European origin and the 
Africans,  
 
“On the one hand the policy [segregation] does not impose any restriction on one race which is not 
applicable to the other. A European is as strictly prohibited from living in the native reservation, as a 
native is from living in the European Quarter. On the other hand, since this feeling exists, it should in 
my opinion be made abundantly clear that what is aimed at is a segregation of social standards, and not 
a segregation of races. The Indian or the African gentleman who adopts the higher standard of 
civilization and desires to partake in such immunity from infection as segregation may convey, should 
be as free and welcome to live in the civilized reservation as the European, provided of course, that he 
does not bring with him a concourse of followers. The native peasant often shares his hut with his goat, 
or sheep, or fowls. He loves to drum and dance at night, which deprives the European of sleep. He is 
sceptical of mosquito theories. “God made the mosquito larvae,” said a Moslem delegation to me, “for 
God’s sake let the larvae live.” For these people, sanitary rules are necessary but hateful. They have no 
desire to abolish segregation.”21  
 
This quotation illuminates how people who regarded themselves as liberal viewed the 
accommodation and recognition of difference. Difference in social standard caused by 
different levels of civilisation should be segregated, but if people from uncivilised cultures 
adopted the European beliefs, customs and behaviour, they should be regarded as equal 
regardless of “racial” origin. In other words, liberalism was premised on white superiority, but 
                                                 
19 Bennett, T. W, The Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa, Cape Town: JUTA & Co, Ltd, 1985:5. 
20 Discussion Paper 76:7. 
21 Perham, Margery, Colonial Sequence, 1930 to 1949, London: Methuen, 1967: 65.   
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it acknowledged the possibility that a small number of Africans could be admitted to the circle 
of civilized. Other “uncivilized” people would be much more at ease in their own uncivilised, 
cultural surrounding. Legal assimilation was seen as a desirable goal on a distant horizon, an 
objective that would one day replace indigenous institutions.22  
 
However, in 1910 when the new republic’s constitution was to be signed, another notion of 
segregation started to emerge. This idea has been called protectionist segregation, and it 
started to get substantial support from a variety of different angles. Anthropologists acted as 
advisors for the government’s politics since they strongly supported segregation politics on 
the grounds that they protected Africans from detribalisation. Protectionist segregation was 
theoretically supposed to reject notions of the African as essentially inferior and also to 
discard the assimilation approach that destroyed the basis of the African systems.23 
Nevertheless this notion of the African was rather exotic. The anthropological studies 
developed in South Africa, and in other parts of the world, presented the image of a cohesive 
and unchanging African rural culture.24 The essentialists viewed the African people as 
belonging to a static culture, almost outside of history. They had an imagination of Africans 
as living in unchanging societies, in which the present was the way things had always been, 
and in which the past defined the future.25  This segregationist discourse provided an insincere 
celebration of cultural differences and a future of continuing, and appropriate, legal 
segregation. Africans would realize themselves through perpetual otherness, not eventual 
sameness.   
 
The differences and distance between the state’s regulatory order, and the way people actually 
do things, are a part of every society. And especially in the South African context, a great gap 
developed between the idea of the African as belonging to a tribe and the reality of Africans 
living in an industrializing society. The policy, though, was a Janus faced endeavour. On the 
one hand the new policy was to foster an indigenous native culture or system of cultures,26 on 
the other hand, the policy was implemented to avert a growing threat to white hegemony. 
Africans now formed a sizable urban proletariat and had developed independent political and 
labour associations. The government thus began to revive traditional institutions in the hope 
                                                 
22 Chanock, Martin, “Law, State and Culture: Thinking About Customary Law After Apartheid”, South Africa: 
Acta Juridica, 1991:53. 
23 Ibid:88. 
24 Worden 2000:88. 
25 Chanock 1991:53. 
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that the energies of an increasingly competitive class of people would be deflected towards a 
“tribal culture”. In 1913 the Natives Land Act laid down a territorial framework for 
segregation. Africans were thereafter prohibited from buying or leasing land outside certain 
areas. This act has been known as the first pillar of Apartheid, and drew a clear division 
between rural reserves and the white-owned urban areas and farmlands. 
 
Not until the commencement of the Black Administration Act 38 in 1927 did the government 
of the new republic pass any specific provision for the recognition and application of 
customary law and traditional institutions. This Act was introduced as an attempt to establish 
a national system for inter alia recognition and application of customary law and the creation 
of a separate court structure.27 The Act gave the Traditional Courts a formal status, and they 
were given authority over both private and criminal jurisdiction. However, the customary 
courts were limited by different provisos that functioned as control mechanisms. For instance, 
a general reservation in favour of public policy and natural justice, the repugnancy proviso, 
was inherited form the colonial period.  It is also important to mention that women were 
excluded from any positions of authority in the customary court structures. Women were 
regarded as minors under the guardian of a father or husband and hence were not to represent 
the court nor even represent themselves in court. The court structure and rules for recognising 
and applying customary law, which was settled in Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, 
lasted until the 1980s. Only when the Law of Evidence Amendment Act was passed in 1988, 
a series of reforms were initiated.28 But still, the customary law was subjected to some 
important provisos, which, as I later will debate further, even exist today.   
 
In this new institutional structure traditional leaders came to play the role of the development 
facilitator, the executive and the judiciary in African communities. Traditional leaders also 
became responsible for claiming taxes from Africans under their control, and at the same time 
they became subject to a more codified single system of “Native Law”. The customary law 
was then supposed to be the regulation of non-market relations, in land law, in personal, 
family law and in community affaires. A problematic feature of segregation, however, was the 
urban claim for labour. This feature resulted in the idea that it was only when the whole 
family migrated from the tribal home, and out of the “tribal” jurisdiction, that the traditional 
system would fall into decay. Because of this it was the migration of the native family, of the 
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females and children, to the farms and the towns that should be prevented. This turned the 
male African population into semi-migrant workers, living in male compounds it the 
townships, but belonging to their rural community, later labelled, the homelands.  
 
Although the government’s ostensible purpose was to rejuvenate African tradition, its actual 
intention was to establish a segregated system of justice to match segregation in land and 
society. British colonial practice came to be the mode of domination over a “free” peasantry. 
Indirect rule signified a rural tribal authority. It was about incorporating natives into a state-
enforced customary order, and a system where the urban power spoke the language of civil 
society and civil rights, the rural power, the language of community and culture.29  The 1927 
Act marked a rejection of the notion of political assimilation of Africans into the Union. It 
clearly backed the Natal principles of bolstering “traditional” authorities in the reserves under 
the “Supreme Chief”. In 1936 the Representation of Natives Act was passed, removing the 
Cape franchise. Segregation of African administration and political power was now 
complete.30   
 
1.3.4 The Apartheid rule  
 
As described earlier the policies of former governments and rulers had developved a legacy of 
discriminating institutions and laws prior to the Apartheid Era. So was Apartheid simply 
segregation by another name? One can argue that this was essentially so, but the Apartheid 
ideology developed the idea further. Apartheid introduced a more ruthless system of labour 
control,31 more thorough laws on the immorality of mixed marriage and sexual relations, and 
a system of separate freedoms where the rights to movement was especially restricted.32 The 
latter developed into a system of homelands and regulation of urban African residence into 
townships. One of the greatest causes of racial humiliation in South Africa and maybe one of 
the most symbolic description of the policy, was simply the sign, “Slegs Blankes”, or in 
English, “Whites Only”. These signs were justified by the policy of separate facility, which 
were supposed to provide separate facilities for different racial groups. Separate but equal. 
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30 Worden, 2000:85.  
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The separate but equal ideology was based on the idea of separate development, but the 
ideology has been understood as merely propaganda more than a sincere interest for the 
protection of authentic cultures in an industrialising world. The term Apartheid, which is the 
Afrikaans word for apartness, soon developed from a political slogan into a drastic, systematic 
program of social engineering. From now on the new government applied Apartheid in a 
plethora of laws and executive actions. Thompson33 has pointed out that Apartheid policies 
were based on four different ideas. First, the government had an idea that the population of 
South Africa compromised four “racial groups” – White, Coloured, Indian and African- each 
with its own inherited culture. Second, Whites, as the civilized race, were entitled to have 
absolute control over the state. Third, white interests should prevail over black interests. The 
state was not anymore obliged to provide equal facilities for the subordinate “races”. Fourth, 
the white racial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans and English-speaking 
components, while Africans belonged to several distinct nations or potential nations. This 
formula made the white population the largest in the country.        
 
The idea of different nations became the fundament in the Grand Design of separate 
development, more known as the foundation of the Homelands. The Grand Design of separate 
development was supposed to end in the creation of separate independent nation states for the 
various ethnic groups in South Africa. They were intended to eliminate the racial friction and 
discrimination by allowing each ethnic group the right to self-determination within its own 
territory. In 1951, the government abolished the only official countrywide African institution, 
the Natives Representative Council. Then it grouped the reserves into eight, eventually ten, 
territories. Each such territory became a “homeland” for a potential African “nation”, 
administered under white tutelage by a set of “Bantu” authorities, consisting mainly of 
hereditary chiefs. In its homeland, an African “nation” was to “develop along its own lines,” 
with all the rights that were denied it in the rest of the country.  
 
The first self-governed district became Transkei, and the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 
1963 constituted it as a self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa. In these 
self-governed areas citizens had dual citizenship, with black people being designated as 
citizens of these national states while retaining their South African citizenship.  Self-
governing areas were given the own flag, anthem and official language. In 1976 Transkei was 
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declared independent by the South African government, followed by Bophuthatswana in 
1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 198134. With this declaration of independence blacks who 
became citizens in these new states lost their South African citizenship. Citizenship of 
Transkei, for instance, depended on the ethnic origin and not necessarily upon residence, 
domicile or the choice of the individual concerned. Many Transkeians living in urban areas in 
South Africa, who were born there and had lived there all their lives, lost their South African 
citizenship in this way.35      
 
Most of the self-governing territories were direct legacies of the haphazard system of 
reserving certain lands for African use during the final stages of white settlement. Nearly 
every Homeland consisted of several pieces of land, separated by white-owned farms. 
Bophuthatswana had nineteen fragments, some hundred miles apart. KwaZulu compromised 
twenty-nine major and forty-one minor fragments. For an illustration of these fragmented 
homeland areas see the map in figure 1.1. The names of the homelands established by the 
Apartheid government are Transkei (Xhosa), Ciskei (Xhosa), KwaZulu (Zulu), 
Bophuthatswans (Tswana), Lebowa (Pedi/North Ndebele), Venda (Venda), Gazankulu 
(Shangaan/Tsonga), Basotho Qwa Qwa (Sotho), Kangwane (Swazi) and KwaNdebele 
(Ndebele). It was also forbidden for white capitalists to directly invest in Homelands, and the 
governments of the Homelands depended on subsidies from Pretoria. As a consequence of 
this policy the Homelands could provide full subsistence to a smaller and smaller proportion 
of the African people. Consequently, the economic incentives for Africans to leave the 
Homelands in favour of the great industrial complex around the largest cities grew more 
powerful than ever. 
 
At the same time the government tried to herd nearly all Africans into the Homelands, except 
those whom white employers needed as labourers. The Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development stated in 1967 that the “Bantus” were only temporarily resident in the 
European areas as long as they offered their labour there. As soon as they no longer were fit 
for work or superfluous in the labour marked, they were expected to return to their country of 
origin. All non-whites needed passes with a special permit to stay in the urban centres. 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Homelands designed by the government  
 
  
 
Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Historical Maps of Africa,  
The University of Texas at Austin, 1986. 
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Hundreds of thousands of Africans had been born and bred in the towns, and nearly as many 
African women as men were living there. Still the government persisted in treating all urban 
Africans as visitors whose real homes were in the Homelands and whose leaders were “tribal” 
traditional chiefs.36 If a person had no real link to any self-governing territory, as for instance 
was the case for thousands of urban Africans, he or she should become a citizen of the 
territorial authority area to which he was attached by birth, domicile or cultural affiliation.37 
Both Africans living in the self-governing territories and those living in the common areas 
were deprived of the rights to vote in the South African parliament, since they had their own 
national or local governments in which they were free to participate.  
 
The government also removed African squatters from unauthorized camps near the cities, 
placing those who were employed in segregated townships, and sending the rest either to the 
homelands or to farms where the white owners required their labour. Under the Group Areas 
Act of 1950 the government divided urban areas into zones where members of one specified 
race alone could live and work. In many cases, areas that had previously been occupied by 
Blacks were zoned for exclusive white occupation.  Some of the most notorious removals 
were Sophiatown, an African area four miles west of Johannesburg centre, and District Six, a 
vibrant Coloured community in the centre of Cape Town. The homes were razed and the 
inhabitants relocated, but still the government claimed that the removals were voluntary. 
Nevertheless, in the urban ghettos, Africans mingled regardless of ethnicity. For example, 
they ignored the government’s attempt to carve up the townships into ethnic divisions. Many 
married across ethnic lines, and members of the younger generations identified themselves as 
Africans rather than Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, Pedi or Tswana.38   
 
1.3.5 The institutional legacy 
 
There are several explanations of why the Apartheid state found itself in a crisis in the 80s. 
Both internal and external events influenced the position of the Apartheid government. 
Internal explanations are for instance that, in quantity the white population was further and 
further outnumbered by the groups of people they ruled. The Africans became steadily more 
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educated and shared growing percentages of the country’s disposable income.39 Apartheid 
was due to its social engineering an extravagance, with its grand designs of segregation, large 
military and security establishments.40 Haunted by internal revolt, foreign boycotts and mass 
demonstrations, the Apartheid government collapsed. The end of the Soviet Union had two 
effects in South Africa. One, it deprived the ANC of its main source of support, and second, 
the NP could not claim to protect South Africa from a communist onslaught.41      
 
It soon became evident that the elements of a future democratic state needed to be negotiated. 
But how were the diverging parts of this plural society to agree upon rules for their further 
democratic coexistence? The South African institutional legacy, which combined the idea of 
parliamentary supremacy and a tradition of indirect rule, had been devastating for the 
multicultural society of South Africa. Parliamentary supremacy gave tremendous power to 
those in government. With no judicial review or Bill of Rights the government could pass 
every law of their own desire, if they had enough forces at their hand. This had paved the way 
for an enormous project of social engineering, based on the idea of protectional segregation.  
 
In a speech at the opening of parliament the 2nd of February 1990, the new president and 
leader of the NP, F. W. de Klerk legalised the ANC and opened for negotiations: “On its part, 
the Government will accord the process of negotiation the highest priority. The aim is a 
totally new and just constitutional dispensation in which every inhabitant will enjoy equal 
rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of endeavor - constitutional, social and 
economic.”42  
 
But which kind of political structure was to be the outcome of this negotiation? How was one 
to view cultural difference in the future? The speech reveals that in the mind of de Klerk and 
the National Party, cultural difference was not something one could simply neglect.  
 
“The formal recognition of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a heterogeneous 
population will simply disappear. Any new constitution which disregards this reality will be 
inappropriate and even harmful. Naturally, the protection of collective, minority and national rights may 
not bring about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither the Government's policy nor its 
                                                 
39 Thompson 1995:242. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid:243.  
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intention that any group -- in whichever way it may be defined -- shall be favoured above or in relation 
to any of the others.”43
 
The future was, however, to be negotiated, which did imply that the ones that were so 
ruthlessly discriminated due to their cultural difference were to have a say in the shaping of 
the future political system. Special policies designed to accommodate cultural groups did 
probably not sound as exotic to the ANC as it does to many western thinkers. How was the 
legacy of centuries of colonisation and decades of Apartheid to mark the future? As 
mentioned in the introduction the African traditional law, authorities and institutions became 
recognised in the new constitution. How and why was this the outcome of the negotiations? 
Was the recognition followed by sufficient political action in order to meet the requirement of 
the constitution? 
 
1.4 The further design of the thesis 
 
In the next chapter I am going to present different theoretical contributors to the debate on 
how it is possible to secure both the right to be equal, and the right to be recognised for who 
you are in a liberal democracy. In the last decades several attempts have been made that 
confronts the old two dichotomies of universalism and particularism, and I am in the next 
chapter going to present some of the main thinkers in this debate on multiculturalism. Which 
suggestions do the different theories put forward in order to make difference compatible with 
the right to equality?  
 
In the subsequent chapter, Chapter 3, I am going to present my methodological approach. In 
this chapter I will present the data material used in my analysis of why the role and the 
functions of traditional and customary law became recognised in the South African 
Constitution of 1996, and to what extent this recognition resulted in a political will to fulfil 
these constitutional obligations. The key topics introduced are: why did I decide to apply a 
single case approach and which sources of evidence have been analysed? 
 
Chapter four is an empirical analysis aimed at trying to explain why traditional leaders found 
themselves in a relatively strong position in the negotiations towards the drafting of the 
interim constitution? Secondly, I will address the question of why the traditional leaders’ 
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influence on the process diminished from the drafting of the interim constitution to the 
signing of the final constitution of 1996?   
 
Chapter five analyses whether the conditioned recognition given to traditional authorities was 
followed by political action aimed at both reforming these institutions and clarifying their 
specific position in the democratic future? Which political and judicial powers were the 
traditional authorities to possess? Was there any political will to clarify the traditional leaders 
functions and roles through official statements? Which legislations were initiated? And what 
influenced this process?   
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2. Theoretical approach:  Liberalism and cultural recognition 
 
The scope of this part of the analysis is to present disparate advocates of the accommodation 
of difference inside the liberal democratic discipline. The idea is to put forward different 
theoretical solutions and strategies to the question of difference in a liberal democracy, in 
order to be able to analyse these attempts empirically later. The questions I will seek to 
answer are: Which suggestions do the different theories put forward in order to make 
difference compatible with the right to equality? How are these theories able to secure both 
the right to be equal, and the right to actually be recognised for who you are through the 
protection of cultures and different ways of life?  
 
In order to increase the capacity of liberal democracies to accommodate different cultures, 
there have been attempts to go in-between the old dichotomies of universalism and 
particularism in normative political theory, and find solutions that in theoretical terms are able 
to make the two different principles compatible. The question raised is which kinds of cultural 
recognitions a liberal democracy can accommodate without jeopardising its own foundation. 
Several groups have in the last decades claimed the right to self-government and special 
treatment because their culture is different from the majority population. But what is at stake 
by giving into these claims? In philosophical terms liberalism and its ideas of universalism, 
have always stressed that all human beings should be treated as equal because of their 
capacity of simply being. Due to this, the state should always treat its citizens with neutrality 
and impartiality. Are cultural recognition and the liberal ideal of equality compatible? Is it 
possible for the liberal tradition to respect people because they are, without also recognising 
who they are? 
 
A concern that occupies many liberal thinkers is if we do acknowledge the right to certain 
cultural protections, how can we at the same time assure that some autonomous individuals 
are not being sacrificed in the name of cultural survival? Others have argued that if liberal 
democracy is not able to accommodate difference, universalism reduces itself to a dominant 
hegemonic idea of civilisation, unable to recognise human beings for their different beliefs, 
ways of life or diverging ideas of the good. This has raised the question of whether or not the 
right to be treated as an equal because of your mere existence is incongruent with the right to 
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be protected for who you are. But is this conflict inescapably unsolvable? Are the rights of the 
autonomous individual and the right to cultural survival necessarily incompatible?     
 
The concessions made to accommodate difference, are however, quite variable in extent, and 
in my further theoretical analysis I am going to present some of the major liberal thinkers in 
this field as well as some of their critics. First, I will concentrate on two thinkers, both of 
which stress that new answers need to be anchored in the liberal tradition of state neutrality 
and the individuals right to equality, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Rawls argue that 
cultural rights should always be subject to constitutional principles, such as basic human 
rights and political rights. Habermas argues that if one are to recognise cultural practices, one 
need a thorough deliberation process where all parts are consulted and do have their 
opportunity to voice. Subsequently, I am going to present two thinkers who argue that one in 
some cases might provide certain groups differential treatment in order to protect certain 
cultures. The former, Will Kymlicka, highlights that these group rights needs to be neutral, 
while the latter, Charles Taylor, argues that neutrality not necessarily needs to be a 
presupposition for liberalism.  
 
2.1 The origin of the debate 
 
Even though the discussions of recognising cultural difference within liberalism have been 
thoroughly debated in the last few decades, the conflict between the idea of the autonomous 
individual and the right to cultural survival have been debated for centuries. Both Rawls and 
Taylor make use of Kant’s and Herders work when they argue for the best way to organise 
society in order to make it just and legitimate for different citizens. The Enlightenment 
philosophers have been highly influential in the development of modern liberal thought, but 
its limitation in acknowledge the significance of particularity and diversity has been criticised 
since the onset of Romanticism.  
 
2.1.1 The origin of the autonomous subject 
 
The traditional liberal effort to accommodate difference is inevitably anchored in the right of 
the autonomous individual. The liberal idea is that in order to treat all human beings as equal, 
the states should not favour certain beliefs, cultures or religions. Citizens will regard the state 
as legitimate, because everyone knows that they have the same opportunities as everyone else 
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no matter what they believe in. But who is the autonomous individual? To answer this it is 
useful to start with the Enlightenment. One of the most influential thoughts of Enlightenment 
philosophy was an emphasis on the use of reason to critically examine all issues, including the 
conception of human nature. Immanuel Kant was one of the philosophers who were 
preoccupied with reason, and argued that all men are equally endowed with the capacity to 
reason, and that this capacity is identical in all men. It is this capacity, rather than the results 
of exercising it, that is the most fundamental to the dignity and worth of human beings.44  
 
Even though early liberalism did not necessarily view all humans as autonomous individuals, 
Kant emphasised that one needed a universal law that treated all humans as equal. So how 
was one to agree upon such a universal law? Kant answered that to agree upon a moral law 
the autonomous individuals needed to use their will and follow practical reason. If the 
individuals used practical reason they would understand that in order to make stable and fair 
societies the citizens needed to behave and live by rules which all would agree upon as 
universal.45 Only such a law of practical reason, which Kant call the categorical imperative, is 
able to provide a universal standard of morality that can be recognised by all humans. In 
consequence all humans need to distance or transcend their particular allegiances, such as to 
be able to participate in an ideal, unconditioned society completely independent of the citizens 
social and psychological inclinations.46 In other words, all citizens ought to leave their 
differences in beliefs, conceptions of the good and ways of life behind, in order to 
acknowledge the universal law that is reached by deducing what is the best for all. Something 
viewed as divergent from rules and laws based upon what is the best for some of the citizens’ 
particular interests.  
 
So what is the political implication for liberal democracy? As the subject is prior to its ends, 
so the right is prior to the good. Society is best arranged when it is governed by principles that 
do not presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement would fail 
to respect persons as being capable of choice.47 In other words, a liberal society must remain 
neutral on the good life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, different 
citizens ought to deal fairly with each other and the state ought to deal equally with all. 
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Because human dignity consists largely of autonomy, and each person is able to determine 
their own view of the good life.48  It has thus been normal in the liberal tradition to view the 
state as a contract between undifferentiated individuals where no account is taken of the 
customs, tradition and institutions, which may constitute a particular people prior to the social 
contract. The state is a voluntary association between individuals, and can only claim to be 
legitimate if it has the consent of the governed.49 But as pointed out earlier, is this benign state 
neutrality based upon the idea of universal rights for all citizens a sufficient criterion to 
accommodate the rich diversity in most democratic countries?  
 
2.1.2 The Romantic quest for cultural survival 
 
Kant and other philosophers of the Enlightenment were heavily criticised by contemporary 
thinkers, especially those regarded as the Romantics. This movement aimed at highlighting 
the value and pervasiveness of diversity, rather than view diversity as equivalent to human’s 
particular self-interests. Herder was one of the most important of the Romantic philosophers, 
and to understand why he viewed cultural survival as vital, it is important to understand his 
conception of two different levels of originality.50 The first level is the person among other 
persons. Each person has his or her original way of being human. There is a certain way of 
being human, that is my way. If I am not being true to myself, I miss what being human is for 
me. Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I 
can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my 
own. It is this idea that has been the background for contemporary understanding of 
authenticity, and the goals of self-fulfilment and self-realization.  
 
To look at the political implications of this thought one need to look at Herders second level 
of the conception of originality. At this level he applies his concept of originality to the 
culture-bearing people among other peoples. Just like individuals, a Volk should be true to 
itself, which is to be true to its own culture. Germans shouldn’t try to be derivative and 
second-rate Frenchmen, and European colonialism should be rolled back to give the peoples 
of these territories their chance to be themselves unimpeded.51 By this he attacked the 
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universalism by stressing the unique character and value of diverse and incommensurable 
cultures. In demanding that we abandon the natural bonds of language, history, habit and 
tradition, which bind us to a specific culture and community, the individualists asks us to shed 
those characteristics that make us most human. In this way Herder asks if it is possible to fully 
value all human beings if we do not also recognise who they are, and since culture is 
important for all humans’ self understanding, it is vital that we protect the opportunity for 
different cultures to survive. If not, one actually argues that some cultures are more 
meaningful than others.  
 
This last argument was also something that occupied Nietzsche. His argument was that by 
suggesting that all human beings must obey a universal rule of reason, philosophers such as 
Kant, rather than show humanity the road towards emancipation, merely make man subject to 
yet another “guardian”. The advocates of universal reason fail to recognise the historical 
specificity of their own principles. He argues further that an attempt to construct a universally 
applicable system of rational principles, in practical terms makes liberalism unable to 
appreciate and respond to genuine diversity and deep value conflicts.52 According to 
Nietzsche such value-conflicts are inevitable, and he points out that Kant by drawing a 
distinction between universal reason and the multitude of human desires and life-styles, 
regards reason as essential and real, and the multitude of lifestyles merely contingent and 
apparent. In real life the transcendental self is not prior to the empirical self, and, thus the 
subject cannot abstract itself from its own affections; “thinking is an activity, to every activity 
pertains one who acts, consequently”.53
 
These criticisms of traditional liberalism question the idea of a human being that is able to 
abstract itself from its own particularities in order to see what is the best for all of us. Because 
no matter who you are, culture and conceptions of the good influences your way of thinking, 
and, more important, this should not be regarded as a human deficiency, but simply what it 
means to be human. In the next pages I will present contemporary theoretical perspectives on 
the possibility of making these diverging ideas of diversity compatible.  
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2.2 Contemporary strategies for accommodating diversity 
 
In contemporary political thought the challenges of multiculturalism and democratisation 
have required a debate, which forces the liberal democracy to accommodate diversity to a 
much further extent. But how many compromises is it possible for the liberal school to agree 
upon without stretching the boundaries to far? Should one give some groups cultural rights in 
order to survive or should one always secure the individuals’ autonomy? Different theoretical 
thinkers provide diverse answers to this question, and put forward different strategies on how 
to make these cultural rights and the right to equality compatible in modern constitutions and 
jurisdictions. First, I am going to present strategies anchored in the tradition of the 
unquestionable right to equality, second, I will present some theoreticians who argue that 
liberalism not necessarily presupposes state neutrality, but that the state can legitimately 
promote particular conceptions of the good life, provided it respects the fundamental rights 
and liberties of all citizens, including those who do not share the public definition of the 
good.54 The liberal state is thus not marked by a commitment to cultural neutrality, but by a 
sense of tolerance and respect vis-à-vis the cultures and values of minorities.  
 
 2.3 Neutrality and impartiality 
 
Both Rawls and Habermas have sought to re-emphasise the traditional commitment to 
neutrality and impartiality. For both of them the most important foundation of society is the 
legitimate state created by free, autonomous individuals, and their strategies towards the 
question of recognising difference is somewhat impeded by this. But how do their strategies 
open for recognition of difference? In the next paragraphs I will present their diverging 
answer to this question. Rawls’ project to accommodate difference has been to stress the 
importance of a just society for all, while Habermas has stressed the importance of 
deliberation in society. Both theories are regarded as very distinguished normative theories, 
and have been of major importance in the western debate on the politics of difference. 
Nevertheless, both theories have been challenged by the question of whether their attempt to 
recognise difference is sufficient when it comes to solving disputes and provide protection for 
minorities in culturally divided societies. 
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2.3.1: Rawls - accommodation of difference through justice 
 
To Rawls one of the most central question in this debate is: “How is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly 
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”?55 This denotes that 
Rawls’ occupation with difference is inspired by the urge to settle conflicts in a divided 
cultural society, rather than cherishing difference and protecting cultures from obliteration. In 
order to settle these conflicts, Rawls draws on Kant. Based on his philosophy Rawls 
introduces the idea of the original position, and tries to present a practical solution to the 
potential conflict diversity generates, by adopting the tools of liberal contract theory. With a 
strong commitment to each individual’s right to equality and liberty in mind, he tries to make 
the diverging principles of cultural rights and the right to equality compatible by establishing 
the basic principles of justice in a society and the order between them.    
 
So how does one establish the basic principles of justice in a society? Rawls answer to this is 
that if the constitutional principles and the political institutions in a democracy are the 
outcome of a process of free and fair bargaining, all the different groups and individuals in a 
society will regard the political system as just. Different cultural groups will then be able to 
coexist since they share the vision of the society as just, despite distinctive life-plans and 
conceptions of the good. He reaches this answer through his idea of the veil of ignorance 
presented in A Theory of Justice (1971). The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment that 
puts forward the argument that what would be a just or fair organisation of society is to 
imagine what principles people who were denied knowledge of certain particular facts about 
themselves would agree to.  
 
Principles of justice such as rights and duties, and how to distribute social and economic 
advantages, should emerge as a hypothetical contract arrived at by people ignorant of 
particular aspects of their beliefs and circumstances, the original position. In the initial 
position, people would agree on a contract which protects fairness and equality for all, 
because if people don’t know who they are going to be, then it will make sense for them to 
choose fair or just principles to regulate their society.56 This argument can be characterised as 
Kantian, since the parties in the original position regard themselves as autonomous agents and 
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do not “view themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the 
good that they affirm at any given time”.57   
 
Since the autonomous agents in the original position are deprived of their own particular 
allegiances, but maintain their powers of reason and their capacities of judgement, thought 
and inference, Rawls argues that the parties in the original position would adopt his two 
principles of “justice as fairness”. The first guarantees each citizen an extensive system of 
basic equal liberties; the second is divided into two sets of principles. While the former 
principle ensures equality of opportunity, the latter stipulates that social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so as to benefit the least advantaged.58 In other words any 
rational agent deprived of the knowledge of who he or she is will define a just distribution of 
goods in any social order in terms of the two principles and a rule for allocating priorities 
when the two principles conflict. The first principle has priority over the second; liberty is to 
be restricted only for the sake of liberty.59 These principles were first presented in A Theory of 
Justice. Afterwards he has made a few changes, but the ordering of principles are the same: 
  
(a) Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights 
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this 
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their 
fair value.  
 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First they must be 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity, and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society. 60
 
The political strategy Rawls offers is that governments in a liberal democracy should agree 
upon certain fundamental principles that ought to be entrenched in the constitution. This 
includes the political process’ constitutional structure, such as the legislative, the executive 
and the judicial powers, and specification of the basic individual liberties and rights. In order 
                                                 
57 Rawls , Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, Journal of Philosophies , Vol. 77, NO. 9, 1980:539.   
58 Baumeister, 2000:52. 
59 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ”Justice As Virtue: Changing Conceptions” in Avineri, S. & de- Shalit. A. (eds.), 
Communitarianism and Individualism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992:55. 
60 Rawls, 1993:5-6. 
 37
to avoid conflict he also argues that the governments can agree upon certain social and 
cultural rights provided these do not deprive any individuals of their basic rights. By this I 
understand that the principle of social justice is a moral guidance, which the governments 
themselves are free to decide whether they will support or not. It is a political question, 
similar to other moral questions, and should not necessarily be adopted as a part of the issues 
concerning the basic democratic structure. In this way Rawls argues that social rights such as 
the right to cultural protection does not necessarily need to be entrenched in a just 
constitution. What is most important is to make non-discriminating basic liberal political 
structures which all can agree on, no matter how their beliefs and ways of life diverge.  
 
At the deep end of the ocean, Rawls does not make many concessions to the ones who argue 
that cultural difference ought to be protected politically. Rather he urges diversity to flourish 
in the non-political sphere if the members of the society wish for it. His idea of social justice 
tries to combine formal equality with real equality,61 but still, Rawls stresses that 
considerations of social justice only come into play when the basic constitutional rights are 
fulfilled.62 Only when these are provided to the individuals of the society, is it possible to 
discuss and accommodate differential treatments of the least advantaged. However, in such 
societies deep-seated claims for self-government and cultural protection are not likely to 
develop according to Rawls. In Political Liberalism, he argues, “so long as there is firm 
agreement on the constitutional essentials and established political procedures are reasonably 
regarded as fair, willing political and social cooperation between free and equal citizens can 
be maintained”.63   
   
2.3.2 Rawls’ circular argument 
 
When it comes to securing cultural rights, Rawls is criticised for not securing these at an 
adequate level. Proponents of multiculturalism have accused him for being more concerned 
with how to avoid conflicts between different groups of people rather than with the 
recognition of difference. Chantal Mouffe has argued that Rawls like other proponents of 
liberal pluralism, generally starts by stressing what they call the fact of pluralism and then 
proceed to find procedures to deal with difference, procedures which in the end actually 
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render those differences irrelevant and relegates pluralism to the sphere of the private.64 
Rawls for instance, stresses the importance of gaining support for a political conception of 
justice in a society despite equal citizens’ diverging “reasonable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines”. But as Mouffe asks, what is this if not an indirect form of asserting that 
reasonable persons are those who accept the fundamentals of liberalism?  
 
In other words, the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable helps to draw a frontier 
between those who accept the liberal principles and those who oppose them. To call the anti-
liberals unreasonable is a way of stating that such views cannot be admitted as legitimate 
within the framework of a liberal democratic regime. Rawls subsequently gets caught in a 
circular form of argument: political liberalism can provide a consensus among reasonable 
persons who by definition are persons who accept the principles of political liberalism.65 Can 
one argue that in Rawls’ sense the liberal society is just another conception of a good society?  
 
2.3.3 Habermas – distributive justice 
  
When it comes to the question of recognising difference, Habermas, like Rawls, argues that 
one need an impartial and neutral state. Unlike Rawls, however, he does not believe that it is 
possible to create a legitimate democratic society by abstracting the individual from its 
particularities, and simply move these particularities to a non-political private sphere. In order 
to accomplish understanding between diverging beliefs and conceptions of the good, 
Habermas argues that in multicultural societies one need to use a discourse theoretical 
strategy. In a discourse individuals voluntarily communicate with each other in order to form 
a legal community of free and equal consociates. Drawing on a Kantian perspective, 
Habermas argues that equal protection under the law is not enough to constitute a 
constitutional democracy. The citizens not only need to be equal under the law, they must also 
understand themselves as the authors of what binds them.66 In contrast to the subjects of 
Rawls and Kant, Habermas states that the authors are not transcendental selves in a thought 
experiment, gathered in order to make social contracts. The authors are individuals with 
beliefs and conceptions of the good, who gathers in order to decide which laws that are to be 
in force in their own society.  
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 But on which grounds does Habermas argue that this is a strategy which both secures the 
individual rights and protects cultural difference? His answer is that we need to make a 
distinction between two philosophical phenomenons’, morality and ethical life – Sittlichkeit. 
Moral questions are based upon questions of justice. These questions have priority in 
legislative politics, and concern how a matter can be regulated in the equal interest of all.67 
Consequently, to Habermas, there are some unavoidable and universal presuppositions 
regarding rules of practical discourse in society. The reason for this is that there must be 
certain rules that organise the discourses in society, if the involved participants are to resolve 
normative disputes. These rules of practical discourse are supposed to function as structures 
that ensure discursive equality, freedom and fair play, and they settle the right of every subject 
who share the same competence to speak and act, to take part in discourse. A discourse where 
everyone is allowed to question or introduce any assertion, everyone is allowed to express 
their attitudes, desires and needs, and no one may be prevented by internal or external 
coercion from exercising these rights.68
 
The force of the best argument is then what settles a dispute between equal individuals in a 
fair structure of communication. In order to make sure that the state is neutral and impartial, 
the constitution ought to ensure that the rules of practical discourse are observed and 
institutionalised as legal norms, legal norms that are only legitimate if they safeguard the 
autonomy of all citizens to an equal degree.69 Unless all citizens participate in public debate 
and express their specific needs, there is a real danger that the needs of socially disadvantaged 
groups will be misunderstood, which in turn may undermine the capacity of such groups to 
pursue effectively their own conception of the good.70  
 
In this way Habermas grants all individuals the right to participate in discourses regarding 
their own particular interests. The questions debated in these discourses are questions which 
Habermas refers to as Sittlichkeit, - ethical questions. Ethical questions are questions related 
to the conceptions of the good life. These ethical questions cannot be evaluated from the 
moral point of view of whether something is equally good for anyone, these are questions 
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which modes of behaviour are open to influence by the distinct societies’ political goals.71 
Questions regarding the recognition of difference are thus seen as ethical discourse, as 
opposed to moral practical discourse. These discourses, which are aimed at achieving self-
understanding for members of a special nation or group, are aimed at discussions of which 
traditions they will continue and which regulations they will agree upon regarding the 
treatment of minorities and marginal groups.72  
 
To recognise particularity and difference, one needs to ask if a specific norm is the most 
appropriate one in these circumstances. The impartial application of norms therefore requires 
attention to the particular needs of actual persons and socio-cultural groups. Hence it is 
important that social groups organise themselves politically so as to articulate their 
differences and political needs. Yet such participation and organisation may only be possible 
if groups are granted special cultural and social rights. “For historic reason, in many countries 
the majority culture is fused with general culture that claims to be recognised by all citizens… 
This fusion must be dissolved if it is to be possible for different cultural, ethnic and religious 
forms of life to coexist and interact on equal terms within the same political community.”73 
According to Habermas, battles of recognition arise whenever a state fails in this task. If 
minorities perceive the existing arrangements as discriminatory, they will demand these 
arrangements changed to take into account their interests and needs. 
 
The controversial part of this is that not only questions of the politics of difference are 
regarded as ethical, but also human rights cannot be paternalistically imposed on a sovereign 
legislator. Human rights may be quite justifiable as moral rights, yet the “addressers of law 
would not be able to understand themselves as its authors if the legislators were to discover 
human rights as pregiven moral facts that merely need to be enacted as positive law.”74 
Human rights are thus not to be regarded as prior to popular sovereignty, since they are 
positive laws decided by a political legislature. The human rights as other laws needs to be 
procedurally enacted, because only a democratic process is able to legitimatise them.  
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In this analysis, an important feature of Habermas’ theory is that he sets no limit for what is to 
be regarded as an appropriate topic for public discussion. Unlike Rawls he does not demarcate 
between what should belong to the public as opposed to the private sphere. Hence, what is 
regarded as political questions needs to emerge from an ongoing, actual debate, not 
discovered theoretically. 
  
2.3.4 Discourse ethics as the provider of difference 
 
But is this protection of culture sufficient to solve practical disputes between diverging 
cultures? Gutman argues that Habermas’ cultural rights are individual rights of free 
association and non-discrimination, and as such do not guarantee survival for any culture.75 
This objection is somehow supported by Habermas himself in his response to Charles 
Taylor’s defence of cultural recognition in Multiculturalism.76 In this article he stresses that 
the political project of preserving cultures as if they were endangered species deprives 
cultures of their vitality and individuals of their freedom to revise and even to reject their 
inherited cultural identities, but they guarantee survival to none. Because, according to 
Habermas, cultures survive only if they draw the strength to transform themselves from 
criticism and recession.77
 
This argument shows that Habermas is deeply rooted in the liberal tradition, where culture is 
regarded as something that only is legitimate if the individuals share personal rights. This has 
led opponents to criticise Habermas for being unable to make solutions for deeply divided 
societies, holding that Habermas’ preoccupation with autonomy leads him to equate toleration 
with the liberal principle of individual freedom of conscience. These critics have emphasised 
that all accounts of justice are rooted in the values and judgements of specific cultures and 
that different communities will value different goods. It is thus, as for instance Wranke notes, 
78 impossible to separate justification and application of laws, as Habermas attempts to with 
his demarcation between morality and ethical norms. Wranke argues that if our normative 
judgements are inevitably tainted by our evaluative assessments, it is unlikely that we will 
always be able to resolve our normative differences via the force of the better argument.  
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In a practical discussion it is often difficult to reason about what the best argument is. Since 
what seems to count as the better argument for the most participants always involves values, 
sensibilities, cultural traditions and conceptions of the good. If a society is genuine plural, it is 
almost inevitable that people will frequently disagree about what constitutes the better 
argument. Habermas presents a theory that provides an invitation for the participants to leave 
behind their particular experiences and interests in their search for the common good, but the 
problem is that in this situation the perspectives of the privileged are likely to dominate the 
definition of the common good. Habermas may thus be criticised for not being able to secure 
the right of all individuals to partake in discourses that concerns them. Differences in social 
power often make members of the dominant group able to assert that their experiences and 
perspectives on social events are impartial and objective. This, it is argued, clearly 
marginalizes groups that lack the social power to frame the terms in which the debate is 
conducted.79 Baumeister has stressed that the problem with Habermas’s discourse theory is 
that he fails to recognise the extent to which differences in social power may undermine the 
ability of participants in practical discourses to take part in debate on equal terms.80  
 
2.4 The right to cultural survival 
 
Some proponents of cultural difference argue that in order to provide accommodation of 
difference to minority cultures, it is important to not only grant individual rights, but that in 
some cases group rights are desirable. Group rights are corporate rights, and whereas personal 
cultural rights apply to group members individually, the collective as a whole exercises 
corporate group rights. Given the traditional liberal emphasis on individual rights, many 
liberals view demands for corporate rights with suspicion. Among the theories that defend 
group rights, there are quite immense differences. I am first going to present Kymlicka who 
gives some practical strategies for how it is possible to recognise difference without 
jeopardising the traditional liberal commitment to equality of respect, individual freedom and 
the state neutrality. Secondly, I am going to present Taylor who argues that a liberal state can 
actively pursue particular collective goals and support specific conceptions of the good, as 
long as they respect the fundamental rights.81       
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2.4.1 Kymlicka - citizenship and difference  
 
While both Rawls and Habermas operate on a very abstract normative philosophical level, 
Kymlicka use a more practical approach in his defence of group specific rights for ethnic 
minorities. In Liberalism, Community and Culture he argues that liberals have wrongly 
assumed a homogenous society in their theories. In order to strengthen liberal democracy, 
states need to recognise the differences of their populations, and provide justice between 
different ethno-cultural groups. Societies are not necessarily homogenous, and in order to 
secure freedom of choice for all, it is essential to deliver a fair and just context in which to 
make the choice. This indicates that in order to be free as a person, one must also be able to 
express oneself as a member of a group or a certain culture. According to Kymlicka this is 
often not so in multicultural societies. If a culture is not generally respected then the dignity 
and self-respect of its members will also be threatened. The reason for this is that people do 
not make choices as atomistic individuals, but as a part of a societal culture that is 
institutionally embodied, tends to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared 
language.82 Since the viability of a culture promotes people's self-identity and thus their 
autonomy, he argues that in multinational states, some people's cultural membership can only 
be recognized and protected by endorsing group-differentiated rights within the state.83
 
Kymlicka suggests that there are certain kinds of group differentiated rights which the state 
can grant groups in order to recognise culture and secure justice in society. He presents three 
different versions of group-differentiated rights that can be provided in order to incorporate 
groups into the political community. He acknowledges that different kinds of groups need 
different kinds of rights. Some groups only need to get temporarily rights in order to achieve 
de facto equality in a differentiated society. Others claim rights that recognise who they are in 
order to protect distinctive cultural identities from disappearing. 
   
The first kind of group-right Kymlicka introduces is the right to special representation. 
Special representation within the political process of the larger society should be given to 
members of marginalized and disadvantaged groups, and are regarded as temporary since the 
aim of these groups is to be at an equal footing with those in power. What necessitates these 
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rights is that the political process in many states are unrepresentative in the sense that it fails 
to reflect the diversity of the population. Group-representational rights are often defended as a 
response to some systemic barrier in the political process that makes it impossible for the 
group's views and interests to be effectively represented.84 These rights are viewed as a 
response to conditions of oppression, and they are most plausibly seen as a temporary 
measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists. 
Society should seek to remove the oppression, thereby eliminating the need for these rights.  
 
The next type of group rights is concerned with the right to self-government. In some of the 
most common claims for self-government, such as the reservation system of the American 
Indians, the demand for group rights is not seen as a temporary measure. It is misleading to 
say that group rights are a response to a form of oppression that we hope someday to 
eliminate. Aboriginal peoples and other national minorities like the Québécois or Scots claim 
permanent and inherent rights grounded in a principle of self-determination. These groups 
find themselves within the boundaries of a larger community, but claim the right to govern 
themselves in certain key matters. This right ensures their full and free development of their 
culture and the best interests of their people. What these minorities want is not primarily 
better representation in the central government, but rather the transfer of power and legislative 
jurisdictions from the central government to their own communities. 
 
The last form of group rights concerns those who claim multicultural rights. Many ethnic 
groups and religious minorities have demanded various forms of public support and legal 
recognition of their cultural practices. Their demands include public support of bilingual 
education and ethnic studies in schools and exemptions from laws that disadvantage them, 
given their religious practice. These measures are intended to help immigrants express their 
cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and 
political institutions of the dominant society. Like self-government rights, these rights may 
not be temporary, because the cultural differences they promote are not something we hope to 
eliminate. But unlike self-government rights, multicultural rights are intended to promote 
integration into the larger society.  
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There are many reasons why some groups claim these kinds of special rights. However, 
Kymlicka argues that despite their differences, these claims are basically of two different 
characters. One is more compatible with the liberal democracy than the other. If the claim 
involves the right of a group against the larger society, they would in many cases be 
compatible with the liberal democratic principles. These claims are inter-group relations and 
are intended to protect the group from the impact of external pressures, for example the 
protection from political or economic decisions of the larger society. These rights are often 
compatible with liberal democracy, and to reduce some groups vulnerability one can give 
them constitutional protection through language rights, education, media, guaranteed political 
representation, land rights, compensation for historical injustice, or regional devolution of 
power.85
 
If however the claim involves the right of a group against its own members, these rights might 
lead to situations where the freedom of individuals are in danger of being violated. These 
claims are internal restrictions and involve intra-group relations where for instance a group 
needs rights to prevent individual members from detaching themselves from traditional 
practices and customs. The rationale is to protect the group from destabilizing impacts of 
internal dissent. In these situations the most debated danger of intra-group oppression 
concerns the potential for sexual discrimination in minority cultures.86 Since internal 
restrictions have the potential of denying some individuals their freedom, most collective 
rights for ethnical and national groups should according to Kymlicka be defended in terms of 
external protection against the larger community.  
 
2.4.2 The problem of intra-group inequalities 
 
Even though Kymlicka acknowledges that there actually do exist some problems with 
protecting justice within ethno-cultural groups, feminists like Susan Okin accuse him for 
being less preoccupied with this question than the question of providing fairness between 
ethno-cultural groups. In Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? she argues that despite the fact 
that cultural practices in many cultures control and subordinate women, no defenders of 
multicultural groups rights have adequately addressed the troubling connections between 
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gender and culture.87 The policies designed to respond to the needs and claims of cultural 
minority groups must take seriously the urgency of adequately representation of less powerful 
members of such groups.  
 
She indicates two problems Kymlicka and other proponents of collective rights have when it 
comes to their defence of group rights for minorities within liberal states. The first problem 
she observes is that they treat cultural groups as monoliths, and thus pay more attention to 
difference between groups than differences within. The second problem is that they pay no 
attention to the private sphere. Religious and cultural groups are often concerned with 
“personal law”, these are the laws of marriage, divorce, child custody, division and control of 
family property and inheritance, and she argues that these are also rules in which women 
often are regarded as subordinate. Defence of “cultural practices” trough special group 
designed personal laws is thus likely to have a much greater adverse impact on the lives of 
women than those of men. She stresses that while it is obvious that culture is about more than 
domestic arrangements, it has been common to view these as important cultural bearing 
traditions amongst contemporary cultures.88 Liberal democratic states’ central aim should 
subsequently be to ensure that every human being has a reasonably equal chance of living a 
good life according to his or her unfolding views about what life should consist of.    
 
Kymlikca’s response to Okin is that both of them are actually occupied with the same 
question of invisibility. Okin has shown how liberal theorists implicitly or explicitly operate 
with the assumption that the citizen is a man, and never ask what sorts of institutions women 
would prefer behind the “veil of ignorance”.89 But when Okin is occupied with the invisibility 
of women, Kymlicka argues that he is concerned with the invisibility of minority cultures. 
Because of this he views himself and other proponents of multiculturalism as allies with 
feminist since both are engaged in related struggles. Their common struggle against the old 
liberal complacencies should not make multiculturalism blind to gender inequalities, but at the 
same time it should not make feminism blind to cultural differences, either. Okin agrees, but 
underlines that they do not necessarily agree on the order of priority. Okin is not just 
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88 Ibid: 13. 
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concerned with invisible women in a male dominated society, but with invisible women in 
invisible minority cultures, a phenomena which make the alliance far more thorny.   
 
This incongruence between protection of minority culture and securing the right to equality of 
all its members is a conflict that has occupied theoretical thinkers such as Azizah Y. Al-
Hibiri.  In her response to Okin, which she has called, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good 
for Third World / Minority Women? she questions whether this necessarily is an unsolvable 
conflict. Such theories of conflict, as is common in the liberal approach to the question, tend 
to have stereotypical views of the “Other”. Her argument is that one needs not necessarily 
view all other traditions than that of liberal western universalism as oppressive, and in cases 
of oppression, the idea of liberalism is not the only “salvation” for non-western women. Ideas 
like these tend to change western feminists into the patriarchs they fight in their own society, 
and view minority women as misled women who chose oppressive lifestyles because they do 
not know anything better. Al-Hibiri argues that contrary to view all non-western cultures as 
oppressive, and as a result abolish all non-western traditions that might seem discriminating, 
one should rather examine these traditions and try reinterpreting them by separating the 
customary from religious and cultural practices. In this way one can try to change cultures’ 
discriminating features, and keep the essence of the religion and culture, since the essence 
seldom is intended to discriminate against groups of people.90  
 
2.4.3 Taylor – and the politics of recognition91
 
Charles Taylor, writing from a Canadian perspective, approaches the question of whether the 
institutions of liberal democracy are able to make room for distinctive cultural traditions, from 
another angle than that of the earlier discussed theorists. He does not view the question of 
diversity as something one needs to turn to in order to create stable democracies, but views 
the recognition of difference as the essence of liberal democracy. In Taylor’s opinion, 
liberalism does not have to be distinguished in terms of a commitment to cultural neutrality. 
On the contrary, he maintains that a liberal society can legitimately promote the collective 
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goods associated with a particular conception of the good life, provided it respects the 
fundamental liberal rights of all citizens and grants equal citizenship to all members of society 
”including all those who do not share public definitions of the good”.92  
 
Taylor argues that the problem with the liberal notion of universalism is that it has started to 
confuse universalism with sameness. It is this feature that according to Taylor creates the 
problem of making liberalism compatible with diversity and cultural difference. Human 
particularity and distinctiveness have been ignored, “glossed over, assimilated to a dominant 
or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of 
authenticity”.93 As a consequence Taylor argues that one needs to have a totally different 
conception of universalism if one is to make liberal democracy compatible with difference. 
He suggests that universalism might imply something radically different from what is the 
common view among liberals, since it might just as well be understood as the right of 
everyone to be recognised for his or her unique identity.  
 
This concern with the recognition of difference draws on Herder and his articulation of the 
ideal of authenticity. His effort is to combine Herder’s ideas with an analysis of modernity 
and the development of modern conceptions of the self. By this he presents a context with 
distinctly modern conceptions of individual identity based upon the ideals of authenticity and 
equal dignity. This ideal of human dignity demands that all people be treated as free and 
equal. Yet, once this ideal is combined with the idea of authenticity it points in at least two 
directions. While on the one hand it implies the protection of the basic rights of individuals as 
human beings, it gives rise, on the other hand, to the demand that the particular needs of 
individuals as members of a specific culture be acknowledged.94
 
But how is he supposed to achieve support for this new kind of universalism? Taylor argues 
that the idea that one actually might treat some people different in order to create equality is 
nothing new in the liberal tradition. In order to change individuals’ socio-economic 
inequalities, one used the idea of equal dignity that did not accept second-class citizenship in 
a liberal democracy. This paved the way for socio-economic redefinitions, and hence justified 
social programs that were highly controversial in order to achieve social, economic justice. 
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Around the world many groups and individuals experience that their particularities are not 
being recognised by the majority culture. Is this not also a kind of second-class status in 
society? The only difference is that this time liberals fail to acknowledge that cultural groups 
often are exposed to unequal recognition. One should rather begin to understand identity as 
something formed by exchange, respect groups and individuals for who they are, and thus 
give them certain rights aimed at conserving their cultural identity.  
 
However, Taylor underlines that there are of course immense differences between the 
arguments defending these policies. Reverse discrimination is defended as a temporary 
measure that will eventually level the playing field, and allowing the old “blind” rules to 
come back into force in a way that does not disadvantage anyone. The cherishing of 
distinctiveness is on the contrary of course not just for a short period, but something that 
supposedly is going on forever. If one fails to stress this distinction, one might do the same 
mistake that western liberals have been doing with their notion of “the other”. Western 
theoretical thinkers are often criticised for not only suppressing, but also failing to appreciate 
other cultures. As an example of western arrogance, Taylor quotes Saul Bellow as saying 
something like “when the Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him”.95 This statement is 
taken as a quintessential statement of European arrogance, not only because Bellow is being 
de facto insensitive to the value of Zulu culture, but also because it is seen to reflect a denial 
in principle of human equality. First, there is the implicit assumption that excellence has to 
take forms familiar to ours. It is an aim that the Zulus should actually make a Tolstoy. 
Second, we are assuming that their contribution is yet to be made. These two assumptions 
obviously go hand in hand. If they have to produce our kind of excellence, their only hope is 
in the future.  
 
The example of the Zulu Tolstoy can also be used as an allegory for the politics of 
multiculturalism and the liberal democracy. It implies that we already have the standards to 
make the perfect, just, society. This standard is western liberalism, and when other cultures 
build liberal communities, we will be more than happy to accommodate them. From this point 
of view, the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal 
dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. It views itself as neutral, but as it turns 
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out, only the minorities and the suppressed cultures are being forced to take alien form. The 
political society cannot remain “neutral” between those seeking to maintain cultural traditions 
and those wishing to “cut loose” to promote individual self-interests. Both cases should be 
accepted, and it should be acknowledged that these are different subject matters. One should 
thus distinguish between two levels of rights: 1) One level of basic or fundamental rights 
construed along the line of liberal universalism, and 2) one level of cultural rights that permit 
public regulation. While the former requires uniform treatment and should never be infringed, 
the latter allows for cultural diversity.96 The latter should, however, be accepted as a good, 
and a preservation for both present and future generations, not just an individual right which 
one might follow in one’s private life. By not accepting diverging conceptions of the good, we 
actually fail to recognise their equal human dignity. 
 
2.4.4 Just another kind of liberalism? 
 
As other proponents of the politics of difference that tries to present new suggestions for how 
it is possible to make liberal democracy compatible with the recognition of culture, Taylor is 
also criticized for not being able to provide a solution that satisfies either side. The liberal 
critique is of course almost inevitable. In their view a preoccupation with cultural identity 
may not only restrict the freedom of future generations, but may also prove oppressive vis-à-
vis existing group members. Even if individuals’ rights are respected, a politics of cultural 
survival may lead to pressure being placed upon the individual to define itself primarily in 
terms of its cultural membership rather than a whole host of alternative criteria that may shape 
his or her identity.97
 
Taylor is also criticised for failing to address some of the most challenging aspects of the 
demand of recognition. His concrete willingness to actually recognise non-liberal cultures, is 
questioned. Is his defence of cultural survival and his politics of recognition just a different 
wrapping, which actually entails the same as the liberal universal rights? The reason for this 
criticism is that Taylor developed his defence of the right to cultural survival in the context of 
a discussion of the constitutional crisis in Canada surrounding the status of Quebec. His 
suggestion is therefore seen as a dispute between two particular conceptions of liberalism. 
While English-speaking Canada is wedded to the liberalism of universal rights, Quebec 
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favours a conception of liberalism akin to his politics of recognition. Although these two 
models of liberalism differ with regard to the status of certain collective goals, both recognise 
fundamental liberal rights and acknowledge the importance of individual freedom. This 
dispute of multiculturalism is thus regarded as quite “thin”, and one questions this theory’s 
ability to work in societies of severe structural diversity.  
 
According to Baumeister, Taylor appears to be caught in a dilemma: “While in the eyes of 
liberals and advocates of thin multiculturalism his approach fails to provide adequate 
safeguards for key liberal values such as autonomy and equality of moral worth, non-liberal 
minorities fear that his approach remains too wedded to liberal values to accommodate the 
depth of complexity of diverse characteristics of contemporary liberal societies.”98 This is a 
dilemma that can easily be applied to all the different theoretical approaches presented in this 
theoretical chapter, when they try to put forward answers to how it is possible to make liberal 
democracy compatible with the accommodation of cultural diversity. The question is whether 
it is actually possible to get any further in this debate without examining more empirical 
cases.  
 
Theoretically there seems to be an almost unsolvable conflict regarding the right to equality 
for all and the rights of certain groups to protect their difference. The reason for this is as we 
have seen, that at once you grant groups the right to cultural protection, there is always a 
danger of violating the rights of some subgroups inside the cultural groups. However, these 
questions do exist, and one needs to find answers in many liberal democracies all over the 
world. The debate on multiculturalism in the western world is at a very abstract philosophical 
level, and in most cases it is based on empirical studies of Canada, the European Union and 
the challenges of western democracies regarding immigration. In my further presentation I am 
going to see if these western philosophical attempts to solve the question of cultural diversity 
are able to provide any solution for one concrete example of cultural diversity, that of the 
post-apartheid South Africa’s new democracy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Baumeister 2000:147.  
 52
2.5 Analytical model of further thesis 
 
The question is now how it is possible to apply these different solutions of compatibility on 
the concrete empirical case of post-Apartheid South Africa. Which dilemmas might occur 
when one introduces these liberal strategies in a society with deeper cultural differences than 
those exposed on the surface in western democracies? In the South African context it is 
important to remember the legacy of colonisation and apartheid that I discussed in chapter 
1.3. Rawls and Habermas stress the importance of state neutrality on the question of the good 
life. Neither the colonisers nor the Apartheid governments had been neutral to the good life. 
To illustrate this I can use the quotation of the colonial secretary Lord Milner presented in 
chapter 1.3.3: “The native peasant often share his hut with his goat, or sheep, or fowls. He 
loves to drum and dance all night ... They have no desire to abolish segregation.” What this 
implies theoretically is that the earlier judicial and political system was based on an idea that 
different groups had different conceptions of the good. The “natives” were only happy if they 
were left alone doing what “natives” normally do.  
 
Rawls stresses that one cannot simply decide that all individuals in this “native” group had a 
completely different conception of the good than that of the government. Behind the ‘Veil of 
Ignorance’ it would have been possible to comprehend that though you might cherish a 
culture, you would not view this as your most important right. Deprived of the knowledge of 
who you are, you would have argued that it is important to decide yourself as a rational 
individual if the cultural practice is important to you. This implies that one need to regard a 
fair political structure and basic universal rights, as more important than cultural rights. You 
might be happy to live in a hut with your goat, but the state ought not to interfere with this 
desire. Due to this, Rawls advocates for a priority of rights, where individuals are the bearers 
of rights not groups.   
 
Habermas argues that you do need an impartial and neutral state, but it cannot achieve 
legitimacy through abstracting the individual from its particularities. The problem with the 
Apartheid vision of culture was that the people itself did not claim cultural segregation. The 
governments without a thorough consultation with the people decided that this was a desired 
political structure due to the people’s different ideas of the good life. These considerations 
were done without any system of rules that ensures discursive equality, and hence, the 
African, Indian and Coloured population were deprived of their Sittlichkeit – the right to 
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discuss ethical questions, such as their conception of the good.99 The Apartheid state had no 
legitimacy since the people was not the author of the law. If, however, all citizens participate 
in the public debate and express their specific needs, one can discuss which cultural traditions 
that ought to continue and which regulations that ought to be applied towards cultures. But in 
order to be legitimate, the people who practise the culture need to understand and decided 
what the good is to be, not the state. The state structure must, however, make sure that the 
practices agreed upon do not deprive any individual of their freedoms.  
 
Kymlicka and Taylor on the other hand do stress that in order to provide accommodation of 
difference for minority cultures, one might sometimes offer them group rights. In South 
Africa many cultural groups might have been constructed in a vast social engineering 
program, this deprived many groups of people from their political rights, but can one in the 
aftermaths of this regime act like differences do not exist? Though people should not be 
forced to live in accordance with stereotypical images of themselves, like a “Native” with his 
goat in a hut, there might be reasons why groups of people claim the right to be treated 
differently due to their culture. 
 
As argued in 2.4.1, one of Kymlicka’s main concerns is that in a liberal democracy one ought 
to provide justice between different ethno-cultural groups. Societies such as South Africa are 
not homogenous, and in order to deliver a fair and free context for all, one must respect all 
cultural groups equally. He thus presents three different strategies for how different cultural 
groups can be incorporated into the society. To sum up 2.4.1 these are special representation 
in the political structure, the right to self-government for some groups in certain matters and 
the claim for multicultural rights, which is for instance bilingual education and exemptions 
from laws that are incompatible to their religious believes etc. By accommodating these 
concerns in a multicultural society as South Africa, all groups would be able to exist together 
since no group discriminate towards another, and therefore no group becomes invisible in the 
larger society.  
 
Taylor is also sceptical to attempts to glossing over cultural differences, and accuses 
liberalists for equating universalism with sameness. We all deserve respect because we are, 
but liberalism cannot require that we all have the same conception of the good. To neglect a 
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groups difference, can be just as discriminating as forcing an identity upon a group of people. 
Of course one should not oppose the right of those that do want to cut loose from their culture 
and traditions, but as a liberal society one should also accommodate those who wants to 
remain true to their culture and traditions. In South Africa, all people ought to be free to 
embark a liberal western way of life, but if people chose to live by African traditional values 
this must be recognised. But how is one to provide for the right to choose between ways of 
life? By the freedom of choice, or by territorial delineation?   
 
All these attempts to go in between the two old dichotomies of universalism and 
particularism, and try to develop a strategy to accommodate both, have been criticised. For 
theoretically they fail in both. First, you have those who criticise these strategies since they do 
not secure all individuals right to equality. Secondly, they are also criticised because, how can 
these liberal attempts to recognise different cultures be applied in societies with deep-rooted 
cultural differences. Many of them draw on western empirical experiences and western 
perspectives, but how can they accommodate cultures with different beliefs in what a just 
institution is, what it is that make an authority legitimate, and what is it that ought to form our 
ways of life? 
 
So, is it possible to apply these theories to South Africa? Which theory has most similarities 
with the final outcome of the constitutional bargaining in South Africa? Which diverging 
claims of accommodation was presented, and how can one view these preferences in the light 
of the different theoretical perspectives? When the constitution was to be implemented, was 
one able to meet the requirements of both securing the right to equality and at the same time 
recognise cultural difference?    
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3. Methodological approach  
 
The scope of this chapter is to present the data material applied in my analysis of why the role 
and the functions of traditional and customary law became recognised in the South African 
Constitution of 1996, and whether this recognition resulted in a political will to fulfil these 
constitutional obligations. The key topics introduced are: Why did I decide to apply a single 
case approach? Which sources of evidence have been analysed, and why did I use documents, 
interviews, literature, statistical data and observation as evidence in the investigation? I will 
also address the question of how one can assure a sufficient validity and reliability in a cases 
study.   
 
3.1 A single case study 
 
Doing a case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Robert Yin has 
argued that one of the main reasons for selecting this methodological approach springs from 
“a desire to understand complex social phenomenon”.100 In order to understand a social 
phenomenon, contextual conditions might be highly pertinent, and a case study research 
makes room for investigating unclear boundaries between the phenomenon and the context.101 
One decides upon this approach with the intention to place the case centre stage, and not 
necessarily the variables.102 One can choose to use either single case studies or multiple-case 
studies. In this research I have chosen to apply a single case approach. To account for why I 
have chosen this design in my research, I will turn to Yin’s three rationales for using a single-
case approach. 
 
First, studying a unique case. Sometimes one is interested in analysing a phenomenon that is 
regarded as an exemption. There are not any known cases having significant similarities with 
the case under investigation, and one decides to analyse the deviances of this case. Is the 
South African process of accommodating cultural difference a unique case? All cases are 
somehow unique, and it has been quite normal in the political science tradition to view South 
Africa as an exceptional case. Westernised, but still in Africa, with a legacy of Apartheid. If 
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one turns to the question of accommodating traditional African institutions in a new 
democracy, South Africa is in the same situation as other earlier African Commonwealth 
states.103 The question of what to do with these traditional institutions and the plural system of 
law in a democratic state is not unique in an African setting.  
 
However, one might say that the outcome of the transition and the process of implementing 
cultural rights are unique in an African context. But is this result unique if one conceptualises 
traditional African institutions as cultural institutions? Does the case then have similarities 
with cases in other parts of the world? The answer to the question of the South African 
uniqueness is in many ways a question of operationalisation. I think one can argue that South 
Africa is both unique and still not. It depends on the perspective of the analysis, and the 
reasons for using a single case approach must be justified by other considerations than those 
of its uniqueness.   
 
Secondly, another rationale for choosing a single case study approach is the revelatory case. 
This situation exists when a researcher has an opportunity to observe and analyse a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific research.104  The case does not have to be 
unique, but there have not been any similar studies on the subject earlier. Is then my case a 
revelatory one? In regard to studies done by political scientists, I would almost argue that this 
is in many ways so. In both recent and present time, there have been various studies on 
traditional African institutions and customary law. Most of them have been judicial studies, 
and have been carried out by social anthropologists. T.W Bennett has for instance done 
exhaustive researches on the subject of Customary Law. Especially his work Human Rights 
and African Customary Law105 gives an excellent presentation of the key challenges related to 
customary law under a system of universal constitutional rights. Little research has been done 
within the field of political science. Barbara Oomen has, however, done a study on traditional 
leaders and democracy presented in Traditions on the move – Chiefs; Democracy and Change 
in Rural South Africa.106 In one chapter of their book The politics of transition – A hidden 
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history of South Africa’s negotiated settlement, Spitz and Chaskalson107 describe how the 
chapter on traditional leaders was negotiated prior to the interim constitution. Other studies 
have been carried out, but these are sporadic, often descriptive works on the system of 
customary law.  
 
Since it has been difficult to draw support from earlier studies in my investigation, I have 
valued the relevance of contextual sensitivity highly. If one tries to grasp too much in one 
project one might be in danger of jeopardising the importance of understanding a 
phenomenon on its own premises. Thus, I decided to concentrate my attention to a sequence 
of events in one particular case, rather than comparing a case at a certain stage with other 
cases. In this way it was possible to have a more open strategy in my search for a fuller 
understanding of the process. The problem with this is that it makes it more difficult to draw 
significant generalisations on basis of the analysis. It is thus fruitful to look at the last 
justification of using single-case study as an approach.   
 
Finally, a last rationale for applying this type of research strategy is when the case represents 
a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory. A single case study can thus be used to 
illuminate strengths or weaknesses in an existing theory. The single case study does not have 
the power of refuting an existing theory, but it might be able to point at some parts of the 
theory that needs reconsiderations or clarify aspects earlier neglected. The single case can 
then be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some 
alternative set of explanations might be more relevant.108  The theories discussed in the 
previous chapter, is based on empirical studies of western democracy, and they are at an 
abstract philosophical level.  
 
My intention with using South Africa as a case is predominantly to analyse whether these 
theories are interesting in explaining some of the incidents in a South African context. 
Furthermore, I am interested in analysing how normative theories can be used as a tool for 
investigating practical processes. Hence I will analyse questions of whether the exhaustive, 
western theoretical debate on multiculturalism revolves around topics relevant for challenges  
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Figure 3.1: Three rationales for single-case designs  
 
  
Unique  
 
Revelatory  
 
Critical  
The 
South African Case 
 
- (+) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
exposed in a specific case. Is the outcome of the South African process for accommodating 
difference in accordance with these theories? In this way the project is to compare different 
theories in light of one empirical process, rather than to compare different empirical processes 
in light of one theory. Figure 3.1 shows that the present study does to some extent fulfil two 
of the rationales for employing a single case study. Few studies have been done on the 
implementation of cultural recognition in South Africa, and the study also tries to shed some 
light to whether the challenges exposed in the theoretical debate is different from the 
challenges discovered in an empirical case. Though it might not stand as a critical case 
capable of rejecting an entire theoretical debate. The South African case might have some 
similarities to the experiences of other countries. In order to be able to study the phenomenon 
on its own premises, I have chosen an in depth study of one case, even though it would have 
been interesting to compare the south African experience with other countries in an more far-
reaching study.    
  
3.2 Multiple sources of evidence 
 
One of the major strengths of case study data collection is the opportunity to use many 
different sources of evidence. By using multiple sources of evidence one can gather and 
analyse the findings from different sources in order to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal and behavioural issues.109 In my study I wanted to understand why traditional 
leaders became recognised in the new constitution, and whether this recognition actually 
ended in political action aimed at clarifying their position. It was important to investigate 
different sources of evidence to see which kinds of aspects that affected this process. By 
examining multiple sources I could increase the construct validity of the analysis, by trying to 
test my assumptions of what influenced the courses of events in my case. Yin has defined 
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construct validity as the establishing of correct operational measures for the concept being 
studied.110   
 
My object was to understand the process and not just one single event, and different sources 
uncovered information from different stages of the process. Sometimes interviews were 
important to gather information about something that was absent in other sources of evidence. 
Other times it was important to use multiple sources to check if information derived from one 
source actually correspond with information from other sources. By doing this I was able to 
use converging lines of inquiry in order to provide more convincing and accurate findings. 
For instance, when an informant argues: “the government is only interested in the situation of 
the traditional leaders because it is soon election “, one needs to investigate other sources to 
be able to present this claim as valid.  
 
In my research I ended up employing 5 different sources of evidence; documents, interviews, 
literature, statistical data and observation. Some of them revealed more important evidences 
than other; these were documents, interviews and literature. Others such as statistical data and 
observation were mostly used to achieve a better understanding of the context in which I did 
my research. Before I present the sources employed in my investigations of the process of 
recognising cultural difference, I am going to centre my attention on the reliability of the 
project. Reliability refers to the extent to which different operationalisations of the same 
concept produce consistent results. High reliability means that two procedures yield the same 
outcome, or the same procedure reapplied over time shows high agreement.111 To increase 
reliability it is important that the data material is transparent for the purpose of making the 
reader aware of how and under what circumstances the information was gathered.  
 
By making my data transparent it is possible for others to control whether my assumptions are 
biased or if I actually have done some errors in collecting my data. For instance, I am going to 
analyse bills initiated by the government as a source. Suddenly it seems like a Bill has 
vanished from the process, and I decide to present this as an evidence of “lack of interest” to 
amend it. The truth might on the other hand be that the name of the Bill was changed to 
something completely different, and then tabled in parliament. This means that the research 
                                                 
110 Ibid:33. 
111 Bohrnstedt, George, W. and Knoke, David, Statistics for Social Data Analysis, Third Edition, Inc. Illinois: F. 
E. Peacock Publishers, 1994:14. 
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reliability is weakened because I fell short in being sufficiently precise in my data collection, 
and therefore did a careless mistake. I have presented the process of collecting data below.      
 
3.2.1 Collecting the data material  
 
Most of the data analysed in this research were collected in South Africa from late January 
until August 1999. In the first period, January until the mid of March, I did some background 
research in Cape Town. Documents and literature were collected at the South African Library 
and the Parliament of South Africa. Historical secondary sources from the Apartheid era were 
also collected in second hand bookshops. Two periods were spent in the capital, Pretoria. The 
first lasted from the mid of March until the mid of April. In this period I collected literature at 
the Library of the University of Pretoria, and I also did some informal interviews with Peace 
Corps Volunteers from the United States of America. The volunteers were living in different 
rural communities in the northern part of the country, and I interviewed them to get an 
impression of the degree of authority the traditional leaders possessed in these communities. 
To understand the process of accommodating cultural difference further, I decided to do a 
short field observation in a rural area. This was done in KwaZulu-Natal in Eshowe and some 
of the villages in the surroundings (8 –17 of May).  
 
In my second period in Pretoria (late May until late June) I did one interview with Prof. 
Thandabantu Nhlapo at the South African Law Commission. At the 22nd of June I went with 
the Law Commission to one of their Workshops on “Traditional Courts and the Judicial 
Function of Traditional Leaders” in Kwamshanga, Mpumalanga. At the Law Commission I 
also collected documents. Documents, reports and literature were also collected at the 
Department of Constitutional Development. At the department I also had informal talks with 
some of the departments researchers in the section of Traditional Affairs.  
 
The last period was spent in Johannesburg (late June until August). In Johannesburg I did two 
interviews. One with the deputy director of the Rural Women’s Movement, Popi Ngema and 
one with Likhapha Mbatha at the Gender Research Project, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
University of Witwatersrand. In Johannesburg literature was collected from various libraries 
at the University of Witwatersrand112 and at the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung. Documents and 
                                                 
112 More specific, the Libraries used at the University of Witwatersrand were the William Cullen Library, the 
Wartenweiler Library and the Library at Centre for Applied Legal Studies.  
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reports were also collected at the offices of the Commission of Gender Equality. To fill in 
some gaps in the data collected in South Africa and also to remain updated on recent 
developments, literature have since August 1999 been collected in Norway, at Chr. Michelsen 
Institute Library and University of Bergen Library, and some reports and documents have 
been downloaded from the Internet. In the following, I am going to present the different 
sources of evidence used in this research, with the purpose of visualising the construct validity 
of this research and avoid biased conclusions.    
 
3.2.2 Documents 
 
Documents are often known as primary sources. In this analysis documents are an important 
source of evidence. I have categorised the documents into two sets. The first set consists of 
legal documents, such as constitutions, Bills and Acts. These documents are outcomes of a 
political debate. They uncover what politicians view as important issues to decide upon, and 
are often to be interpreted as normative, since they tell us what politicians think that ought to 
be done with a subject matter. They thus tell us something about “what” is agreed upon and 
“when” this is agreed upon. These document are interesting for the process since they tell 
something about priorities and changes in priorities over time. As with the interim 
Constitution of 1994 and the final constitution of 1996, one can see that changes in priorities 
have occurred. They also lay down guidelines for how policies are supposed to be 
implemented in the future. The succession of the Bills and Acts also tells something about the 
priority of issues, and what it is possible to decide upon. Sometimes it becomes interesting to 
find that a Bill is not enacted though other sources tell that this is intended. While legal 
documents may reveal the “what’s” and the “when’s” of a process, they seldom give any 
certain evidences on “how” the process was or “why” this was the outcome of a process. The 
content of a legal document is often interesting to analyse. They are, however, seldom viewed 
as findings in themselves, but serve to find clues for further investigation.    
 
The next set of documents is more descriptive. This set of documents includes public progress 
reports, newspaper articles, submissions, speeches and public statements. These are 
documents that can help us to investigate “why” and “how” something occurred, since these 
are the opinions and views of persons involved in the process under investigation. For 
example, a Discussion Paper on the process of harmonising common law and customary law 
includes submissions from important figures in the debate. In this way they both tell us 
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something about the visions of the people affected by the process, important NGO’s, 
academic researchers and also the recommendations of the South African Law Commission. 
The most important strength of this kind of evidence is that it is unobtrusive – meaning that 
the evidences is not created or influenced by the case study. It tells me something about what 
the interests of different actors are at a certain point of the process, but does not directly 
answer to questions that I find interesting, as is the case in interviews. The documents denote 
the arguments made in the din of battle, and are not influenced by belated wisdom or the wish 
to appease the researcher. Due to this, one needs to have an open eye on the events, and 
sometimes one is forced to change earlier comprehensions of ones suppositions.    
 
The weaknesses of using documents as a source of evidence, are that it sometimes might be 
difficult to uncover the biases of the document under investigation. Public reports often only 
give the answers to what the government views as important findings, and newspapers have 
tendencies of paying more attention to extreme statements than views most people approve of. 
Because of this it is important in reviewing any document to understand that it was written for 
some specific purpose and some specific audience other than those of my case study. For 
instance, a public speech by government officials tends to be severely coloured by the 
circumstances in which a speech is held. A speech by Mandela at the opening of the House of 
Traditional Leaders certainly give traditional institutions a higher value, than what would be 
the case if the speech were held at a Women’s Convention.          
   
In my research I have tried not to view documents as objective evidence devoid of bias. All 
accounts revealed by documents are contextualised, and must be analysed in this way. Though 
I am aware of this it is of course difficult to know the exact context of a document, and further 
how much the document influenced the final outcome of the process. However, the greatest 
difficulty was to make a representative selection of documents. How to cover all the different 
agents without making a too extensive dataset? The main purpose of analysing documents 
thus became to corroborate the findings with the information gathered from other sources. 
Other sources of evidences were also important since not all opinions and events are possible 
to get hold of in documents. To be able to make my data explicit and open to different 
interpretations, I have listed all documents analysed in the appendix.   
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3.2.3 Interviews 
 
Two different kinds of interviews were used to gather information about the process of 
recognising cultural difference in South Africa. The first type of interviews I regard as 
focused, formal interviews with informants. The aims of these interviews were that the 
informants would give information about their participation and their insights into certain 
events in the process. All interviews were open ended, but they did follow a certain set of 
questions derived from my case study protocol. Since my aim with the investigation is to 
understand the process, I tried to make the interviews as open as possible. The positive side of 
this was that the informants came up with facts, events and information that I was not 
acquainted with previously. In this way I got a better understanding of the process. The 
negative effect was that questions that I had planned to ask sometimes were left out of the 
interview. During the interviews I had to decide upon which questions that were the most 
important. In my transcription of the interviews I became aware that some interesting 
questions suddenly were left out. All in all I do think the positive sides of using an open 
strategy stem the negative consequences.   
 
Three focused, formal interviews were done with a tape recorder. The interviews were few, 
but well selected. The first was done at The South African Law Commission on the 17th of 
June 1999. This interview was with Prof. R.T. Nhlapo. He was at the time the leader of a 
project, which aim to harmonise common law and indigenous law. The Law Commission has 
arranged several workshops in relation to the implementation of cultural rights. The Law 
Commission is an important organ in the initial stages of new law reforms. Before a law is 
debated in the legislative, the commission gathers information about the Bills. In order to 
secure community participation at an early stage, the commission publishes an issue paper 
with the intention of making room for a public debate. After the public debate the 
Commission drafts a discussion paper with both submissions from diverging contributors and 
recommendations to be discussed in parliament. Prof R.T Nhlapo was selected because he had 
an extensive knowledge about both the political debate and the different events of the process. 
 
The next interview was with Likhapha Mbatha on the 2nd of June 1999, a researcher at the 
Gender Research Project at Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witswatersrand. 
Mbatha had done some research into the process of harmonisation and had also written 
comments on Bills to be enacted by parliament. Discussions with other researchers help to 
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increase the construct validity of the analysis. Since I did not have the time to write any report 
to be reviewed by other South African researchers, I decided to both test some of my 
assumptions together with asking my questions from the case study protocol, in this 
interview. One criteria for getting a fresh commentary on the topic, is that the interviewer 
appear as naïve as possible.113 In this interview I might not have accomplished this criteria. 
One always needs to be sensitive when asking questions, and since I tried to test some of my 
assumptions, I might have seemed predetermined. Especially since this was our first meeting, 
and earlier contact had only been through emails. This impression of a small hostility might 
however been caused by an unwillingness of the informant to answer questions outside her 
domain of research. Which of course is very understandable.      
    
The last interview was with Popi Ngema, the deputy director of the Rural Women’s 
Movement on the 16th of July 1999. The Rural Women’s Movement have participated as an 
NGO on several Workshops held in relation to the process of harmonising common law and 
customary law. They have also produced an extensive set of submissions to the Discussion 
Papers. The Rural Women’s Movement has been an important contributor to the 
understanding of the process since they somehow seems to operate between old established 
dichotomies, such as modern feminism vs. concern for rural traditions. All though, the RWM 
was an important contributor at the workshop, it was difficult to gather sufficient information 
about their views and ideas form other sources than that of the Law Commissions Papers. It 
was also interesting to get an opinion of someone form the civil society, since they 
participated on many workshops, but had a different opinion on the process than the Law 
Commission and the state.   
 
There are two different groups of people that would have been interesting to interview. The 
first groups are formal interviews with traditional leaders. As I am going to discuss in 3.3 
many view the subject under investigation as very sensitive. It did take time to achieve 
confidence, and it is difficult to get permission to interview the most important traditional 
leaders. At the end of the stay my acquaintances at the Department of Judicial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development did open many doors for me, but unfortunately I needed to return 
to Norway at that point. A second group that would have been interesting to interview was 
key politicians. It was important to do my data collection as early in the process as possible 
                                                 
113 Yin 1994:85 
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since it was difficult to gather information in Norway. In the beginning it was difficult to both 
find out who the key politicians to interview would be, and secondly, if I was to interview 
elite politicians, I needed to have a clear vision of the total process. I thus decided that I 
needed to draw on other sources to get these groups vision of the process. The interviews are 
available on request.  
 
The other type of interviews I did was informal interviews with respondents. My intention 
with these interviews was to receive an improved understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation. No information gathered in these interviews is used directly in the analysis as 
findings, and I did not use a tape recorder or a strict interview guide. The information did 
however give me some clues on where to look and how to interpret some of the events. In 
informal interviews a respondent is more likely to speak more openly, and they will be less 
likely to hesitate in exclaiming their assumptions and judgements. Like for instance in 
informal interviews with researchers at the Department of Constitutional Development, the 
respondents would put forward views contrary to the department’s official statements. If these 
judgements are interesting, it is the investigators role to use other sources of evidences in 
order to provide them with support.  
 
Informal interviews can also help to gather information from another perspective than views 
originating from a classical top down standpoint. As for instance, the Peace Corps of the 
United States of America started a project in 1997 where different volunteers live in South 
African rural villages. Since these volunteers were living in rural areas in the northern part of 
the country I decided to ask ten volunteers questions about the power and legitimacy of the 
traditional leaders and institutions in their villages. By doing this I would get an enhanced 
idea about the phenomenon from a bottom up perspective. Some of the respondents lived in 
areas with strong traditional authorities, others lived in areas were the traditional leaders 
played a marginal role. One, however, told about a situation of total confusion in relation to 
the subject. The traditional leader in the village was growing old. He had only one heir, but he 
lived a modern life as a policeman in Pretoria. Was the village supposed to call this successor 
home to do his duty as a traditional leader, or should they just let the traditional institutions in 
the community wither away with the old leader? Practical problems like these opened my 
eyes to a different view of the consequences of this process in rural areas.  
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Both formal and informal interviews might be biased. The selection of the informants may not 
represent all views and the asking of questions might be leading. Both these facts are 
important when one draws conclusions out of the data material. The data material, which I 
have collected, is not intended to represent all opinions related to the issues. It is also 
important to be aware of the reflexivity of the data collected through interviews. The 
respondents and informants only answer the questions directed to them, and seldom respond 
with objections to the relevance of the questions. However, in a situation where I am trying to 
gather information about my assumptions, interviews are useful both since they are on the 
target and give insights to the assumptions under investigation. No support for an assumption 
might be just as relevant for the outcome of an analysis, as if all your assumptions are 
approved.   
 
3.2.4 Literature 
 
Skocpol has remarked that the “comparative historical sociologists have not so far worked out 
clear, consensual rules and procedures for the valid use of secondary sources as evidence”.114 
Nevertheless, a rationale for using secondary sources is that it enables case study researchers 
to present evidences of past conditions.115 As I view past conditions as important to 
understand the current process of recognising cultural rights, it has been necessary to rely on 
secondary sources. The problem with this strategy is the possibility of inaccurate historical 
accounts, something that can be quite fatal in understanding such sensitive subject as cultural 
accommodations in South Africa. 
 
Another rationale for using secondary sources is to make sure that rival interpretations of the 
phenomena is considered. By using diverging secondary sources it is easier to achieve 
historical and political sensitivity, since one can test different opinions and assumptions 
against each other. Regarding the question of traditional leaders’ position in South Africa, this 
question brings with it dark shades of past discrimination. Still, it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish the well-intended studies of the phenomenon from analysis aimed at justifying 
politics of cultural segregation. A secondary source considered unbiased by first glance, might 
after advanced knowledge of the phenomena disclose a hidden agenda. This has made it 
                                                 
114 Skocpol, Theda “Emerging agendas and recurrent strategies in historical sociology” in Vision and method in 
historical sociology, Skocpol (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984:382.   
115 Neuman, Lawrence, W. Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Third Edition, 
USA: A&B, 1997:398.  
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difficult to evaluate the bias of phenomenon presented as “objective analysis of mere facts” in 
secondary literature.  It is nevertheless important to stress that literature presented as “neutral” 
might be an important source of evidence if one manage to uncover the concealed agenda. To 
uncover the bias in secondary literature, I have always tried to ask, why was this text written, 
who published it, which type of language is used, and in which context was the text 
presented? However, to chase all ghosts of bias in the field of secondary South African 
political sources might turn out a ceaseless endeavour.116 Though it remains an extremely 
important aspect to linger on. 
 
3.2.5 Statistical data 
 
Statistical evidence is used to achieve a further understanding of the process, and it consists of 
elections results and demographic information. The demographic information is gathered by 
Statistic South Africa, and they are based on The South African Population 96’ Census.117 
One often regards statistics as reliable sources of evidence. In regard to statistical measures of 
the South African population in the period 1970 to 1996, Stats SA used a demographic model 
to adjust the census count. This model was influenced by government politics, and it is 
important to know that the earlier homeland of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei 
(The TBVC states) were excluded from the model since they were declared independent by 
the government. Separate censuses were conducted in the TBVC states, but no attempt was 
made to use these counts to estimate the size of the total population of South Africa.  
 
The demographic model used to count the African population within South Africa, was to use 
groups of enumerators to sweep the population within rural self-governing territories. This 
was done without any demarcated boundaries or lists. In 1991 aerial photographs were used to 
count the number of dwellings in particular informal settlements, such as shantytowns. These 
were then used to estimate the size of the population, by estimating the average household 
size per dwelling out of small-scale surveys on the ground. In the 96’ Census this strategy was 
rejected, and the numbers and percentages presented are based on empirical evidence. Both 
the actual count and the adjustments by a post-enumeration to avoid an ‘undercount’, were 
arrived at by visiting households in enumerated areas throughout the country, as well as 
                                                 
116 For an extensive, deconstructive reading on the topic see Taylor, Rupert and Orkin, Mark “The Racialization 
of Social Scientific Research on South Africa” in The Politics of Social Science Research. ‘Race’ ethnicity and 
social change, Ratcliffe & Palgrave (ed.), UK: University of Warwick, 2001:61-84.  
117 A Census 2001 is under production, but the results are not to be launched until 2003.  
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hostels and institutions, and by that figure out how many people that used to live in them. 
There are thus reasons to believe that Census’96 provides more accurate measures of the 
population.118
 
The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa provides information on local, provincial and 
national election results. Together with the Census’ 96 these election results may be used to 
reflect upon questions concerning the ability of the traditional leaders to mobilise a political 
vote. I have also used a survey done by the Afrobarometer on Popular Attitudes to 
Democracy, Selected African Countries, 1999 – 2001. The statistical data are presented to 
support certain assumptions, but they give few interesting findings in themselves. Because of 
this they only shed light to assumptions made by drawing conclusions from other sources of 
evidences. Largely they can only be used as presentations of facts.  
 
3.3 Observation – obtaining cultural closeness  
 
As a researcher it is important to project oneself as a neutral observer of certain social facts. 
But, especially in studying foreign cultures, one inevitably becomes aware of the cultural 
background one possesses. In order to be aware of the scope of my cultural bias, I tried to 
come closer to the phenomenon through observation. By doing this it is easier to understand 
the process, and observation as evidence is often useful in providing additional information 
about the topic being studied.119 For instance, all though you read in a book that traditional 
leaders, and especially the royal leaders, are very honoured among their people, you might 
underestimate the effect they have on others. As a Norwegian I know that the Norwegian 
monarchs are very highly valued among the Norwegian people. However, when I read about 
the 11 South African Kings and Paramounts who are still recognised in the new constitution, 
it was easy to forget that in many communities they are almost more respected among their 
people than the Norwegian king is in Norway.  
 
In the Workshop in Kwamshanga, Mpumalanga, where I met the Ndebele King C N 
Mahlangu (Mayisha II), I made the entire delegation from the Law Commission and the 
Department of Constitutional Development hold their breath in anxiety. They had just 
introduced me as a Norwegian researcher, when they suddenly realised that I probably did not 
                                                 
118 See press statements from Statistic South Africa on the findings in Census’96 launch on 20 October 1998.
119 Yin 1984:87. 
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know that it would be extremely rude to put out my hand to initiate a handshake. Since I was 
not of royal blood that gesture would have been a severe offence. I do not know why I choose 
not to do this mechanical gesture, but in the car on our way back to Pretoria, the government 
officials burst out in a relieved debate on what might have happened with the entire meeting if 
I had offended him. So, although I had attended the Workshop to get information about 
different groups of people and their argument on the Discussion Paper, the experience turned 
out to be an observation of customs and power structures.  
 
The Workshop was predominantly on Zulu, QwaNdebele and Setswana, and the government 
officials were only able to give me sporadic translations. The meeting became extremely 
important in order to comprehend how consultation was arranged and also to provide an 
indication of the actual authorities of the traditional leaders I am analysing. It also became 
clear that the researcher can in some cases have an effect on the event under observation, and 
the event might proceed differently because it is being observed. This leads me to the next 
topic, that though you feel you are transparent, you might not be so in relation to the people 
observed.  
 
In all studies and especially in studies of a foreign context it is important to remember Van 
Maanens words; “While the fieldworker is undertaking a study of others, others are 
undertaking a study of the fieldworker”.120 During my stay in South Africa my background as 
a western, white woman became very apparent, an observable fact reinforced since my 
interest was to study a somewhat sensitive subject for many involved in the process. After I 
had spent some time together with people involved, many said to me “I became so anxious the 
first time you came her, asking question about the process of recognising African traditional 
institutions. I thought why is she interested in this? Is she going to understand what we are 
trying to do? Will she go back to Norway and tell crazy stories about those mad people down 
in South Africa?” The fact that they told me about their first impressions, made me feel that I 
managed to be trusted, at least by some informants. However, it is obvious that when you 
enter the field, just interested in gathering sources of evidence, people are studying you. Due 
to the legacy of earlier regimes many Africans are quite sceptical towards a white person, and 
in regard to multiculturalism many female researchers are known as liberalist suspicious of 
culture and traditions originating from outside the western countries. It is apparent that many 
                                                 
120 Van Maanen, John, “Fieldworks on the beat” in Van Maanen et al. Varieties of qualitative research,. 
California: Sage Publication, 1982:110. 
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asked themselves; “is she a racist, is she a feminist, is she as a western person able to 
understand our customs?” 
 
To not always be known as “the Norwegian researcher” and also to get firsthand information 
about rural communities, I did a field study in a rural area. I was pretending to be an 
accidental tourist, with no further interest in traditions and customs other than that of normal 
curiosity. In a village outside Eshowe in Zululand this turned out to be quite enjoyable when I 
visited a traditional leader together with my male companion. The traditional leader always 
turned to my companion when he spoke of the doings and customs of the village, and only 
turned to speak with me once: when he told me how to be a nice, submissive wife! 
Observations are of course always biased, and one should not read this event as a 
representative evidence of traditional leaders’ views of women. I do, however, think that the 
table had turned in this situation if I had introduced myself as a Norwegian researcher 
studying traditional African institutions. Observations done in the country under investigation, 
are of course ever-present. As for instance, many urban young people that I by chance met did 
not know about the process of recognising cultural difference. To realise this was another 
interesting information in my venture to grasp the full perspective of the case studied.  
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4. A conditioned constitutional recognition of traditional authorities  
 
The core question in the subsequent two chapters of this analysis is whether the new South 
African democratic order is able to both secure the right to be equal and the right to be 
recognised for who you are through the protection of cultures. As argued earlier, there seems 
to be a theoretical incongruence between these two principles, is this theoretical dilemma also 
prominent in the new South African constitution and the process of implementing the new 
democratic order?  
 
In the South African negotiation towards a fully democratic constitution, where all shared the 
same political rights, the ANC became one of the strongest negotiation parties. ANC as 
opposed to the earlier apartheid system based on an institutional engineering of cultural 
cleavages, were not particular interested in giving in to claims of self-representation raised by 
cultural and ethnic groups. The previous systems had so ruthlessly uncovered what a policy 
aimed at mirroring cultural diversity could be. The new South Africa was to be colour-blind 
in its political set up with entrenched human rights. Knowing this, why did the traditional 
African leaders as the only specific cultural group manage to be recognised for their 
difference in the final constitution? In the final constitution their recognition was conditioned, 
but in the interim constitution traditional authorities and institutions were almost fully 
recognised. Why did the ANC compromise their views in regard to traditional African 
institutions and authorities? Why did the traditional leaders find themselves at such a 
relatively strong position in the negotiations, and why did their ability to influence the final 
constitution diminish? Initially, it might be revealing to present an overview of the different 
political negotiators and positions in the South African transition to democracy, before I 
center my attention to only matters concerning traditional African traditions and authorities.  
 
4.1 An overview of the political negotiators and their constitutional proposals  
 
Throughout the 80s there had been extensive debates in South Africa on the subject of a new 
Democratic order. One of the most well known works on the subject matter was Arend 
Lijphart’s contribution to the debate, Power-Sharing in South Africa.121 In this work, Lijphart 
                                                 
121 In the context of this analysis I regard Lijpharts contribution as a source of evidence, and not as theory to be 
analysed. Lijphart puts forward a practical suggestion, which early in the process came to be rejected. The 
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presents four basic elements of consociational democracy, which he argued was the most 
suitable democratic model for South Africa. These elements are 1) Executive power-sharing 
among the representatives of all significant groups: 2) A high degree of internal autonomy for 
groups that wish to have it: 3) Proportional representation and proportional allocation of civil 
service positions and public funds and: 4) A minority veto on the most vital issues. As other 
models such as the majority democracy, he argued, would be “both unfair and unworkable in 
a society that is as deeply divided as South Africa”.122 Further he stated that this political 
system would “inevitably lead to the violation of the rights of minorities, both black and 
white, to ethnic and racial polarization, and to civil war and/or dictatorship”.123  
 
This model highly influenced the National Party’s (NP) proposal for the drafting of a new 
South African constitution in the early 90s. The NP formed the sitting government, and as 
Lijphart they argued that in a plural and divided society as South Africa, a majoritarian 
system would not provide sufficient dynamics. For instance the dynamic would be 
jeopardized in a democracy where the party cleavages coincide with the ethnic cleavages, 
since shifting majorities would not occur.124 Spitz and Chaskalson argues that this proposal 
also sought to entrench the government’s place in the new constitutional order.125 Since the 
NP, as the main representative of Afrikaans-speaking whites and of a large number of 
coloured and Indian voters, would be able to veto key ANC126 policy decisions. Minority 
parties with sufficient support would be guaranteed cabinet representation, the presidency 
would rotate among three to four members, and national decisions would be subject to 
consensus in the cabinet and the presidency.127 To secure the NP’s interests the party strived 
to agree upon a final constitution before the first free elections were held. Their support base 
was assumed to be smaller than that of the ANC, and it was important to secure as much of 
their interests as possible before the setting of the first National Assembly.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
theories under investigation are of a more normative, philosophic character, and they shed more light to the 
whole process of recognition.    
122 Lijphart, Arend Power-Sharing in South Africa, Policy Paper in International Affairs, no. 24, Institute of 
International Studies, California: University of California Berkeley, 1985:5. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Gloppen, Siri South Africa: The Battle over the constitution, Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1997:94. 
125 Spitz and Chaskalson 2000:16. 
126 All assumed that the ANC would be the largest party after the first free elections, an assumption that also 
came to be the correct.  
127 Spitz and Chaskalson  2000:16. 
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The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), based in the KwaZulu homeland, also supported the 
Consociational model, since this model implied stronger self-governmental rights for 
traditional institutions and their leaders, such as the Zulu chieftaincies. In theory, the IFP 
shared many of the government’s ideas. Including both a conscociational model of democracy 
and a market-driven free enterprise. However, as the negotiations started, it became clear that 
the process was primarily bilateral, with the bargaining between the ANC and the NP 
delegates as the leading force. IFP because of this became bedfellows with the KwaZulu 
Government, the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVF) and the Homeland 
governments of Bobhuthatswana and Ciskei, in other words a quite peculiar alliance. This 
alliance was called the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), and sought to form a 
third political power block. COSAG’s main manifesto was their oppositions to a unitary state, 
and required a strong system of federalism. Since this in practice would make it possible to 
found an Afrikaner Volkstaat, and strengthening the position of KwaZulu Natal and the earlier 
TBVC homelands.128
 
However, the consociational model of democracy was abandoned as the main guideline to the 
new South African constitution, which were finally signed in 1996. To form a Consociational 
Democracy brought with it too many similarities with the past, and was anathema to the ANC. 
Contrary to Lijphart, ANC highlighted a majoritarian democracy instead.129 Its readiness to 
make concessions in the negotiations was influenced by the awareness of the need for strong 
political intervention to eradicate the legacies of apartheid and transform the society into a 
just liberal democracy. The future was not to be in a democratic system stressing ethnic 
differences, it was to be in a system were everyone was regarded as equal no matter what 
“racial” category the apartheid government had labeled one with earlier. To secure this, one 
needed a strong unitary state with strong centralized power, and a strong foundation of 
universal human rights.130 In the new South Africa everyone should be equal before the law, 
and the slogan for the new nation building process was “unity in diversity”. But does this 
imply that no kinds of difference are recognised in the constitution?         
 
Lijphart had argued that due the plurality of South African society, one needed a political 
system that mirrored this diversity. In the final outcome, however, the plurality was not to be 
                                                 
128 For further information on the COSAG parties, see Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000:212 - 250. 
129 Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000:16.  
130 For further and more thorough readings on the transition to democracy in South Africa, see Gloppen, 1997 or 
Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000. 
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mirrored in the political system but to some extent in the system of law. In order to 
understand this unanticipated turn in the process of accommodating cultural difference, I am 
in this chapter going to analyse the process of drafting the new constitution of South Africa. 
In doing this I will first turn to the content of the interim constitution, and in accordance with 
this ask why did the traditional African leaders find themselves in such a strong position in 
the negotiations? Second, I am going to analyse the outcome of the final constitution, and ask 
why did the traditional leaders influence on the final document diminish after the 1994 
elections?    
 
4.2 Whose cultural institutions became protected in the interim constitution?  
 
Before I turn to why the traditional leaders got a relatively strong position in the negotiations, 
I am going to analyse the content of the interim constitution with regard to culture. There are 
two important aspects of the question of the weight of cultural rights in constitutional matters. 
The first aspect is whether the cultural right or recognition is subject to other constitutional 
principles or subject to legislation. In regard to other constitutional principles, this aspect sorts 
out which right that ought to take precedence in cases of conflicts between two principles. For 
instance, if the right to culture is subject to the right to be equal, a woman, if she is the first-
born child, cannot be denied the right to inherent property even though this is inconsistent 
with cultural practice. In regard to legislation, if cultural rights are not subjected to legislation, 
some legislation might be unconstitutional. Normal procedures in these cases are that you 
give a certain group the right to not be effected by this legislation. As for instance, if a 
medication is illegal, customary witch doctors might be given the right to use these substances 
in his practice due to cultural protection.  
 
This introduces the second aspect of the weight of cultural rights, which asks whether a 
cultural right is regarded as belonging to a group or individuals. As for instance, if one gives a 
group the right to practice a customary law system, one can be given a certain territory where 
the people living there are under the jurisdiction of customary law. The people living there do 
not then necessarily have the right to take a dispute to another court, since the right applies to 
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Box 4.1: Interim Constitution, Chapter 3: Fundamental Rights   
- protecting cultural rights   
Section: 31 Language and culture 
Every person shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice. 
 
a group. If however the right to practice customary law is an individual right, then the 
individuals themselves decide which court will try their case. In order to establish a coherent 
universal right system it is important to clarify these aspects of cultural rights. The interim 
constitution was as Nhlapo131 has argued more a kind to a peace treaty, than a fundamental 
law, and thus it reflects that political compromises inevitably is full of conflicts and 
inconsistent rights. ANC and the NP had agreed on a strategy of significant consensus in 
matters concerning the interim Constitution. The positive side of this strategy was that the 
process always was pushed forward, and one did not spend too much time lingering over 
potential conflicts. The negative side of this, however, was a highly inconsistent document, 
also in regard to questions of which weight the cultural rights were to hold. Were the cultural 
rights to be applied to groups? Were the cultural rights subject or not to other constitutional 
principles or to legislation?    
 
4.2.1 Interim constitution: Cultural recognition subject or not?  
 
There were two different kinds of cultural protection in the interim Constitution. The first is 
entrenched as a fundamental right, and is not group or culture specific, it is a right all citizens 
share. The second is a specific recognition of traditional authorities and customary law, but 
this recognition is not a fundamental right. Box 4.1 exposes the words of the right as it is 
listed in chapter 3 in the interim constitution. If one analyses the content of this cultural right 
one can see that it does not mention whether it is to be subject to other principles of the 
constitution. Often one uses another term in regard to the subjection of cultural rights. This 
term state that all basic universal rights such as political rights and the right to equality and 
certain freedoms are regarded as the predominant rights, when cultural rights and social rights 
are secondary rights. Section 31 does not settle the right to culture as a secondary right, and 
does not sort out the answer to questions such as; what if the cultural right comes into 
conflicts with other fundamental rights, which ought to take precedence? Since this is not 
                                                 
131 Nhlapo, Thandabantu, “African customary law in the interim Constitution” in Liebenberg (ed.),The 
Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective, Cape Town: Interpack, 1995:157. 
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Box 4.2: Interim Constitution, Chapter 12: Traditional Authority  
- subject to legislation  
Section 181: Recognition of traditional authorities and indigenous law 
(1) A traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law and is recognised by law immediately 
before the commencement of this Constitution, shall continue as such an authority and continue to exercise and 
perform the powers and functions vested in it in accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to any 
amendment or repeal of such laws and customs by a competent authority 
 (2) Indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law. 
 
 
specified, the cultural rights can be interpreted as not subject, and this implies a strong 
protection of the right to culture. Other liberal principles do not condition the cultural 
practices. An illustration of this is that in a liberal democratic society people are to have the 
right to elect the ones who to some extent possess political power over you. If a cultural right 
is not conditioned by these democratic mechanisms, a cultural group who possess some kind 
of power over its members might have authority based on heritance, and this practice is not 
unconstitutional since the cultural right is not conditioned by other constitutional principles. 
This implies that an unconditioned right to culture might deprive the members of a group the 
right to voice, since the power structure is predetermined by a cultural practice.  
 
In an interview Ngema the deputy director of the Rural Women’s Movement described this 
dilemma with these words: 
 
“There is a big difference between traditional leaders and the [local] governments. The governments are 
elected and the traditional leaders are appointed. The traditional leaders think that since they are born to 
it, they got the right to do everything they want. But the elected bodies need to be accountable to their 
constituencies. Because if the elected person is not doing what the people want him to do, the people 
have the right to say “No”, we do not want to elect you again. Well, the traditional leader is born into 
his position. So what do you do when you disagree with him? Sit down and wait for him to die? Then 
another takes over, and you hope that this one will fit in. So an elected government is much better than 
a traditional leader. There are however nice traditional leaders, and those might come. There are many 
traditional leaders who are leaders for their people. They are not like this. They are leaders for their 
people not for themselves.”132
  
Though liberal mechanisms always emphasise the right to voice, these mechanisms might be 
influenced in a society where one entrench a strong protection of culture in the constitution.  
                                                 
132 Ngema, Popi, interview in Johannesburg the 16th of July 1999. 
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Box 4.3: Interim Constitution, Chapter 12: Traditional Authority 
-  their role and function on the different levels 
Section 182: Traditional authorities and local government 
The traditional leader of a community observing a system of indigenous law and residing on land within the area 
of jurisdiction of an elected local government referred to in Chapter 10, shall ex officio be entitled to be a 
member of that local government, and shall be eligible to be elected to any office of such local government. 
Section 183: Provincial House of Traditional Leaders 
(1) a):The legislature of each province in which there are traditional authorities and their communities, shall 
establish a House of Traditional Leaders consisting of representatives elected or nominated by such authorities in 
the province. 
Section 184: Council of Traditional Leaders 
(1) There is herby established a Council of Traditional Leaders consisting of a chairperson and 19 
representatives elected by traditional authorities in the republic. 
(4)  The Council shall, in addition to any other powers or functions assigned to by any law, be competent- 
(a)  to advise to any matter pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs of 
traditional communities anywhere in the Republic, or any other matters having a bearing thereon; and 
(b)  at the request of the President, to advise him or her on any matter of national interests. 
 (5) (d) If the Council fails to indicate within the period prescribed by paragraph (5b) whether it supports or 
oppose the Bill, Parliament may proceed with the Bill.     
 
 
The second kind of cultural protection mentioned in the interim constitution complicates these 
dilemmas even further. These sections of the constitution settle the recognition of traditional 
authorities and customary law. However the question of subjection was of immense difficulty 
when it came to traditional authorities. With the legacy of the colonial and apartheid system in 
South Africa, the question of “subject” African authorities brought with it a history of western 
jurisprudence unable to fully recognising the African system of law. As one can see in Box 
4.2 the traditional leaders recognition is subject to legislation. This might be infected by the 
interim Constitution’s purpose. It was only to function until a final constitution was signed, 
and this might imply that one at this stage saw the importance of reforming the traditional 
authority and customary law, but one did not reach a clear understanding of its position in the 
future democracy. This might imply that at the same time as one were interested in 
recognising traditional authorities and institutions, one was aware of the problems connected 
with it, such as the dilemma Ngema pointed at above. Though it is subject to legislation, it is 
as one can see in Box 4.3, not subject to other principles of in the constitution. In this way is a 
strong protection of traditional customs and institutions they 
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Box 4.4: Interim Constitution, Chapter 11A: A Volkstaat Council  
- constitutional guarantee of the establishment of a Afrikaner Volksaat Council 
Section 184: B Functions of Council 
(1) The Council shall serve as a constitutional mechanism to enable proponents of the idea of a Volkstaat to 
constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a Volkstaat, and shall for this purpose be competent – 
(a)to gather, process and make available information with regard to possible boundaries, powers and functions 
and legislative, executive and other structures of such a Volkstaat, its suggested constitutional relationship with 
government at national and provincial level, and any other matter directly relevant to the establishment of such a 
Volksaat; 
 
 “shall continue… to perform the powers and functions vested in it accordance with the 
applicable laws and customs”. This section does still not abolish the Black Administration Act 
of 1927 see chapter 1.2.3. 
 
However, despite the dilemmas connected to traditional authorities in a liberal democracy, 
Box 4.3 does illustrate that one at this stage did have a clear understanding of the functions of 
the traditional leaders. The interim Constitution specifies the legislative powers of the 
traditional leaders through an establishment of Traditional Houses at provincial and national 
level. It states that the legislature “shall” establish these houses in order to make it possible for 
traditional leaders to be consulted in issues of interest of traditional leaders, institutions and 
communities. Secondly, it states out the executive authority of traditional leaders at local 
level. In accordance to section 182 in Box 4.3 the traditional leaders shall be ex officio 
members of the local government. Further it is also clear on the question regarding legislative 
authority on local level, since it argues that traditional leaders “shall be eligible to be elected 
to any office of such local government”. This box 4.3 is only an excerpt of the content of the 
interim Constitution, but it is illustrative for my argument. The traditional authorities and 
institutions were recognised as partakers of the political system in the future, though certain 
issues, regarding the exercise and content were subject to further legislation. This implies that 
the traditional leaders political role in the future democratic structure is not subject to other 
legislature, since it states the they “shall” establish the Houses and “shall” let the traditional 
leader have a say in local governments.  
 
One can however, argue that the recognition of traditional leaders was not the only specific 
recognition given to a certain group. The interim also gives a constitutional right for 
Afrikaners to establish a Volkstat Council. As Box 4.4 implies this council is to sort out what 
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there is to be done in order to establish a Volkstat Council. The interim constitution thus only 
recognises that this is to be investigated, it does not settle the right to actually establish these 
houses. They are only to be established if this Council make available information that a 
further legislative assembly can agree upon.    
 
4.2.2 Interim constitution: Group or individual right? 
 
Are then the rights and recognition of culture supposed to be applied to groups or individuals?  
This is a complex question, and the interim constitution is quite incoherent considering this 
matter. In regard to the cultural right in the chapter on fundamental rights presented in Box 
4.1, it is stated, “all persons shall have the right to … participate in the cultural right of his or 
her choice”. This implies that all cultural rights are to be held by individuals not groups. 
Cultural practices are then not to be imposed on any individual, it is only a freedom that 
individual share. It is thus the individual not the group that is the bearer of rights.  
 
But how is this to be understood in accordance with customary law and traditional 
authorities? The sections listed in Box 4.3 only gives a right to certain people to partake in 
political structures. This is a personal right given to some individuals due to their position. If 
these individuals are the only ones consulted and also given rights to possess some political 
powers, then they are given some power to impose their understanding of cultural practise 
upon others. The question is as follow: do members of these groups have the formal right to 
exit, or even the possibility to exit? The interim Constitution does not specify how many 
percentages of the local government that actually might be ex offico members of the 
government. In a community, it is thus possible that quite an extensive part of the government 
is traditional leaders. This would make it difficult to exit for persons living in these 
communities. In regard to judicial authority in Box 4.2, the customary law is to be applied as 
earlier. The question is here between the right to exit and the possibilities of exit. Are there 
any other options available than customary courts? All areas do have a magistrate court, but is 
it optional to try your case in these? Formally, the right to choose between different systems 
of law exists, but in many rural societies this is not an optional choice in day-to-day life. 
 
However it is difficult to answer whether this is a group right or not. It is probably intended to 
be an individual right. ANC’s delegate on the issue in the negotiation, Penuell Maduna, was 
very clear on the issue: “The new constitutional order cannot avoid placing the individual at 
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the centre of things. The basic unit of society is the individual. The individual is then linked to 
all sorts of groups - for example to a trade union, a parent-teacher association, or a church. 
But these entities cannot be allowed to dictate the individual’s right and his or her enjoyment 
thereof.”133 It is probably intended to be an individual right, but the interim constitution it not 
sufficiently clear on the subject.  
 
The protection of traditional authority and custom in the interim constitution is quite strong, 
even though it is quite unclear in certain matters. For the governments of the earlier 
homelands this result is probably less approving then desired in the beginning of the 
negotiation process. Diverging traditional leaders had tried to argue for the need of self-
determination in the earlier homelands. When it became clear that this was not an obtainable 
option, they started to lobby for constitutional protection in the chapter on Fundamental 
Rights. One of the reasons why customary rights were not entrenched as a constitutional right 
was the ANC‘s belief in the unquestionable right of the individual. Still the recognition of 
traditional leaders is stronger than any other recognition of cultural authorities and 
institutions. However, the document seemed unclear in regard to the two measures I have 
discussed in this chapter. Was the final constitution to become more coherent on the subject 
of cultural protection? Were the agitators for cultural rights able to fasten their grip on the 
process, or did their influence diminish? Before I turn to these questions, it would be 
illuminating to ask why the traditional authorities had found themselves in such a strong 
position in the negotiation process? Why were their claims more vital than the claims of 
establishing an Afrikaner Volkstaat?   
 
4.3 Three aspects effecting cultural accommodation 
 
In order to answer these questions it is fruitful to put forward three different aspects that had 
an effect on the outcome of the interim constitution regarding cultural recognition. First, there 
is what I have called the centre-periphery aspect, which argues that these institutions are to 
such a high degree incorporated in the rural society, that it would create severe practical 
problems to actually abolish them. Secondly, there is what I have called the ethical aspect, 
which includes a recognition of institutions discriminated in the past. Thirdly, there is what I 
                                                 
133 Interview with Penuell Maduna in Pretoria, January 1996 by Spitz and Chaskalson 2000: 391.  
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have called a strategic aspect, which is based profoundly on the potential of the traditional 
leaders to mobilise electoral support.      
 
4.3.1 The centre-periphery aspect 
 
A problem connected to the establishment of an Afrikaner Volkstaat was that no such thing 
existed prior to the 1994 elections. As the interim constitution stated one needed “to gather, 
process and make available information with regard to possible boundaries, powers and 
functions and legislative, executive and other structures of such a Volkstaat”.134 Spitz and 
Chaskalson have argued that the AVF parties did not agree among themselves on which 
territory they wanted. One line of thinking was that the Afrikaner people should be 
empowered where they were in their greatest concentration, Pretoria and its surroundings. The 
alternative line saw the Volkstaat as a culmination of a process of creating a state, a state that 
would be developed from nothing in a designed area.135 In both cases this meant that a 
Volkstaat in order to function actually had to be invented and given territorial space within the 
boarders of the republic. 
 
Customary Law and traditional African institutions, however, did exist. Though they in many 
cases represented something unclear and backward for the negotiators with predominantly 
urban background, a sever number of the rural population were effected by them. The 
question asked was; what are we to do with these institutions? Figure 4.1 attempts to illustrate 
the areas in which the traditional leaders probably obtained strong power. The map of the 
homeland areas consists of the ten territories established as “independent” or “self-
governmental” by the Apartheid governments, combined with the 9 new provinces established 
in the interim constitution.136  
 
The ANC had started to find strategies towards how one were to address and infiltrate the 
rural areas already at a National Consultative Conference in Zambia, 1985. In a report 
presented after this conference it is obvious that one wanted to mobilise the inhabitants of 
rural areas: “Considerable attention was given to the question of the Bantustans. It was 
generally felt that in view of our weaknesses in the Bantustans and relative acquiescence there 
                                                 
134 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa act 200 of 1993 Chapter 11A inserted by s. 9 of Act 2 of 1994 
135 Spitz and Chaskalson 2000: 228 
136 Before the first elections the names of the provinces were a little bit different, but I have presented the final 
names of the provinces.  
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Figur 4.1: Map combinding the new provinces with the earlier homelands  
 
 
 
Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 1986 and 1995
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we review our policy towards Bantustans. It is no longer enough to denounce the fraudulence 
of these racist institutions; we must devise effective means to mobilise the people to oppose 
these regimes.”137 Due to this it seems like the ANC started to be conscious of the fact that it 
were people in exile and people in urban areas who were the main vehicle in ANC. At this 
conference they viewed this as the strategy towards the rural area: “We must give 
consideration to opposition parties within the Bantustans, boycotts and building up ANC 
structures in these areas. The more notorious puppets should be eliminated whilst opposition 
parties in these Bantustans must be targets for infiltration and, if found suitable, assisted 
covertly with finance etc. Bantustan armies should be targeted for infiltration.”138 The reports 
further state a strongly recommendation for specific machineries to be set up in forward areas 
to deal specifically with Bantustans. 
 
The ANC strategy and rhetoric towards the Bantustans changed in the late eighties, and 
though many still viewed these structure as extremely racist, it seems like their awareness of 
their weakness to influence the rural communities made them compromise on their 
revolutionary character. The country was at a rickety stage, and piecemeal transformation 
would probably be the only way to reform the traditional communities. The National Party, 
who was in favour of group rights and self-determination, argued up to the negotiations that 
these areas were not necessarily a part of the new South Africa.  
 
The NP’s president, De Klerk, in a speech, also mentioned in chapter 1.2.5, at the opening of 
the parliament in February 1990 address the question in these manners: “In recent times there 
has been an interesting debate about the future relationship of the TBVC countries with South 
Africa and specifically about whether they should be re-incorporated into our country. 
Without rejecting this idea out of hand, it should be born in mind that it is but one of many 
possibilities. These countries are constitutionally independent. Any return to South Africa will 
have to be dealt with, not only by means of legislation in their parliaments, but also through 
legislation in this Parliament. Naturally this will have to be preceded by talks and 
agreements.”139 The NP was thus interested in keeping these areas as “neighbouring 
countries”, probably they would not be able to control and mobilise the rural areas without the 
support and a firm hand of the government of the homelands. Giving these territories self- 
                                                 
137 African National Congress, National Preparatory Committee Documents, National Consultative Conference, 
Kabwe, Zambia, June 1985. 
138 Ibid. 
139 De Klerk, FW, Opening speech of the parliament, the 2nd of February 1990. 
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Table 4.1: Rural and non-rural settlement in the different provinces140
 
  
EASTERN 
CAPE 
 
FREE 
STATE 
 
GUTENG 
 
KWAZULU 
NATAL 
 
MPUMA-
LANGA 
 
NORTH. 
CAPE 
 
NORTH. 
PROV. 
 
NORTH 
WEST 
 
WESTERN 
CAPE 
 
Urban 
 
36.6 68.6 97.0 43.1 39.1 70.1 11.0 34.9 88.9
 
Non- 
Urban 
63.4 31.4 3.0 56.9 60.9 29.9 98.0 65.1 11.1
 
Total 
 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
governmental rights would make the African rural communities outside national policies, and 
the space of the NP would be larger.   
 
The problem, however, was that both the ANC and the NP were centred in the urban areas, 
and did not know the sentiments of people towards traditional authorities in rural 
communities. As one can see on Table 4.1 there are vast differentiation between the provinces 
due to percentages of urban and rural inhabitants. In the population Census from 1996, three 
years after the drafting of the interim Constitution, 46.3% of the population lived in rural 
areas. There are no statistical measurers on how many percent of the population who are 
living under traditional authorities in the different provinces. If one looks at the map in Figure 
4.1, and compare it with the percentages presented in Table 4.1, one might anticipate that 
quite an extensive part of the rural population in Eastern Cape, Northern Province141, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and the North West live under the jurisdiction of traditional 
leaders. In some of the rural parts of the country, many expected the traditional authorities 
powers to be tremendous, and they doubted whether it actually was possible to change the 
social circumstances in the rural areas with a formal, constitutional abolition of customary law 
and traditional institutions.  
 
According to Houston and Somadoda142 there are over 16.5 million rural people in South 
Africa which live under the jurisdiction of approximately 800 traditional leaders assisted by 
                                                 
140 Statistics South Africa, Census 96. 
141 From the 12th of February 2002 this province is called Limpopo, but it will be referred to as Northern 
Province in this thesis.   
142 Houston, G F & Somadoda, F P, Constitutional development and the issue of traditional leadership in rural 
local government in South Africa. Paper presented at the International Conference on the new South African 
Constitution at the Holiday Inn, Umtata. 25-26 April 1996:1 
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10 000 traditional councilors. Others have estimated that the number of people living under 
traditional authorities might be up to 18 million people, but also down to 11 million people.143 
The number would also depend on the operationalisation of “living under traditional 
authority”. Studies such as those of Sandra B. Burman144 have revealed that it is quite 
common, especially in urban areas, to actually live under both common and customary law. It 
depends both on the situation and what is been regarded most favorable in a certain situation. 
These studies also reveal that people outside the borders of the earlier homelands do live by 
customary traditions, it is not only a rural phenomenon of earlier Homelands. Due to this 
scarcity of statistical evidence, it is important to remember that the numbers presented to the 
political negotiators, were even more inaccurate. They did not have any statistical evidence 
backing their argumentation, though many believed that quite an extensive part of the 
population were loyal to traditional institutions. In many opinions sweeping away traditional 
institutions might have caused severe social problems, and recognising traditional institutions 
might be a necessity in accommodating rural conditions. 
 
These reflections might also have been influenced by experiences from the neighbouring 
countries. It was known that even though the post-colonial governments had tried to abolish 
customary law and traditional institutions, this was more complicated than expected.  
Chanock145 argues that countries with both a weak state and a weak western-trained legal elite 
had particular difficulties with sweeping aside traditional institutions. In Mozambique where a 
radical mass party took over government after a liberation struggle, the traditional institutions 
were abolished. However, the state was not strong enough to actually remove the institutions 
from rural people’s day-to-day life.  
 
Zimbabwe has a history closer to that of South Africa, with a strong state and the legacy of a 
thoroughly administered and oppressive white indirect-rule. As implementers of the colonial 
policies the traditional leaders ended up having minimal authority in a short period before and 
after independence. The chiefs were replaced by an elected structure of local government, and 
by state-appointed judicial officials. In according to Keulder, even though the state was 
                                                 
143 While some as Charmaine French in “Functions and Powers of Traditional Leaders” Occasional Papers, 
Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg, 1994:20, argue that it is about 18 million people who are loyal to the 
institutions, other such as Ando Donkers and Renata Murray in “Prospects and problems facing traditional 
leaders in South Africa” in de Villier, 1997:40, argues that it might be 11 million.    
144 Burman, Sandra B. ”The Interaction of Legislation relating to Urban Africans and the Laws regualting Family 
Relationships” in Urban Black Law ed. by Bennett T. W. et al, Cape Town:  JUTA & Co, Ltd, 1984:89. 
145 Chanock, 1991:58 – 62. 
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comparatively strong in regard to other African states, the policies towards traditional leaders 
started to change in the early 90s, and political reforms were proposed which would return 
many of their former powers and functions as traditional leaders.146 In South Africa the 
politicians were afraid of doing the same mistake, and ANC knew out of other countries 
experiences, that if one tried to abolish the institutions, they would still exist as informal 
hidden structures in the rural communities. It was thus important to take charge of the 
situation and encourage to a deliberation around the subject; what are we to do with these 
institutions in the future?  
 
4.3.2 The ethical aspect 
 
Though it might be a social necessity to recognise the traditional authorities, the question also 
had an ethical side. The traditional authorities had started to point at the issue of its 
institutions being discriminated in the past. When it comes to the question of giving a group 
special treatment because of discrimination in the past, it is in most cases quite controversial. 
This was also the case in South Africa. The question of giving customary law and traditional 
institutions recognition not only created divisions between the parties, it also split the parties 
internally. Within the ANC the differences were particularly deep-seated.147 In both the past 
and the present, there were both formal and informal bonds between the ANC and the 
traditional authorities. Leading ANC figures, like for instance Nelson Mandela,148 came from 
a royal origin, and no matter how their relationship with these institutions had been in the 
past, it was apparent, that as all African people living within the borders of South Africa, they 
had also been through centuries of discrimination.  
 
The reputation of traditional leaders among many young and also urban inhabitants were, 
however, very biased, because many accused the traditional leaders of actually having used 
their position in the apartheid system to secure their own particular interests. The National 
Executive Committee of the ANC did as late as in 1986 have this attitude towards the 
“collaborators” in the Bantustans: “Let us mobilise everywhere to smash the Bantustans and 
to isolate the puppets who continue to collaborate with apartheid. The few Bantustan office-
                                                 
146 Keulder, Christian, “Traditional leaders and comparative experiences” in De Villiers, The Rights of 
Indigenous People: A Quest for Coexistence, , Pretoria: Human Science Research Centre, 1997:74 - 80 
147 Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000:381. 
148 Mandela is the son of a chief councillor to the paramount chief of the Thembu in Transkei, who later became 
his guardian when his father died. Instead of becoming a chief himself, Mandela ran off to Johannesburg at the 
age of 22 partly to avoid an arranged traditional wedding.  
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bearers who are aligning themselves with the democratic movement are showing the real way 
forward.”149 This official statement reveals that most of the Bantustan officials were regarded 
as puppets, but there was someone who started to align themselves to the democratic 
movement. However, the rhetoric used by the ANC in accordance to the traditional authorities 
started to change in the late eighties, and they soon started to be interested in accommodating 
traditional institutions and customs to some extent. So how much accommodation was one to 
give these institutions in the future?  
 
Formal relations between the chiefs and the ANC can be traced back to 1912 when the ANC 
was formed. A considerable number of the founding members of this liberation struggle were 
chiefs. Another formal relation was for instance Chief Albert Luthuli, a minor Zulu chief, who 
was elected as ANC’s president from 1952 to 1967, and won the Nobel Peace Price in 1960. 
However, in the 1950s the ANC had been through a decade of radicalisation, and when the 
National Party in government started their Homeland policies in the 50s and 60s, the 
relationship between the chiefs and the ANC was put to a test. Some traditional leaders did 
revolt as a reaction to the Apartheid policies. These traditional leaders went into exile, and the 
government started to offer subordinate headmen recognition if they accepted the 
establishment of Tribal Authorities. As Van Kessel and Oomen have put it: “Chiefs had 
become civil servants, to be hired, fired, paid and, if necessary, created by the 
government.”150 As a liberation movement, the ANC did not longer perceive the chiefs as 
potential allies, and the proliferation of chieftaincies also eroded their legitimacy further 
because of the doubtful origins of many chiefs. 
 
ANC started to consider the road to power as an urban phenomenon with urban guerrilla 
activity in combination with indefinite strikes and mass rising, as the main path forward. 
Officially the ANC never denounced the traditional institutions, but many leading figures in 
ANC assumed that chieftaincies would either die of its own accord or otherwise somehow be 
abolished.151 For many, such as Govan Mbeki, traditional institutions were regarded as 
backward: “If the Africans have had chiefs, it was because all human societies have had them  
                                                 
149 African National Congress, National Executive Committee, From ungovernability to People’s Power, ANC 
Archive, Historical Documents, 1986. 
150 Van Kessel and Oomen, ’One Chief, One vote’: The Revival of Traditional Authorities in post-apartheid 
South Africa, African Affairs, 1997:564. 
151 Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997:565. 
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Box 4.5:  Contralesa and the ANC using the ethical aspect in an appeal to traditional 
leaders in August 1989152
The future of our motherland lies in the hands of the people, the victims of oppression and dispossession, and the 
courageous fighters against this evil system. Among these multitudes are hundreds of patriotic chiefs: deposed, 
harassed and even killed, but forever unbowed. We salute these brave patriots, deserved heirs of the glorious 
tradition of no surrender shown by our forebears in the wars of resistance of past centuries. 
 
Our traditional leaders feel very keenly the effects of the apartheid system. The very institution of chieftainship 
has been overturned and abused by the racist rulers. From leaders responsible and responsive to the people, you 
are being forced by the regime to become its paid agents. From being a force for unity and prosperity you are 
turned into perpetrators of division, poverty and want among the oppressed. The so-called homeland system, 
land deprivation, forced removals and the denial of basic political rights - all these and more are the anti-people 
policies that the white ruling clique forces the chiefs to implement on its behalf. 
 
at one stage or another. But when a people have developed to a stage which discards 
chieftainship, when their social development contradicts the need for such an institution, then 
to force it on them is not liberation but enslavement.”153 Conversely, even tough the new 
generation inside the ANC started to regard the traditional institutions as ghosts from the past, 
they still existed. And even more important; in 1987 a self-declared ANC-aligned 
organization of chiefs was launched, called the Congress of Traditional Leaders (Contralesa).  
 
Contralesa was met with an ambivalent response; could “progressive chiefs” actually organise 
themselves and fight for a unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa? The answers were 
sceptical, but in February 1988 the ANC gave Contralesa it’s blessing, and welcomed the 
”chiefs back to the people”.154 Box 4.5 is an excerpt from a joint communiqué between 
Contralesa and the ANC were they urge traditional leaders to join the democratic movement. 
The traditional leaders, who ANC just a few years earlier had characterised as collaborators, 
were now patriotic victims of the apartheid system. This was the defining moment of the 
ANC’s attitude towards the traditional authorities, and it marked the start of a quite 
ambiguous ANC policy towards them. On one hand, members that represented Contralesa in 
the negotiations to democracy, such as Stella Sicgau and Patekile Holomisa, were also 
prominent ANC politicians. Further, ANC also acknowledged the need for recognising 
                                                 
152 Joint Communiqué by Contralesa and the ANC, “Appeal to all Traditional Leaders of South Africa” 19th of 
August 1989.   
153 Mbeki, Govan, The Peasant Revolt, (1964; Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1984:47) cited in Van Kessel and 
Oomen, 1997:565.   
154 Zuma, Thando, The role of the Chiefs in the struggle for liberation, African Communist, 121, 1990:65-76.  
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institutions that had been discriminated in the past, especially since these institutions represent 
valuable, old African traditions. On the other hand, ANC worked to achieve a thorough 
transformation of the apartheid society and the political system. Brief historical moments of 
sporadic chief involvement in the liberation struggle were certainly not a sufficient aspect for 
the ANC’s official policy to recognise conservative and, in many ways, illiberal institutions 
such as customary law and traditional authorities.  
 
The ethical aspect might have influenced the position of the traditional leaders, but it could 
not be the only aspect that gave the traditional leaders a relative strong lobby power in the 
negotiations. As a contrast, the ones that argued for an Afrikaner Volkstaat could not use this 
argument. Conversely, they anticipated that there were high probabilities of being 
discriminated in the future. In a democratic order based on liberal ideas, this argument was 
not welcomed by the ANC, since their main venture was to transform the society into a just 
place to live for all in the future.    
 
4.3.3 The strategic aspect 
 
Since the African population of South Africa had never been a part of the electorate, it was 
difficult to postulate how much potential the traditional leaders had in mobilising political 
support. Diverging incidents indicated that the potential of traditional leaders was difficult to 
estimate. According to Spitz and Chaskalson both the ANC and the NP out of electoral 
consideration tried to act like they paid attention to the destiny of the chiefs. The parties 
believed that if they involved themselves in matters such as customary law’s position in the 
new constitution, traditional communities would support them.  
 
The NP’s strategy was to work for self-government rights through a system of federalism. De 
Klerk highlighted in his main features of a constitutional transition that one needed to provide 
for self-representation for cultural groups in the new constitution. In regard to regional 
governments he stated: “If some of the present regional authorities still exist when the 
Transitional Constitution comes into effect, they will continue to exist for the time being; 
provided that a TBVC state may participate in the transitional dispensation by undergoing a  
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Table 4.2: Provincial Legislature results 1994 elections (percentages) 155
 EASTERN 
CAPE 
FREE 
STATE 
GAUTENG KWAZULU 
NATAL 
MPUMA- 
LANGA 
NORTH. 
CAPE 
NORTH. 
PROV. 
NORTH 
WEST 
WESTERN 
CAPE 
ACDP         0.5         0.5           0.6          1.0         0.5         0.0        0.4       0.4          1.2 
ANC        84.4       76.7         57.6         32.3       80.7       49.7      91.6     83.3        33.0 
DP          2.1         0.6           5.3            2.1         0.6        1.9        0.2       0.5           6.5
IFP          0.2         0.5           3.7          50.3         1.5        0.4        0.1       0.4          0.4 
NP          9.8       12.6         23.9          11.2         9.0       40.5        3.3        8.8         53.3
PAC          2.0         1.8          1.5            0.7         1.6        0.9         1.3        1.7           1.1
FF/VF          0.8         6.0           6.2            0.5         5.7        6.0         2.2       4.6          2.1 
Other         0.2         1.4           1.3            2.2         0.5        0.2         1.0       0.2         2.7 
Total        100        100         100          100        100        100        100       100        100 
(ACDP=African Christian Democratic Party, DP=Democratic Party, PAC=Pan Africanist Congress, FF/VF= 
Freedoms Front/Vryheidsfront) 
 
transformation of status beforehand from independent state to self-governing territory.”156 The 
NP’s eagerness to constitutionalise minority rights was regarded as an attempt to secure its 
position in the new South Africa more then a concern for African traditional authorities. 
ANC’s former revolutionary strategy could have intimidated the chiefs, but if they turned 
towards them in reconciliation they could appeal to the more progressive ones. With a 
probability amounting almost to certainty, ANC argued that they would be the majority party 
after the elections, and thus an important strategic alliance in the future.  
 
For the ANC it was important to secure this majority, and they were conscious of the fact that 
militant ANC youth groups in the 80s had alienated not only the tribal hierarchies but also 
large sections of the adult population in the rural areas.157 In a new negotiated democratic 
future the ANC needed as much support as possible. At the same time various chiefs started to 
adapt to a new future, and many aimed at being regarded as democratic strategic alliances, 
rather than relics of a feudal past.158 The reason for this was their strategic weapon, - the 
delivering of a “block vote”. An example of this was a statement in 1990 by a Zulu chief, 
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, who was a prominent Contralesa member: “Once a chief has 
identified himself with us, then we know that the whole tribe or the majority of the people in 
that area are now with the progressive forces.”159 Contralesa became an important rural  
                                                 
155 The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. 
156 De Klerk FW, Letter to Nelson Mandela, Annexure F, Regional Government, the 2nd of July 1992. 
157 Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997:571. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Payze, Catherine, “The elimination of political opponents: the Maphumulo assination” in Minnaar et al. 
Patterns of violence: case studies of conflicts in Natal, Pretoria: Human Science Research Council, 1992:247 –
258.   
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Table 4.3: Home language by province (percentages)160
 EASTERN 
CAPE 
FREE 
STATE 
GAUT- 
ENG 
KWAZU. 
NATAL 
MPUMA-
LANGA 
NORTH. 
CAPE 
NORTH. 
PROV. 
NORTH 
WEST 
WESTERN 
CAPE 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Afrikaans          9.9   14.5   16.7     1.6 8.3 69.3 2.2 7.5 59.2 14.4
English          3.7     1.3   13.0 15.8 2.0 2.4 0.4 1.0 20.3 8.8
IsiNdebele          0.0     0.2     1.6 0.0 12.5 0.0 1.5 1.3 0.1 1.5
IsiXhosa        83.8     9.4     7.5 1.6 1.3 6.3 0.2 5.4 19.1 17.9
IsiZulu          0.4     4.8   21.5 79.8 25.4 0.3 0.7 2.5 0.1 22.9
Sepedi          0.0     0.2     9.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 52.7 4.0 0.0 9.2
Sesotho          2.2   62.1   13.1 0.5 3.2 0.9 1.1 5.1 0.4 7.7
SiSwati          0.0     0.1     1.3 0.1 30.0 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.0 2.5
Setswana          0.0     6.5     7.9 0.0 2.7 19.9 1.4 67.2 0.1 8.2
Tshivenda          0.0     0.1     1.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 15.5 0.4 0.0 2.2
Xitsonga          0.0     0.5     5.3 0.0 3.5 0.0 22.6 4.7 0.0 4.4
Other          0.2     0.3     1.3 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6
Total        100    100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
partner in the ANC’s broader strategy to isolate the NP‘s support base, and many chiefs 
started to view Contralesa as the best forum to safeguard their interests under a future ANC-
led government. In Northern Province161 Contralesa managed to recruit a quite considerate 
number of chiefs, and if one looks at Table 4.2 one can see that in the Provincial Elections in 
1994 Northern Province proved to be the most solid ANC bastion, with nearly 92% of the 
total vote. As pointed at in accordance with Table 4.1 on rural settlement, this is also the state 
that has the highest percent rural population.162 ANC’s wooing of chiefs seems to have given 
results also if one look at another rural province, the Eastern Cape. In this area the ANC had 
used historical persons to increase its support. A reburial of Dalindyebo163 was organised in 
1989, and this event turned out to be a demonstration of mass support for the ANC in the 
countryside. In Table 4.2 one can see that in the Eastern Cape the ANC mobilised 84% of the 
total vote in the Provincial Elections of 1994. 
 
In KwaZulu-Natal where the IFP support was assumed to be considerable, the memory of the 
ANC president Chief Albert Luthuli, a minor Zulu Chief elected in 1952, was used for two 
diverging purposes. First by the chiefs to establish a continuity of the traditional leaders in the 
liberation struggle, and secondly it could be used by the ANC to establish its firm base among 
                                                 
160 Statistics South Africa, Census 96. 
161 This province was during the elections called Northern Transvaal, but changed name shortly after the first 
settings of the New National Assembly.  
162 The statistics on rural vs. urban settlement are based on a survey two years after the elections, and of course 
the percentages might have changed. If it however has changed, there are strong reasons to believe that the 
population is slightly more urbanised after the 1994 elections. 
163 A chief who linked up with the ANC in exile in the 1960s. 
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the Zulu people.164 The latter was an important assent for the ANC when contesting Inkathas 
monopolisation of Zulu tradition. As we can see in Table 4.2, ANC gained just over 32% of 
the total vote in KwaZulu-Natal, while Inkatha became the largest party with just over 50% of 
the total vote. KwaZulu-Natal was then the province with the lowest level of ANC votes in 
the country. It is difficult to know what the frequency of ANC support would have been 
without these attempts to gain support.    
 
Another interesting feature is that except the strong IFP province KwaZulu-Natal, the lowest 
level of ANC support is in the urban provinces Western Cape (88.9% urban) and Gauteng 
(97% urban). The tendency suggests that the rural population of South Africa is important for 
the strength of the ANC, and thus, since traditional authorities are highly valued in these 
areas, ANC needed to accommodate them. If one analyses the election results, one might also 
say that the National Party’s policy on accommodating traditional authorities did not result in 
electoral support from the rural population. If one looks at both Table 4.2 and 4.3 one can see 
that the National Party gained most support in the areas with a profoundly percentage of the 
population speaking Afrikaans, a language also most frequently spoken among Coloured.  
 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 might suggest a tendency of an African speaking population living in 
rural areas voting for the ANC, while the NP might draw support from an urban electorate 
with Afrikaans as their home language. However, this might just be a tendency, and not 
something that one can tell explicitly by looking at aggregate numbers. After the first election 
it was obvious that ANC’s support in the rural area was exhaustive. One might however 
suggest that this reveals a strong correlation between “election results” and “language 
spoken” (ethnical background), and following, that the rural-urban dimension was not 
significant. ANC’s accommodation of chiefs might however to some extent have secured the 
election results. It is however important to illuminate that this is only a tendency, not 
necessarily an absolute. Though the results sometimes show a high tendency of correlation 
between the percentage of a language spoken in a province and the percentage voting for a 
party, one does not know what it is that have this exact effect on the outcome. It seems then 
likely that the traditional leaders’ argument of being a strong vote provider did have an effect 
on the outcome of the 1994 elections, even though it is difficult to tell whether their 
                                                 
164 Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997:564. 
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judgement did influence their communities’ electorate. The traditional leaders did deliver 
their votes, but did the ANC keep their part of the bargain after they came to power?  
 
4.3.4 The destiny of the Afrikaner Volkstaat  
 
The followers of an Afrikaner Volkstaat could not to the same extent use the same arguments 
as the traditional leaders. Both in regard to the ethnical and the centre-periphery aspect, they 
emerged weaker then the traditional leaders. But when it came to the strategic aspects, did the 
claim get support from the Afrikaner population? During the negotiations, an umbrella body 
of Afrikaner political parties and organisations formed the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF). Out 
of strategic reasons the AVF joined the COSAG alliance, and argued that along with the 
recognition of earlier traditional authorities of the homelands, the establishment of a Volkstaat 
should accommodate the Afrikaners as a cultural group.  
 
In the negotiations the ANC doubted how much support these right wing Afrikaners actually 
had. While the AVF worked for a guarantee for the establishment and recognition of the 
Volkstaat in the Interim Constitution of 1993, the ANC argued that this question ought to be 
finally settled after the election. The AVF tried to threaten with militant revolts, but as the 
ANC delegate, Penuell Maduna, in the talks on the subject matter argued; “if they win an 
overwhelming support for a Volkstaat they’ve got it”.165 The ANC and also the NP were not 
interested in jeopardising the negotiations and the process forward, by giving in to threats of 
militant uprisings and even civil war.  
      
The Bophuthatswana Coup became a test of both the support of the chiefs’ and the AVF’s 
ability to mobilise support for a Volkstaat. Before the “Bop coup” in March 1994, there had 
been few incidents that measured in reality the potential of the chiefs to mobilise support, and 
also few situations that tested the strategic alliance between the Afrikaner right wing and the 
government of the homelands.  The “Bop coup” started with a strike by civil servants 
employed in the homeland governments, which would cease to exist once the interim 
Constitution came into force. The homeland leader, Lucas Mangope, announced further that 
there would not be any elections in Bophuthatswana. In protest to this, students started a 
counter demonstration, and severe unrest broke out. The government were in jeopardy, and 
                                                 
165 Quoted in Business Day, 26. Jan. 1994, cited in Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000:243.  
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appealed to the Afrikaner right wing leader, Constand Viljoen, to send in armed men, but 
expressively not members of the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB). But the 
AWB ignored this plea, and went into the homelands capital, where they murdered black 
bystanders. In response Mangope’s own soldiers and police officers revolted. In one particular 
incident, which received saturation television coverage, a black Bophuthatswana policeman 
executed three AWB members. The South African Defence Force had to move in, and both 
Mandela and De Klerk persuaded Mangope to resign.166  
 
According to Spitz and Chaskalson the “Bop coup” thus tested different strategic aspects in 
the negotiation process.167 First, it showed that the support for the homelands’ further 
existence was dubious, and that many people wanted to get rid of the system based on 
segregational development between cultures. The consociational democratic model was 
weakened, since many people obviously were not interested in a political system based on 
cultural cleavages. Second, the contradictions between the different COSAG parties became 
apparent. When the AWB entered the revolt, the black leaders of the alliance were 
embarrassed, including the IFP leader Chief Buthelezi. Third, for the Afrikaner right it 
became clear that a civil war was not a romantic endeavour in search for self-determination. 
The realisation of this drew Viljoen into the elections, since civil revolts no longer seemed 
like a desirable solution to solve political discrepancies. Viljoen had always been identified 
with respectful Afrikanerdom, but the “Bop coup” illustrated that the rank and files members 
of the AWB might have other views of Afrikaner nationalism. The main AVF political party 
in the 1994 elections was the Freedoms Front/Vryheidsfront (FF/VF).  
 
Even though the AVF had managed to achieve a Provision for an establishment of a Volkstaat 
Council in the Interim Constitution, the VF/FF did not achieve enough seats in the National 
Assembly elected in 1994 to secure this provision in the Final Constitution of 1996. As one 
can see in Table 4.5, VF achieved just above 2% of the total vote in the election, something 
that gave them 9 seats in the National Assembly of a total of 400 seats. Table 4.5 also 
indicates that the NP, who had proven to be more willing to commit themselves to 
compromises, gained about 20% of the total vote, which gave them 82 seats. Because of this it  
                                                 
166 Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000:244-245. 
167 Ibid. 
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Table 4.4: National election results 1994 
PARTY % VOTES SEATS 
African Christian Democratic Party 0.45 88 104 2 
African National Congress 62.65 12 237 655 252 
Democratic Party 1.73 338 426 7 
Freedom Front/Vryheidsfront 2.17 424 555 9 
Inkatha Freedom Party 10.54 2 058 294 43 
National Party 20.39 3 983 690 82 
Pan Africanist Congress 1.25 243 478 5 
Other Parties 0.71 139 845 0 
Residual 0.11 19 451 0 
Total 100 19 533 498 400 
 
seems like the majority of the Afrikaner population voted for the NP, who also got a 
considerable number of the Couloured and Indian votes.  The Traditional Leaders had 
therefore been a stronger electoral support provider than the AVF. How strong is as 
mentioned difficult to measure, because it is difficult to prove that people in the rural areas 
would have voted for another party, if their chiefs had not officially given ANC their blessing. 
 
4.3.4 The three aspects considered 
 
When ANC’s attitudes towards the traditional leaders changed from the mid to the late 
eighties, this most be viewed in context with the broader picture. ANC from being a radical 
liberation movement turned into a political party with the aim of governing the new South 
Africa. Mandela in particular stressed the importance of reconciliation, over a strategy of 
revenging earlier misdeeds. In this light, reconciliation with African “collaborators” was even 
more likely than the negotiations between the former apartheid government and the ANC. 
However, in other parts of the negotiation, the ANC did not compromise on their classical 
liberal notions towards cultural difference. Mandela himself very well defended this 
compromise on the status of traditional authorities, as you can see in Box 4.6. The ANC 
Youth League and the Woman League were not necessarily sympathetic towards this twist by 
the ANC leadership, and in his address to the Youth League, Mandela tries to explain why 
this is important.  
 
As illustrated in Box 4.6, he first stresses (A) the long line of links between the ANC and the 
chiefs, and also stresses that traditional leaders due to their position deserve respect. With  
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Box 4.6: Mandela uses all three aspects in defending why ANC most join forces with 
traditional leaders in his address to the Youth League in 1990168  
 
A. Mandela is first using the ethical aspect:  
I have touched on the question of homeland leaders and traditional chiefs. It is not the policy of the ANC to 
condemn the chiefs as such. These are our traditional leaders, some of whom have an impressive record in the 
fight against apartheid. We say we must give them the respect that they deserve as traditional leaders.  
 
B. Secondly, he turns to both the Centre-periphery and strategic aspect:  
You must remember that it is going to be difficult for our organisation to take root and be strong in the 
countryside unless we are able to work together with them in their respective areas. And those who feel that we 
have nothing to do with the chiefs do not know the policy of the ANC and have no idea how to strengthen the 
organisation in the countryside.  
In fact, the National Party detected this weakness on our part, of not having strong organisation in the 
countryside. That is how they succeeded in forcing the homeland policy on the masses of our people....  
 
C. Thirdly he employs the Ethical aspect again:  
In our custom and history. The chief is the mouthpiece of his people. He must listen to the complaints of his 
people. He is the custodian of their hopes and desires. And if any chief decides to be a tyrant, to take decisions 
for his people, he will come to a tragic end in the sense that we will deal with him....  
Finally, I wanted to appeal to you not to be unnecessarily hostile against the homeland leaders. These men are 
our flesh and blood and we want them to join the struggle. We know that some of them went into this system 
honestly, thinking that it was an effective option for us. But those who have discovered their mistakes and are 
prepared to come over to the liberation movement, let us welcome them with open arms. There is no need to say 
because a man has made a mistake before, we should no longer work with him....  
Those who confess their mistakes, those who are prepared to listen to the people now must go to the people in 
their areas and settle their problems. When they do that, we will welcome them with open arms....  
 
other words he uses an ethical aspect as an argument. Secondly, he argues that there are 
strategic, rational reasons to this (B), since the ANC is in need of a stronger organisation in 
the rural areas. By this he admits that the ANC have problems with mobilising the periphery 
with its urban and centralised organisation structure. He then turn to a reconciliation 
argument, which bear resemblances with the ethical aspect (C), where he argues that though 
there might be chiefs which “collaborated” with open eyes, one most let all have the 
                                                 
168 Nelson Mandela’s address to the youth, Official Statement, KaNyamazane, 13 April 1990. The aspects 
were not included in the statement, but are mine additions.   
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opportunity to have a second thought. If they now embrace the new democracy, ANC is to 
welcome them.    
 
All things considered, the traditional leaders managed to achieve a relative strong position in 
the negotiations, compared to other proponents of cultural groups. 1) The traditional leaders 
were anticipated to be able to mobilise the electorate, and therefore considered an important 
alliance due to their ability to mobilise extensive support. The main political opponents to the 
ANC, such as the NP, were interested in giving the traditional leaders their own self-
governmental areas. This might have resulted in the ANC’s will to compromise on its own 
slogan “Unity in Diversity”. On the contrary, the traditional leaders’ position in the 
negotiations might never have been so influential if they had been regarded as a strong 
political power. The political arena in South Africa is profoundly urban, and the traditional 
leaders operating in the rural areas are at the periphery of the political system, though they 
were able to mobilise extensive support for the ANC. When the aspect of centre-periphery 
actually might have influenced the outcome, it is also because these were institutions not on 
the “first priority list” in the transformation of society.  
 
The Afrikaners on the other hand, would have been too strong politically. Even though the 
election results for the FF were quite low, the symbolic effect would have been tremendous. 
Other groups, as Muslims and Indians, operating in the urban areas, would not be able to 
mobilise enough votes to be heard. The strength of the traditional leaders seems to be 
influenced by 1) their potential of mobilising support was too strong to sweep them under the 
carpet. 2) Their political power was too peripheral to be a threat to the central state. Combined 
with an ethical aspect of pointing to the discrimination in the past, the traditional authorities 
became able to voice quite decisive arguments for their prevalent existence in the future.  
 
This is interesting because the traditional leaders by their alliance with the ANC managed to 
influence the political party, which is most skeptical towards policies designed to 
accommodate cultural groups, see Figure 4.2. Since ANC became the majoritarian party, this 
was an extremely important negotiation partner for the chiefs. Figure 4.2 presents the different 
key negotiators and their view in questions related to cultural rights and traditional authorities. 
I have divided the negotiators by two different measures. The first group is parties with a 
holistic negotiation program, and consists of ANC, NP, DP and IFP. The latter group consists 
of negotiators with specific cultural interests, which are FF/VF, TBVC-governments and  
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Figure 4.2: Key negotiators and their view on cultural and traditional matters  
HOLISTIC PARTY PROGRAMS SPECIFIC CULTURAL INTERESTS  
ANC DP NP IFP FF/FV TBVC CONTRALESA 
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Contralesa. However, one can argue that the IFP is predominantly a Zulu party situated in 
KwaZulu-Natal, but they did also aim at mobilizing support at a national level. FF/VF also 
aims at mobilizing support at a national level but their main political manifest is to promote 
the rights of the Afrikaner population. Of the former group, the ANC is the most sceptical 
party in terms of policies aimed at differentiating between cultural groups. DP was also 
founded on the importance of universal rights, and their claim for federalism was not founded 
on strong desire to separate diverging cultural groups. The NP was strongly in favor of 
minority rights, but was willing to compromise. IFP on the other hand, was not interested in 
compromises, and did boycott various phases of the talks. 
 
The latter group, the FF/VF, TBVC and Contralesa, had specific cultural interests and did not 
always specify their attitudes towards policies that were not in direct interest of their group. 
On the other hand in questions that concerned their groups, they had a very detailed  
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Figure 4.3: Tendencies in attitudes toward policies of cultural accommodation  
  ANC DP Contralesa NP IFP FV/VF TBVC 
Volkstaat  No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Power-sharing No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Federalism No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Group-rights No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Symbolic power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Customary law as a right No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Executive power local level No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legislative power local level No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consultative power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Judicial power Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
political vision. For instance Contralesa did not, as far as I can see, have any outspoken policy 
on the division of power at a national level, as long as the traditional leaders received some 
judicial and political authority on provincial and especially local level. This makes it difficult 
in Figure 4.2 to simplify their attitude towards some matters. 
 
To get a clearer general impression of the tendencies see Figure 4.3. This figure is an attempt 
to order the divers attitudes of negotiators from sceptical to promoters of cultural rights. The 
most difficult negotiator to locate is Contralesa. They were concerned with the traditional 
leaders position in the future democracy, but were not especially interested in federalism, 
power-sharing and stressed the importance of traditional leaders to enter into a democratic 
future. The policies of the parties naturally contained more nuances than those presented in 
Figure 4.3, but this figure only aims at presenting a simplistic illustration of the diverging 
attitudes of the different parties. It is also important to mention that many of the negotiators 
which had strong visions about policies at “national level”, did not have strong visions of 
policies regarding traditional authorities, and vice versa. This is especially important in the 
negotiators I referred to as the ones with specific cultural interests in Figure 4.2. However, the 
most important feature that Figure 4.3 illustrates, is that except ANC and to some degree the 
DP, most parties are in favour of some kinds of special policies designed to accommodate the 
difference of cultural groups. ANC did get the majority of the votes, and they had a firm hand 
on the wheel for the further policies toward cultural accommodation in the years to come.  
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4.4. Settling cultural rights in a the final constitution 
 
Were the traditional leaders able to maintain their position in the final constitution signed by 
an elected Constitutional Assembly dominated by the ANC?  The interim constitution has 
been regarded as a quite disjointed document. The final constitution, however, needed to be a 
more coherent document. Knowing that the ANC emphasised the ideals of universalism with 
its principles of a neutral state, how did this influence the traditional authorities’ position in 
the final constitution? To analyse this question I am going to compare the interim constitution 
with the final constitution by using the same two measures of self-determination employed in 
analysing the interim constitution. First, is the cultural protection subject to the legislative and 
other constitutional principles? Secondly, are the cultural protections to be interpreted as 
individual or group rights? After I have analysed the differences between the interim and the 
final constitution, I am going to ask why these changes occurred. 
 
4.4.1. Final constitution: Cultural protection subject or not? 
 
As in the interim constitution there are two different parts of the final constitution that 
accommodates cultural difference. First, there are cultural rights protected in Chapter 2 on the 
Bill of rights. These rights are presented in Box 4.7. Whereas the interim constitution did not 
clarify whether the right to culture was to be understood as subject to other parts of the Bill of 
Rights, the final constitutions is not uncertain on the matter. It is obvious that in cases where 
there might be a conflict between cultural rights and other rights, the cultural right is to be 
interpreted as secondary. This is specifically stated: “… but no one exercising these rights 
may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.”  
 
As Box 4.7 illustrates, compared with the interim constitution the chapter on traditional 
leaders is less specific. Wheras the interim constitution goes into specific matters, for instance 
on how the different Houses of Traditional Leaders are to take form and how they are to be 
consulted, the final constitution settles a more open mandate. An open mandate which gives 
the legislative the power of being in charge of the further process of accommodating 
traditional leaders and institutions. The interim constitution established that Councils of 
Traditional Leaders were to be formed at all three levels of government, the final constitution 
only states that the national or provincial legislation “may” provide for this establishment. The 
section in the final constitution which recognises the institutions, status and role of traditional 
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Box 4.7: Final Constitution, Chapter 2: The Bill of Rights 
- individual cultural rights subject to other constitutional principles 
Section 30: Language and culture  
Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one 
exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Section 31: Cultural, religious and linguistic communities  
 (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other 
members of that community   
(b) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
(a) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
leadership, according to customary law, is further subject to the constitution. In this regard all 
parts accommodating culture in the final constitution is either subject to the legislative or the 
constitution. This implies that both legislative organs and other constitutional principles 
condition the cultural recognition. This have created a need for a thorough reformation of the 
customary law.     
 
4.4.2. Final constitution: Group or individual rights? 
 
On the topic of group or individual cultural rights, the final constitution signed in 1996 is 
however much more coherent regarding which kinds of rights that are entrenched. While the 
interim constitution only has one section regarding culture entrenched in the Bill of Rights, 
the final constitution has two, see Box 4.7. Despite the stressing of subjection of cultural 
rights, the first section is more or less the same. One section is however added on “Cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities”. Box 4.7 shows that section 31 establishes that “Persons 
belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with 
other members of that community a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their 
language; and b) to form, join and maintain cultural religious and linguistic associations and 
other organs of civil society.”169 In this context traditional institutions are supposed to be 
regarded as organs of the civil society, individuals should not be denied to participate in them 
or form them. This does not denote that the groups themselves have the right to culture and 
existence. It is established that the individuals are the bearers of rights, not the cultural 
groups.  
                                                 
169 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, section 31.  
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Box 4.8: Final Constitution, Chapter 12: Traditional Leaders 
-  conditioned recognition of customary law and traditional leaders functions and role 
Section 211; Recognition  
(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, subject 
to the Constitution.  
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable 
legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs.  
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.  
 
Section 212; Role of traditional leaders  
(1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters 
affecting local communities.  
(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law and the 
customs of communities observing a system of customary law (a) national or provincial legislation may provide 
for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders; and (b) national legislation may establish a council of 
traditional leaders.    
 
In the interim constitution the formulations in the section of cultural rights combined with 
section 181 on the recognition of traditional authorities, made it possible to understand 
traditional authority as a group right. In the final constitution all parts of the Chapter on 
traditional leaders, see Box 4.8, make it clear that practicing these customs is only a free 
choice of the members of the communities, and nothing which is supposed to be imposed on 
them.  
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the difference between the interim and final constitution in regard to the 
two different applied measures of cultural protection. In this figure one can see that cultural 
rights are more restricted in the final constitution. The cultural rights entrenched in the Bill of 
Right are now subject to other constitutional principles, whereas the interim constitution did 
not specify what ought to take precedence in case of conflicts. In the new constitution it is 
explicitly stated that this is an individual right. It is also specified that the traditional 
authorities are subject to other parts of the final constitution, and since the other parts of the 
constitution stresses that all rights are individual, these are also individual. No group is to be 
the bearer of rights. Traditional authorities are also subject to legislation. The legislative 
might only establish Traditional Houses, and consult them if they find this desirable. It is not 
something they “shall” do, only “might” do. This implies, as mentioned in chapter 4.4.1, that 
the cultural protection of traditional leaders in no conditioned by other constitutional 
principles.  
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Figure 4.4: Difference in measures of cultural protection between the interim and the final 
constitution  
Interim Constitution Final Constitution  
Cultural 
Subjection Form of right 
Cultural  
Subjection Form of Right 
Cultural Rights Not subject Individual Right Subject 
Individual 
Right 
Traditional 
Authorities 
Subject to 
legislation 
To some extent a 
Group Right 
Subject 
Individual 
Right 
 
There are at least three interesting features of this development of the process. One, why did 
the position of traditional authorities diminish? Two, this is a conditioned recognition which 
implies that the traditional institutions and customs need to be reformed in order to be 
compatible with a liberal vision, were there any political will and ability to initiated these 
reforms? Thirdly, did one manage to clarify what the recognition of traditional leaders in the 
end was meant to entail? The two latter questions will be addressed in the next chapter. Until 
then, I will try to answer question one, why did the traditional leaders authority become more 
conditioned? 
 
4.4.3.Why did the constitutional protection of traditional authorities diminish? 
 
As written earlier the interim Constitution was quite incoherent, and the new government 
needed the final outcome to be more consistent on its principles and guidelines. During the 
first years of the new National Assembly the forces against the preservation of traditional 
authorities grew stronger. In the following I am going to present three different reasons for 
this change.  
 
First, the problem of making the accommodation of traditional leaders compatible with 
women’s right to equality. A strong women’s lobby was one of the main reasons why 
traditional leaders did not manage to entrench customary law as a fundamental right in the 
interim Constitution. The women’s lobby was based on a cross-party coalition, Women’s 
National Coalition (WNC), created to secure women’s right in the new Democratic order. 
WNC was formed at a Woman’s League (ANC) initiative, and consisted of 92 national 
organisations and 13 regional coalitions, covering most political parties, rural women’s 
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Table 4.5: Women in Parliament after the 1994 elections170
Party Seats Women Men% Women% Total
African National Congress 252 90 64.3 35.7 100
National Party 82 9 89.0 11.0 100
Inkatha Freedom Party 43 10 76.7 23.3 100
Pan Africanist Congress 5 1 80.0 20.0 100
Democratic Party  7 1 85.7 14.3 100
African Christian Democratic Alliance 2 0 100 0 100
Total 400 111 72.5 27.8 100
 
organisations, and religious and professional organisations.171 In the negotiations the WNC 
pointed to women’s subordinate positions under customary law. Women under customary law 
were regarded as minors under the guardian of a father or a husband, and they enjoyed no 
locus standi172, they did not have the right to inherent or own property, sign any legal 
contracts etc. Because of this women argued that costmary law and other traditional 
institutions needed to be subject to the Bill of Rights, in order to prevent discrimination of 
women living in traditional communities.  
 
Women were able to prevent the customary law of becoming a right or be exempted from the 
interim Fundamental Right, but they were not strong enough to impede the recognition of the 
traditional leaders power and functions. However, after the 1994 elections, as a consequence 
of ANC’s 30 percent women quota, the number of female delegates in the National Assembly 
became one of the world’s largest in percentages. As presented in Table 4.5, women held 111 
out of the 400 National Assembly seats, or close to 28% of the total, where a considerate 
number of these are from the ANC. This compares with less than 3% of female delegates 
prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections. 
 
Whereas the traditional leaders had found themselves relatively strong in the negotiations, the 
women lobby had managed to transform their mobilisation movement into political 
representation in the legislative body. As we can see in Table 4.5 women had managed to be a 
part of the political forum in charge of the political future and the signing of the final 
constitution. In this they worked for a subjection of the accommodation of traditional 
                                                 
170 Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, First South African Report, 
Cedaw 3 1997. 
171 Geisler, Gisela, “Parliament is another terrain of struggle”: women, men and politics in South Africa, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, UK: Cambridge University Press, 38, 4, 2000:613. 
172 Locus standi is the right to appear in court and argue a case. 
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Figure 4.5: Prominent members in Parliament 1994 with traditional background 
Name: Position: Party: Connection: 
Nelson Mandela President ANC Distanced himself from 
his traditional background 
as chief in the 1940’s. 
Ben Ngubane Minister of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology 
IFP Family involved in the 
traditional government of 
the Zulu Homeland. 
Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi 
Minister of Home Affairs IFP Heir to the chieftainship 
of the Buthelezi tribe in 
Zululand. 
Stella Sigcau Minister of Public 
Enterprises 
ANC Daughter of a Paramount 
Chief. Political career in 
the Transkei Legislative 
Assembly where she 
worked for the 
empowerment of women 
in traditional 
communities. 
Bantu Holomisa Deputy Minister of 
Environment Affairs 
ANC Son of a Chief. Earlier 
Minister of Defence and 
Audit in the Transkei 
Government 1988-94. 
Patekile Holomisa Member of Parliament 
and the President of 
Contralesa 
ANC Heir to the Holomisa 
Chieftainship in the 
Thembu Nation in 
Transkei.  
 
authorities under the Bill of Rights. Traditional leaders became somewhat outdistanced in the 
main political, democratic body, since few had joined political parties. As Figure 4.5 point at, 
some prominent politicians had traditional origin, but it was not all of these who considered 
this as one of their most important mandate. Figure 4.5 gives a short presentation of some of 
the most prominent South African parliamentarians with traditional background.    
   
Secondly, a quite extensive part of the ANC delegates opposed the idea of forcing an identity 
of “Africaness” upon the rural communities. Experiences in the past had made them sceptical 
of group rights. The Apartheid government had equated “Africaness” or African culture with 
the African traditional authorities, their institutions and customary law. Being African was 
regarded as a person living in a “kraal”173 in membership with his or her tribe, guarded by a 
lineage of chiefs. As this of course was a part of a cultural heritage, it did not mean that all 
black people living within the borders of South Africa understood their identity in 
resemblance to this definition of “Africaness”. Many people’s identity were just as much 
related to centuries of liberation struggle and a fight to be regarded as a people capable of 
                                                 
173 A homestead.  
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developing liberal, democratic institutions, or related to just being a urban person living a day 
to day life trying to make ends meet. Having suffered racial stigmatation in the past, many 
ANC delegates did not appreciate the thought of traditional authorities imposing their 
particular beliefs on rural communities. The individual ought to have the right and possibility 
to exit traditional customs. In the negotiations Penuell Maduna expressed it this way: “There 
is a tension between a Western-oriented society, as some people want to impose upon us, and 
a pure African, “Africanist” society. I think we are a mixture of all sorts of things, but 
essentially, we place the individual at the center of human activity”.174
 
The ANC was in the beginning formed to unite the African people in the struggle for equality, 
and over the years they had developed to embrace non-racialism. In the negotiation the ANC 
valued universalism, and worked for a new constitutional order based on a united, non-racial, 
non-sexist and democratic society. ANC regarded itself as a non-racial party. It did not 
represent the values of only “black” people. The ANC needed to accommodate the cultural 
institutions of the traditional authorities in accordance with this train of thought. In his speech 
to the Constitutional Assembly on the adoption of the new constitution, Nelson Mandela 
illuminated the importance of non-racialism: 
 
“We are dealing with a situation in which if one talks to Whites, they think that only Whites exist in this 
country, and they look at problems from the point of view of Whites. They forget about Blacks, namely 
Coloured, Africans and Indians. That is one side of the problem. However, we have another problem. 
When one talks to Africans, Coloured and Indians, they make exactly the same mistake. They think that 
the Whites in this country do not exist. They think that we have brought about this transformation by 
defeating the White minority and that we are dealing with a community that is now lying prostrate on 
the ground, begging for mercy, to whom we can dictate. Both tendencies are wrong. We want men and 
women who are committed to our mandate, but who can rise above their ethnic groups and think in 
terms of South Africa as a whole”.175
  
As ANC became the major political party in the Constitutional Assembly, the diminishing 
power of the traditional leaders is not unexpected. If one look at Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 in 
chapter 4.3.4, which both sums up the different negotiators view on cultural accommodation, 
one can see that ANC is one of the parties most sceptical to considering cultural differences as 
a political significant. In regard to the NP and their considerations on the matter, it is obvious 
                                                 
174 Interview with Penuell Maduna in Pretoria, Januar, 1996 by Spitz and Chaskalson 2000: 391 
175 Mandela, Nelson, Speech to the Constitutional Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the new 
Constitution, Cape Town, 8 May 1996. 
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that though they regarded cultural differences as important, they were more concerned about 
the future of the white population. Since the rural population had not given them any 
profound support in the elections, they might have lost interest in the case.    
 
Third, one needed to make the traditional institutions compatible with the elected local bodies. 
Traditional authorities represented illiberal customs, which in many ways were not suitable in 
a democratic society. In ANC’s Constitutional Proposals dated 15 of June 1995, it is argued: 
“the institutions of chieftainship (…) have an important role to play in unifying our people 
and perform ceremonial and other functions allocated to them by law”.176 If ANC were to 
accommodate the institutions of traditional authorities, they wanted to have the opportunity of 
reforming the institutions by subjecting them to National Legislation. The traditional 
authorities were based upon a system of illiberal inheritance of positions. As in other 
monarchical democracies, royals and aristocrats may have a symbolic role to play, but it has 
been proven difficult to grant them a significant political power base. The traditional leaders 
in South Africa under the Apartheid regime resembled the exalted absolute monarchs known 
in European history, with the executive, legislative and judiciary power in one man, this could 
not be justified in a democratic system. As in the rest of society, illiberal institutions needed 
to be transformed, and one needed to give a definition of what would be the role of the 
traditional leaders compared to the elected local governments.  
 
When the interim constitution had been unclear regarding whether the traditional authorities 
were subject to the Fundamental Rights and the national legislation, the final constitution was 
much more coherent on these matters. If one desires to make a simplistic answer to the 
complex process, one can argue that the problem of making the traditional protections 
compatible with the right to women’s equality, made the customary law subject to the Bill of 
Right. The problem of forcing an identity upon the members of rural communities made it 
difficult to grant any groups rights. The problem of defining what ought to be the role of 
traditional authorities compared to the role of the elected, local governments, made it subject 
to national legislation. In this way one had accommodated traditional leaders, their institutions 
and customary law, if these cultural institutions were able to reform.    
 
 
                                                 
176 ANC’S Constitutional Proposals “Traditional Authorities and Cultural Bodies”, 15 of June 1995. 
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4.5 A theoretical perspective on the transition 
 
I will now turn to the questions presented at the end of chapter 2, where I asked how one 
could analyse the transition in light of the discussed theoretical perspectives. The questions I 
asked in regard to the process of accommodating cultural difference in the constitution were: 
Which theoretical perspective was most similar to the final outcome of the constitutional 
bargaining? Which diverging claims of accommodation were presented, and how can one 
view these preferences in the light of the different theoretical perspectives?  
 
To turn to the former question first. The theoretical perspective, which has most similarities 
with the final outcome of the transition, is that of Rawls. As Rawls, the ANC, which became 
the strongest part in the bargaining process, was not willing to compromise on the liberal 
visions that emphasises the importance of a state to remain neutral in questions of the good. 
The final constitution, as Rawls suggests, does present a priority of rights. This implies that 
cultural rights and cultural recognitions are only to be claimed if they are not in conflict with 
other constitutional principles, such as the right to equality and the democratic political set up. 
The accommodation of cultural difference is never to be granted at the expense of state 
neutrality, and in cases where the secondary cultural rights causes a conflict with the 
constitutional essentials, the constitutional essentials are to take precedence. 
 
The emphasis on the neutral state also required that all rights were to be held by individuals. It 
was always the individual, not the group that was to be the bearer of rights. No people in the 
name of culture ought to impose upon others practices or customs that they did not choose 
themselves as free, autonomous individuals. The legacy of Apartheid made the ANC sceptical 
to cultural claims of differential treatment, and as the majority party they tried to minimalise 
the powers offered to cultural agents. The traditional leaders however, became recognised, but 
this recognition was conditioned, which indicates that in order to enjoy this recognition they 
needed to reform their institutions and customary law.  
 
Which considerations might have influenced the different preferences in according to 
accommodating difference? The legacies of colonialism and Apartheid did influence the 
outcome to which degree cultural difference were to be reflected in the constitution, and it 
also influenced whose difference that became accommodated. If one is to draw some 
simplistic lines in the different negotiators vision on the subject of cultural accommodation, 
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there were three main claims represented, 1) a claim for a neutral state, 2) claims for specific 
accommodation of Afrikaners, and 3) claims of recognising traditional authorities. First, it 
was the ANC and to some extent the DP, which emphasised individual universal rights and 
insisted on a neutral and impartial state. This is a vision that resemblance that of Rawls 
strategy of accommodating cultural difference. ANC was founded as a liberation movement 
and the DP was the earlier Liberal Party. The DP was before the transition a party that gained 
support from mainly liberal academics and intellectuals. These parties were, as Rawls, the 
least willing to compromise on liberal notions in regard to the protection of culture. However, 
the ANC though true to the ideas of neutrality was willing to compromise in the question of 
traditional leaders. Something that illustrates that ANC was not exactly behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ in the negotiations. Behind a liberal ‘veil of ignorance’, deprived of all knowledge 
of who you are, would you have recognised ‘illiberal’ traditional authority rather than 
Lijpharts’ consociational model of democracy? My point here is not that the latter is better 
than the former, but that the legacy of the past is always omnipresent in a transition.  
 
The second group that claimed special group protection was the ones that agitated for the 
minority rights of Afrikaners. The most vocal of these claims, was the NP who claimed 
special representation, almost in line with one of Kymlicka’s kind of group-differentiated 
rights, see chapter 2.4.1. Second, it were also diverging small parties such as the FF/VF who 
claimed self-representation, also in line with Kymlicka’s vision of group-differentiated rights. 
When these claims were not accommodated this might have been influenced by the fact that 
few others than Afrikaners themselves viewed this group as marginalized or disadvantaged, as 
Kymlicka put forward as a precondition for special group representation. Neither did one 
approve of the argument that these groups needed self-government in order to ensure the full 
and free development of their culture. As the designers of the grand Apartheid an 
accommodation of their cultural difference would have too many ties with earlier regimes. 
Many viewed their claims as attempts aimed at maintaining political power rather than claims 
from a culture bordering on extinction. Due to the past, an accommodation of these claims 
was not accepted.  
 
The third group that claimed special protection of their culture was the ones that agitated for 
recognition of traditional authorities, institutions and law. Unlike the Afrikaners these could 
argue that they were both marginalized and disadvantaged in the past, see presentation of 
Kymlicka’s approach chapter 2.4.1. However, there were great difficulties attached with 
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recognising traditional authorities. Because as this case reveals, it is not necessarily a 
connection between those who deserves to be recognised due to past discrimination and those 
groups that are suitably liberal in the eyes of the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter 
2. In the case of South Africa the key negotiators sentiments towards a group seems more 
important for the outcome than their degree of “liberalness”.    
 
Even though Taylor has argued that the recognition of difference is the essence of a liberal 
democracy, he also argues that only liberal groups are to be given self-representation. It is 
consequently difficult to apply his perspective on the accommodation of traditional 
authorities, and it does imply that it is difficult to use this theory in cases of deep cultural 
cleavages. On the one hand, one cannot in a liberal democracy accommodate illiberal 
institutions. In the case of South Africa this indicates that one is only able to accommodate 
groups with different language or ethnicity, but not groups following different ways of 
organising society. This signifies that it is of course possible to accommodate a request for 
education facilities in both Afikaans and Zulu, since these are on-the-surface differences. The 
theory does not, however, give any answers to cases where diverging groups have conflicting 
perspectives on how to organise institutions of society. 
 
It is also difficult to apply Kymlicka’s theory, which stresses the importance of giving 
specified group-rights to ethnic minorities. An essential question in this regard is: Can one 
regard traditional authorities as a minority or an ethnic group? If about 18 million people are 
living under traditional authorities, this is quite an extensive part of South Africa’s population. 
Further, though many Africans have relatives in rural areas, it would be somehow difficult to 
view the traditional customs as only a matter of ethnicity. It is rather a question of whether 
one should accommodate other ways of organising society than that of liberal ones in a 
democracy. This is just as much a conflict between the rural and the urban ways of life, or in 
other words the modern and the traditional, than a question of ethnicity. It is thus more 
cultural than ethnical.  
 
The problem with Kymlica’s ideas of group-rights is that they do not take into account that 
most groups claiming the right to be different also claim some kind of authority. In a liberal 
democratic perspective, one is interested in only giving them a symbolic role, or perhaps also 
a right to form democratic institutions in their own communities. The problem in this case 
was that traditional leaders claimed the right to political power, but not as politicians in 
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elected democratic bodies. Traditional leaders in strength of their position as royals, claim that 
they ought to be given the right to be in charge of traditional institutions and customary courts 
in their communities. These are in many ways, illiberal claims, which put traditional leaders 
in a position to impose their particular beliefs and conceptions of the good on the members of 
those societies. In such cases, it is difficult to apply Kymlicka’s idea of cultural group rights, 
since there in these societies are sub-groups which do not have the power to elect the people 
who govern them, and maybe more important, share the same individual rights to equality as 
people not classified as belonging to any group.    
 
Despite the difficulties of recognising traditional leaders, in the negotiations they had what 
Habermas would have called ‘a better argument’ than other advocates of special cultural 
group rights. They emphasised their discrimination in the past, they were able to mobilise 
votes, and they possessed knowledge on how the rural areas functioned. Many also exposed a 
willingness to change and adapt to the new liberal democratic order. In the negotiations before 
the interim constitution they were able to express their specific needs in the debate. This 
debate was however held behind closed doors, and mainly based on bilateral talks between the 
NP and ANC. ANC had been the traditional leaders alliance prior to the elections, in the 
period between the elections and the signing of the final constitution, the influence of the 
traditional leaders had diminished. Did the traditional leaders ‘arguments’ still posses some 
weight in the public debates in the new democratic South Africa?  
 
Consultation with the people had in the past regimes been scarce. The mobilisation of the 
people before the first free and fair election in 1994 marked a breaking point in inviting the 
people to be the “authors of the laws that binds them”, see Habermas chapter 2.3.3.  Would 
people living in rural traditional communities accept the recognition given to traditional 
authorities in the transition as legitimate? When the constitution was to be implemented, was 
one able to meet the requirements of both securing the right to equality and at the same time 
recognise cultural difference? And did ANC have enough political will and possess strong 
enough institutional means to implement the reforms of traditional authorities, institution and 
law as required by the constitution?  What were to be the function and role of the traditional 
leaders in the future? 
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5. Implementation of cultural recognition  
 
The South African final constitution to some extent recognised cultural difference, but this 
concession was only made if the cultural institutions were able to adjust to the new liberal 
democracy. First, the traditional African authority was to be subject to both the legislative and 
other constitutional principles. Second, the right to culture should always be interpreted as 
individual rights, and thus cultural authorities cannot impose their views and ways of life on 
other individuals. The constitution thus recognises cultural difference, but it falls short in 
providing for traditional leaders and institutions specific role in the new democratic society.  
 
If the African traditional institutions were to be viable in their communities, they did not only 
need constitutional protection, they also needed room within the state to perform their role. 
Were there in South Africa political will to specify and enforce the judicial and political 
authority of traditional leaders? Or was the recognition of cultural differences nothing more 
than a façade presented to gain legitimacy in rural areas? To analyse political will I am going 
to employ two different measures. Was there any initiative from the government to 1) Clarify 
their policies in official statements? 2) Initiate new legislation? Did this result in an 
unambiguous set of structure and powers that defines the role and functions of the traditional 
leaders? Which aspects influenced the process?  
 
5.1 The challenge towards traditional authority 
 
To provide a role and function for traditional leaders necessitates a willingness to delegate 
authority beyond symbolic power. In analysing what kind of power they were to possess in 
the new democratic order, I find it constructive to operate with two different kinds of 
authority: 1) Judicial authority and 2) Political authority. Where the latter can be divided into 
executive and legislative powers. In doing this, it is important to notice that prior to the 
transition the traditional leaders’ powers were not precisely defined. Executive, judicial and 
legislative functions were not differentiated, and their authority was both diffuse and all-
inclusive.177 That there is no separation of power has been problematic concerning traditional 
authority. 
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Traditional leaders had in the earlier regimes been functionaries of the state, and a part of the 
administrative apparatus.178 They did enjoy some judicial, executive and legislative powers 
but these were connected to the delegated administrative powers.  But what kind of powers 
did they possess, how were their institutions structured and which challenges did this create 
for the recognition of customary law and traditional leaders role and functions in the new 
political system? 
 
5.1.2 Political authority  
 
Under Apartheid, the traditional leaders constituted local government in rural areas. How 
could democratic institutions be established and still recognise the functions and roles of 
traditional leaders in the same communities? I am first going to turn to the question of 
legislative power. The legislative branches in a democracy derive its powers from periodic 
and popular elections, but most offices in the African political system are hereditary. There 
are large differences between different communities, but there seem to be some resemblances. 
The chief is the head of the communities’ councils, and the other councillors are either 
appointed by the chief himself or co-opted by being elected by those who are already part of 
the structure. The traditional leader can because of this remain the head of the councils for 
years. Since an ordinary mechanism of checks and balance of power is absent, the system is 
often vulnerable to corruption and abuse.179  
 
During the previous regimes, traditional leaders had unspecific powers at the local level in 
relation to the process of law making. Bennett has argued that if national legislation decides to 
establish houses of traditional leaders at the different levels of the political system, this gives 
traditional leaders a political power of which they did not seize prior to the transition. Since 
these houses make traditional leaders a part of the law making process, where they have the 
right to advise, be consulted and make proposals to the legislative. Nevertheless, these organs 
have only limited power. They may advise and they may insist on being consulted about bills 
concerning customary law, but they have no further power than delay the passing of an act.180 
Jones in his studies of the former “independent” homeland Bophuthatswana, has argued that 
at government level these states actually did have some law making powers. He states that 
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prior to the transition, “Bophuthatswana was not simply a puppet but had its own specific 
political, cultural and economic agenda.”181 There are thus reasons to believe that in some 
cases the legislative powers have declined, but the constitution reveals an opportunity for the 
traditional powers to partake in the legislative process on all levels. In this situation, the 
traditional leaders ability to put some force behind their arguments is probably more 
important than their formal status.      
 
The second kind of political authority of traditional leaders, the executive political powers, 
was more specific. They represented their people in all relations with the outside, and they 
also had several administrative functions in their society. Prior to the transition, they for 
instance organised the allocation of land held in trust for small-scale farming, grazing and 
residential purposes. The Apartheid government did not allow commercialism in African 
communities. Other functions they obtained were to provide and administrate certain services 
at local level. These services consisted of social welfare, including the processing of 
applications for social security benefits and business premises. Other services were the 
promotion of education, such as the erection and maintenance of schools, but also the 
administration of access to education finance, i.e. scholarships and study loans to students.182   
 
What was to happen with the executive powers of the traditional leaders after the first local 
elections in 1995? Administrative functions in a liberal, democratic government are regulated 
by norms of fairness and accountability. Though traditional leaders often consulted their 
councillors before taking important decisions, they were as the direct link to the shades of the 
people’s founding fathers, in a special position to carry out arbitrary rule. The traditional 
leaders were then also known to have the benefit of tangible symbols of powers, such as large 
tribal offices, tribal cars, tribal secretaries and, even, tribal cleaners.183 Democratisation 
brought the notion of wall-to-wall elected local government. Elected municipal councils 
would after this run traditional authority in rural areas.184 The constitution said that national 
legislation might provide a role for traditional leadership in the future. Was there after 1996 a 
political will to clarify this role, or were the elected municipal councils the only organs 
                                                 
181 Jones, Peris Sean, From ‘Nationhood’ to regionalism to the North West Province: ‘Bophuthatswananess’ and 
the birth of the ‘new’ South Africa, African Affairs, 98, 1999: 510. 
182 Mokgoro, Yvonne, Traditional Authority and Democracy in the Interim South African Constitution, 
Occasional Papers, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg, 1994: 4. 
183 Van Oomen 2000: 4. 
184 Ibid. 
 115
responsible for the development, services and other tasks formerly carried out by traditional 
authorities?  
 
5.1.3 Judicial authority 
 
Customary law, common law and civil law makes out the three components in the South 
African mixed legal system. The official policy towards customary law fluctuated from time 
to time and from area to area. With examples of both complete rejections, complete 
recognition and a number of intermediate positions.185 The final Constitution of 1996 did 
recognise customary law, but this required that it needed to be compatible with other 
principles in the constitution and also subject to legislation. But what kind of authority had 
customary law possessed prior to 1996 and how were the traditional courts structured? 
 
Traditional courts are established in rural areas where they are presided over by chiefs and 
headmen under the Black Administration Act, No 38 of 1927, but also under various statutes 
of the TBVC states. The Black Administration Act determined that these courts had discretion 
to apply African customary law in instances ‘involving questions of custom followed by 
blacks’, as long as such law was not ‘opposed to the principles of public policy or natural 
justice’.186 In presiding over traditional courts, chiefs and headmen are assisted by their 
councillors. Since 1986 appeals from these courts could go to magistrates’ courts and further 
appeals may be taken to the high Courts and Supreme Court of Appeal.187 In regard to the 
question of punishment, the courts were not permitted to impose death, mutilation, grievous 
bodily harm, imprisonment or fine in excess on R 40.188 189 The fines in reality exceed these 
numbers by far, and the use of corporal punishment was often exercised, particularly to 
rebuke youngsters. The use of corporal punishment is now prohibited, something which has 
created an immense debate.190  
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Customary courts vary in size and content. A customary court can consist of a small gathering 
between two families, a group of men discussing cases under the shade of a thorn tree, or a 
more bureaucratised get-together in a tribal office.191 The first is often referred to as the 
‘living law’, while the latter is often understood as the ‘official law’.192 The ‘official law’ 
formed a part of the Apartheid judicial law enforcement and traditional authorities were 
allowed to try cases such as petty theft, family disputes and land matters, against which appeal 
at the magistrate's court was possible.193  
 
It is important to notice that this right to appeal to a magistrate court did to a high degree 
restrict the authority of traditional courts and the traditional leaders prior to the transition. As 
Mbatha argued in one of my interviews: 
 
“Because if you look at the power, for example, of the traditional courts, you would find that even 
traditionally the power of these institutions was limited. They had the power to deal with customary 
disputes, and as far as this is concerned, they were forced to it. It was not necessary to get the conflict 
sorted out in a customary court, because if you disagreed in their judgments, you could go straight to 
the magistrate court. I think to understand the process now, one need to know the functioning of the 
magistrate courts. The Magistrate courts did not have to ask what were happening in the traditional 
court. [Everyone] …came there a fresh. This was the power that the traditional courts enjoyed.”194  
 
The judicial authority of traditional leaders was in other words conditioned by both limitations 
on which cases it was allowed to precede and by other judicial structures. Pre-1994 laws 
continue to be applied until new legislation is amended in parliament. This implies that 
traditional courts currently have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In regard to this one has 
particularly been interested in asking the question of whether traditional courts should 
continue to exercise criminal justice. The reason for this is that the rights of the accused under 
section 35 of the constitution gives the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain 
silent and also the right to choose and be represented by a legal practitioner. It has been 
suggested that customary procedure is based on an inquisitorial system that leaves no room 
for the right to silence.195 When this is coupled with the prohibition of legal representation in 
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traditional courts, it is questioned whether the accused is afforded a fair trail. Should the right 
to try criminal cases then be removed from the traditional judicial authority?  
 
However, there are also debates on the authority of traditional courts’ in civil cases, e.g. cases 
of family and personal law. These debates are often related to questions of the patriarchal 
aspects of traditional law, since women do not have proprietary or contractual capacity. 
Women are regarded as minors under the guardian of her husband or father, or even uncle, 
son or brother-in-laws. This patriarchal view is also represented in the compositions of courts, 
since women are neither allowed to preside over nor participate in the proceedings of 
traditional courts expect as litigants assisted by men.196 This contravenes the individual rights 
entrenched in the constitution, and features like these has engaged amongst other the Rural 
Women’s Movement to work for a change of women’s position under traditional courts. 
Ngema did in an interview argue, “The chief must not have the power to overrule 
legislations” and further “Chiefs should not interfere in family matters”.197 A reasons for this 
is:  
 
“You know, we have these traditional courts were there are trials, and women are not represented. So 
men discard women. (…) Maybe your husband have said something wrong or done something to you, 
and there are only men to represent you. They might not have the same feeling of what it is that have 
been done. It is not that they do not try, it is just that a women is not represented in any of those cases 
that is important for her. So that people can see things from her perspective. The constitutions says that 
we are all equal, so the women should be represented.”198
 
There are with other words a variety of reasons why traditional courts and customary law 
need be transformed in order to be compatible with the new constitution. In the discussion 
paper on Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders, the South 
African Law Commission have nevertheless presented three arguments in favour of the 
maintenance of this law system. First, it is a part of the cultural heritage of African people. 
Traditional leaders themselves often use this argument. Secondly, traditional courts are useful 
and desirable mechanisms for a speedy resolution of dispute, since it is easily accessible, 
inexpensive and a simple system of justice. Thirdly, it is argued that the shortcomings of the 
system are not beyond repair, and the courts and procedures might well be able to adapt to 
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changing circumstances and the requirements of the constitution.199 But has the government 
shown any political will to clarify the judicial authority of the traditional leaders? Have they 
initiated reforms aimed at transforming the customary law system into a vital court of law? 
 
5.2 The political will to transform and clarify traditional authority 
 
In the negotiations the traditional leaders had been in a relatively strong position. This 
position did however to an extent diminish after the first free elections in 1994. One of the 
main reasons for this was ANC’s ambiguous and sceptical view of traditional authorities. 
With ANC behind the wheel of the implementation of the constitutional principles, how did 
this affect the position of the traditional leaders? Would it result in a further curtailment of 
their powers, or were they to be transformed into viable institutions? In order to evaluate this 
it is important to ask which kind of political will the government had to clarify the role and 
the functions of traditional leaders. I am going to use two different measures of political will. 
Was there any initiative from the government to 1) Clarify their policies towards judicial and 
political traditional institutions in official statements? 2) Initiate new legislation? 
 
5.2.1 Political authority: Official statements 
 
There are often vast discrepancies between governmental promises exposed in official 
statement, and promises that turn into political action. Is this also the case according to the 
relationship between promises and actions delivered by the ANC government in questions of 
traditional authorities? Valli Moosa the prior minister of Judicial Affaires did state in 1994, 
“as long as there are people out there … especially in rural areas … who recognize, support 
and respect traditional leaders, so long will the government support and respect traditional 
leaders because we are a people’s government.”200 But how far would they go in actually 
providing a specific political authority for traditional leaders?  
 
At the opening of the National Council of Traditional Leaders in April 1997, Nelson Mandela 
in his inauguration speech argued: “Your Majesties; When the new constitution was drafted, 
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there concerns were that it did not define in sufficient detail the status and role of traditional 
leaders; that it did not, unlike the interim constitution, oblige government to set up this 
council. But we argued as the majority party and the government that we would be true to our 
word, true to our South Africanness, true to the traditions that form part of our nation.”201 
However, though ANC tried to seem like they took high interest in matters concerning 
traditional institution, they have been severely criticised for neglecting the process of 
implementing traditional political bodies. Nhlapo argued in an interview in 1999 that the will 
to provide for a political role of the traditional leaders, were not especially high: 
 
“Regarding the implementation of the constitution, the ANC stalled, and stalled and stalled on so many 
things; the establishment of the Traditional [Provincial] Houses and the establishment of the [National] 
Council of Traditional Leaders. They stalled to the point that the Council of Traditional Leaders wanted 
to take them to the Constitutional Court (…) because even though the draft constitution said that the 
Councils should be established, it had yet not been established. At the same time a lot of the laws that 
were to be submitted was unconstitutional because they had cultural or a customary law element. Yet 
the traditional leaders had not consulted, since the Houses and Councils had not been set up. They were 
beginning to say, when you eventually want to make these laws operational, we are going to challenge 
the process, because they are not constitutional. There were reasons for these delays, however. 
Especially due to the establishment of Traditional Houses, since questions like “how many seats are 
there to be, and how many should be given to women etc.” were debated. These delays, however, made 
the relationship between the traditional leaders and the ANC very strained. It came to that extent that 
the traditional leaders declared in our workshops and in public statements that they were now in a state 
of dispute with the government. It came to that stage.” 202
 
The matter that has created the most immense conflict between the ANC and the traditional 
leaders is the problem defining the role and the functions of the traditional leaders in local 
government. At the 50th National Conference of the ANC in December 1997, often referred to 
as the Mafikeng, a resolution argued that there is a need to clarify the role of traditional 
leaders at local level: “Local government in rural areas will be restructured in order to achieve 
a clear definition of roles between elected councils and legitimate traditional leaders in a 
manner that eliminates existing uncertainty and friction, that allocates the performance of 
municipal functions to elected local government; that upholds the principle of democratic  
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Box 5.1: Excerpt from Local Government: Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill, 
2000. “The functions of traditional authorities” as presented by the government prior to the 
local elections. 
 
 
Functions: 
A. To collect and administer all fees and charges which are according to custom payable to the 
traditional authority within the traditional area of that authority 
B. To receive fines tend fees collected with regard to the exercise of customary law: 
C. To administer any funding allocated to item any source 
D. To make recommendations in connection with the appointed headmen 
E. To perform such functions as may be delegated it by municipal council 
F. To provide direction and leadership in cultural activities 
G. to be the custodian of culture and function  
H. To attend to matters relating to witchcraft and divination within communities 
I. To carry out all orders given to it by competent authorities  
J. To make known the requirements of any new laws to the community  
K. To convent meetings of common’ members 
L. To promote the interest and well being of residents in its traditional area 
M. To control the holding of initiation ceremonies 
N. To facilitate the gathering of firewood 
O. To coordinate first fruit ceremonies 
P. To coordinate rainmaking ceremonies; and 
Q. To coordinate the clearing of fields to ensure good harvest. 
 
government and that extends the notion of democratic governance to include the constructive 
role to be played by legitimate traditional leaders.”203
 
Few actions however followed the intention of this resolution. The interim constitution had 
established that the second free national elections of South Africa were to be held before the 
end of 1999. The local government structure outlined for these elections, made the traditional 
leaders raise their voices, since it did not provide any specific functions for them in the 
municipals. Secondly, the new municipal boundaries went crossed of traditional communities, 
as a consequence of this the traditional leaders argued that it would make them lose control 
over various functions which they traditionally performed. It became apparent to the 
government that they needed to clarify the position of the traditional leaders before the 
election date could be announced. The announcement was delayed three times as a technical 
team compromising of traditional leaders and officials from the Department of Provincial and  
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Box 5.2: Excerpt from Local Government: Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill, 
2000. “The role of traditional leaders” presented by the government prior to the local 
elections.  
 
Roles: 
A. Officiating at the opening and closing ceremonies of municipal councils 
B. Presiding over the opening of customary proceedings 
C. Liasing, on behalf of municipal councils, with communities in respect of matters which 
affect the communities concerned 
D. Presiding over traditional, customary axed wedding ceremonies 
E. Participating in burials 
F. Mediating during ancestral worship: and 
G. Presiding over the inauguration of headmen.  
 
 
Local Affairs sought to determine the impact of the new local government dispensations on 
traditional authorities.204  
 
Mbeki needed in this situation to find interim solutions to the question, with the promise of 
soon-to-be final solutions. This made him agree on a decision to double traditional leaders’ 
representation in local municipal council, from 10 to 20 percent. This concession was not 
sufficient for the traditional leaders, and on the other side, the opponents of traditional rule, 
rejected it deeply. Zakes Hlatshwayo, the director of the National Land Committee, spelled 
out his view in an article in Sowetan, where he argued that Mbeki had given in to tradition 
with a compromise “hatched behind close doors, without any proper consultation”.205  
 
On the other hand, this concession was not sufficient to convince traditional leaders that the 
government would soon provide them with specific roles and functions in the local 
government. On the 3rd of November the government tried to ease the situation by drafting a 
Bill which clarified the role of the traditional leaders. Box 5.1 and 5.2206 presents the content 
of the intended Bill, and as one can see, it does not particularly clear up the situation of the 
traditional leaders. Box 5.1 states in function E that traditional leaders might if they wish 
perform tasks which the municipal councils delegate them. Apart from this they are to enjoy 
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predominantly ceremonial and cultural functions as for instance function O, coordinate first 
fruit ceremonies. However, function N states that they do have the power to facilitate the 
collection of firewood. The roles of traditional leaders presented in Box 5.2 did not 
accomplish more than settling the ceremonial authorities of the traditional leaders. As for 
instance role A specifies the role of the traditional leaders to officiate at the opening and 
closing ceremonies of municipal councils. The Bill was heavily criticised in the short 
consultation process from the 3 of November until it was to be tabled in parliament, the 19th 
of November.   
 
Of enormous concern for the ANC was the disagreement from Contralesa, which started to 
highly disapprove of the government’s inability to clarify traditional leaders role. The ANC’s 
Premier of the Northern Province, Ngoako Ramathodi, needed to woo the traditional leaders 
in a speech full of promises. First, he marks out the government’s position: “It is (…) 
abundantly clear that the ruling party accepts the reality that, the institution of traditional 
leadership is here to stay. Of particular significance is our recognition of an active role for this 
institution in matters of governance.” Secondly, he states the importance of standing together: 
“So, fundamental to our approach is the belief that, the institution of traditional leadership and 
democratic structure must complement each other, rather than stand in opposition to one 
another. In this principle lies the future of our governance. Implementation of the principle 
would result in a unique structure of governance, which does not water down any of the 
institutions.” Then, the apology: “However, we are aware that the proceeding with these 
elections without addressing the legal systems of the interim, might result in an unintended 
reduction of the powers of traditional leaders.” And, at last an invitation to enter the elections 
with the ANC: “As champions of their people traditional leaders, should be at the forefront 
ensuring that the poor, the majority of whom are rural and African, have the opportunity on 5 
December to vote for Councillors that will ensure a better life for the poor.”207    
 
The Bill has not yet been tabled in the parliament. In a media statement from the 1 of June 
2001 the minister of Provincial and Local Government, Mufamadi, again asked people to be 
patient, since the matter under discussion is severely delicate. “In clarifying government’s 
position on the issue, one has to understand and take into account the history and 
complexities surrounding the role and function of institutions of traditional leadership in a 
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democracy”. He states further that the matter is not just in the interest for the government and 
the traditional leaders. There are by far many other stakeholders to consult, and consulting 
takes time.208 The government have given an impression that it is interested in clarifying the 
specific political authority of traditional leaders. However, in the case of local government 
the government seems very inefficient in delivering political actions to implement the 
traditional leaders position. On national and provincial level the government has been more 
efficient. In Chapter 5.2.3 I am going to present initiated and amended legislation concerning 
the question of traditional leaders political authority. Before this I will centre my attention of 
the official statements regarding judicial authority.  
 
5.2.2 Judicial authority: Official statements  
 
It is difficult to find any sources that clarify the government’s specific ideas on judicial 
authority of traditional leaders prior to late 1998. Prior to this, it seems like ANC’s concerns 
about judicial African traditional concerns women’s right to equality under customary law. In 
a resolution presented after the 50th National Conference of the ANC, December 1997, the 
only matters related to judicial authorities are the ones who reflect concerns for women’s 
rights. In accordance with customary law, the resolution argues that in order to avoid 
“inequality between men and women” and also to make certain that “an inferior status for 
women [not] continues to be entrenched through customary law” one needs “… to campaign 
for the review of all laws, customs, traditions and any other discriminatory and oppressive 
practices which are totally against the equality clause in the Constitution”. Further this 
resolution also argues that “the ANC includes in its own political education programme a 
component to raise awareness among our people, especially in the rural areas, on these 
discriminatory customs, traditions and practices.”209 These statements seem to be in line with a 
report of the ANC Women’s movement National Conference in April earlier the same year. It 
therefore seems like there is a political will inside the ANC to provide for a reform of the 
customary law in order to protect women’s right to equality.  
 
In the beginning, the process seemed to be influenced by normative aspects regarding the 
choice of law and to transform discriminating aspect of the law. In late 1998 there was a shift 
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in this strategy. Minister of Justice, Moosa (ANC), after confrontations by different ANC 
opponents, started to stress the importance of a more holistic solution to the question of the 
judicial power of the traditional leaders. In addition to not only focusing on piecemeal 
reforms, Moosa also required a more time efficient process occupied with practical questions 
rather than abstract philosophical considerations.210 This indicates that ANC now presented a 
political will which did not only concern matters related to constitutional protection of 
individuals, but also paid interest to topics regarding clarification of the judicial function and 
role of traditional leaders in the future.  
 
If one is to consider both the government’s initiations in the legal process and the content of 
official statements, there seems to be a shift in the political will towards traditional authorities 
late 1998. Later in this chapter I am going to discuss why this shift occurred. However, it is 
important to estimate that “not initiate new laws” also could be understood as an acceptation 
of the judicial authority of courts and laws. In cases where new laws are not passed the pre-
1994 laws continue to apply, in order not to create a legal vacuum. It was thus decided that 
laws before 1994, would continue to apply if they were not in conflict with the constitution 
including the battered 1927 Black Administration Act and its counterparts.211  
 
5.2.3 Political authority: Initiated legislation 
 
The first initiative to clarify the role of the political authority of the traditional leaders was the 
Council of Traditional Leaders Act assented the 5th of April 1997. This council was formed 
with the object of promoting the role of traditional leadership within a “democratic 
constitutional dispensation” and to “enhance unity and understanding among traditional 
communities”. The Council “might” also “advise the national government and make 
recommendations relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary 
law, and the customs of communities observing a system of customary law.”212 The act states 
further that the council might “investigate and make available information on traditional 
leadership, traditional authorities, customary law and customs,” but it shall, “at the request of 
the President, advise him or her in connection with any matter referred to in this section; and 
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present an annual report to Parliament”.213 Thus the government accommodated the advice of 
the constitution in establishing houses of traditional leaders at a nation level.214 The traditional 
leaders thus received some limited legislative authority.  
 
Houses of traditional leaders were also established in the Provinces due to this legislation. 
Houses are eventually established in six of the nine provinces, have different sizes and enjoy 
different degrees of authority due to legislation by the provincial governments. Five houses 
explicitly make provision for studying legislation dealing with traditional law and customs. 
The Houses have 30 days to comment and failure to comment may result in the Bill being 
passed. If objections are raised, the Bill may not pass for a period of 30 days. There is 
however no indication of how objections raised ought to be dealt with, since there is no 
obligation for the provincial legislators to take these comments into account. However, the 
KwaZulu-Natal and the North West give more detailed expositions of the functions of the 
houses. Both Houses states that all functions and powers of Traditional Leaders, which 
existed prior to 1994, still remain in force. In the case of KwaZulu-Natal these powers and 
functions can only be withdrawn by a resolution of the House based on a two-third 
majority.215    
 
In accordance with the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act of 1998, all traditional 
leaders, in the National or Provincial Houses and also others, shall be paid allowances as other 
public official holders. By this it is established that they are recognised as having a function in 
the state. So the question is actually after 1998, what role they ought to play, not if they have a 
role to play in the state apparatus. This is interesting since there is no description or definition 
in the legislation of the relationship between the Houses and other state departments, except in 
regard to their consultative role in questions of legislation. But since there are no obligations 
for the parliament or other legislative organs to consult, the Houses have no real powers to 
influence legislation dealing with traditional authority. Du Plessis and Scheepers have argued 
that from the establishment of the National House until late 1999, only two Bills were 
discussed in the House.216 Theses were the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 
and the Succession Amendment Bill of 1998, where the latter was soon withdrawn from 
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214 For the record, one and a half year later the Council changed its name by an amendment to “National House 
of Traditional Leaders”. 
215 Du Plessis, Willemien and Scheepers, The House of Traditional Leaders: Role, problems and future, Seminar 
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parliament. Both these Bills also seem to have been introduced to the houses by the Law 
Commission, not the government.217    
 
An act, which profoundly influenced the role of the traditional leaders, was the “Municipal 
Structures Act” of 1998. This is an example of an act that probably would have prevented 
some of the problems referred to in chapter 5.2.1, had it been introduced to the traditional 
houses at an earlier stage. This act sets out the main features of local government in South 
Africa. The act states that traditional leaders may participate in the meetings of the municipal 
councils, but leaves the details for provincial premiers to decide, if this is considered 
necessary. All executive powers are, as on the provincial and national level, in the hand of the 
political elected governments. All administrative and political functions have thus fallen 
under the role of elected officials. This act also tries to settles the boundaries of the local 
districts, which has proved to be a contentious issue. The traditional authorities have protested 
vehemently against the process of municipal demarcation, since these borders often split their 
communities in two, leaving each half to fall under a different elected local government, see 
chapter 5.2.1.  
 
However, even though the traditional leaders were not consulted in the process of amending 
the powers and structures of the local government, the government had in 1998 initiated a 
process of determining the place and role of traditional leaders. First, researchers from the 
“traditional affairs” section at the department of justice and constitutional affair produced a 
Status Quo Report on traditional leadership and institutions.218 In which they held workshops 
and travelled around the country in order to find answers to practical questions such as; how 
many traditional leaders are there? Which types of traditional leaders do we have? What are 
their remunerations? Which functions did they perform in their society? Following a draft 
discussion document towards a white paper on traditional leadership and institutions were 
presented the 26th of April 2000.219  
 
The white paper was to mark the beginning of a process aimed at “engaging South Africans in 
a dialogue regarding the institution of traditional leadership, in terms of affirming it and 
                                                 
217 ibid. 
218 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Status Quo Report on Traditional Leadership and 
Institutions, Draft 1, 1999. 
219 Department of Provincial and Local Affairs, A Discussion Document towards a White Paper on Traditional 
Leadership and Institutions, 11 April 2000. 
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defining it, and clarifying its role in democratic governance.”220 The white paper, however, 
did not clarify the political authority of the traditional leaders, but it certainly did engage 
South Africans in a dialogue. As Box 5.1 and 5.2 revealed the rushed Bill on the functions 
and role of traditional leaders in the wake of the white paper, did not specify the authority of 
traditional leaders, but it did mark the start of a belated debate on what exactly the function of 
the remunerated traditional leaders were to be. The Local Governmental Law Bulletin, did 
just in time of the election, print an article on the present rights and position of the traditional 
leaders. This article stated that all traditional leaders who were to possess offices needed to be 
identified. Then the number of traditional leaders could not exceed 20 percent of the 
community council, where they enjoy the opportunity to express themselves and participate in 
all faces of a legislative debate, but they are not to vote under any circumstances. They are not 
to be remunerated, since they already receive allowances from national level. Finally, the 
Municipal Elected Councils should not until more specific legislation is amended, try to 
“change the roles of traditional leaders too much.”221  
 
It thus seems like the government has in some way tried to initiate legislation aimed at 
clarifying the political authority of the traditional leaders. The main process did, nevertheless, 
not start until late 1998, and though many features are under investigation, few acts have 
passed through the parliament. This gives an impression of the government’s great challenges 
in solving the question of what the political authorities of the traditional leaders are to be in 
the future democracy. There might be some political will to initiate legislation, but the 
government seems to await the implementation until it sorts out the multifaceted 
consequences of creating a role for traditional leaders in the liberal democracy.      
 
5.2.4 Judicial authority: Initiated legislation 
 
The first initiatives to provide for a new legislation in matters related to traditional judicial 
institutions were taken even prior to the final signing of the new constitution the 10th of 
December 1996. The South African Law Commission on an initiative from the government 
formed a project 90 called the “Harmonisation of Common Law and Indigenous Law”. The 
committee presented Issue Papers on two subjects in relation to this project in June 1996. The 
Issue Papers presented were first, the Customary Marriages and secondly, The Conflict of 
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Personal Laws. In the Law Commissions annual report of 1996 on the question of customary 
marriages they argue: “The new constitution now presents an opportunity to rethink the legal 
dualism of the past”.222 The questions posed further are if there is a need for a common law on 
marriage in South Africa, or whether indigenous marriages are to be dealt with in separate 
legislation. If so would indigenous practices, such as polygamy and bride wealth (lobola) be 
compatible with the new constitution, and if so, in what specific way?223
 
This signifies that on this initial stage, it is not decided whether a dual legal system is to be 
kept. It is to be debated. Doubt about the future of the customary law system is also 
represented according to the issue of conflicts of law. The Annual Report of 1996 states: “At 
present it is far from clear when indigenous law is applicable, for the rules on application are 
fragmented, vague, badly drafted and out of date”.224 The committee states further that this is 
also a question of “choice of law”. Is which law applied to be attributable to persons or 
territories? In order to answer this, the committee argues that one need rules which reflects the 
fact that litigants are subject to particular legal regimes because of personal qualities such as 
cultural orientation. There was in other terms political will to investigate the relationship 
between common law and customary law, and also to clarify issues where customary law 
conflicts with other principles entrenched in the new constitution.   
 
This might denote a political will to sort out some normative questions of whether it is 
possible to make the traditional judicial institutions compatible with the constitutional rights 
entrenched in the constitution. The process of reforming customary marriages got extensive 
attention both in civil society and in media. The Recognition of Customary Marriage Act 120 
of 1998 was passed through the parliament at the 20th of November. The questions related to 
the conflicts of law, did not create such an extensive attention. It remained mainly an 
academic debate within the legal branch. Through the process started at the same time as the 
process of recognising customary marriages, it proved to be more difficult to draft legislation 
on the matter. At the 27th of November 1998 the Law Commission considered a draft report 
on the conflicts of law. Not until almost a year later did the minister submit the draft report. 
The act is still not annexed by the parliament.    
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Through the process of recognising customary marriages it became evident that the dual law 
system was to exist in the future. The government thus initiated two other legal reforms in 
regard to the subject of harmonising common law and indigenous law. The first Issue Paper 
presented was on the subject of succession in customary laws.225 This question was related to 
the question of recognising customary marriages, since it profoundly represented the right to 
inheritance for women living under customary law. The second Issue Paper was on 
“Traditional courts and the judicial function of traditional leaders”. Even though the three first 
reforms were related to questions of constitutional rights and viewed as reforms aimed at 
protecting citizens living under customary law, this is the first reform that directly relates to 
the function and role of the traditional leaders. While the three first reforms provide for 
liberalisation of traditional authority, the latter intend to specify and establish a role of the 
traditional leaders in the future legal system.  
 
As I will discuss later, the intention to draft a bill on the subject of customary succession 
caused severe conflicts. It was presented to the parliament in late September 1998 only to be 
withdrawn, and sent back to the Law Commission. A bill concerning the question of 
succession has not yet past through the parliament. The process of specifying the role of 
traditional courts is still not legislated, but this process somehow became absorbed in a wider 
process of settling the functions of traditional leaders.  
 
The government also initiated a Bill concerning the administration of estates belonging to 
traditional communities in according to the Black Administration Act of 1927. The South 
African Law Commission published a Discussion Paper in December 2000.226 A Bill is to be 
tabled in parliament during 2002, but it has already caused controversy. The Bill, which is to 
recognise African traditional communities as legal persons capable of acquiring property, has 
caused discussion both within and outside the ANC. For instance, the ANC MP Lydia 
Ngwenya rejected the idea that state land was to be transferred to communities, as embodied 
in a draft Bill on Communal Land Rights. On this matter the ANC MP and Contralesa 
president, Chief Phathekile Holomisa and IFP MPL Hulumeni Gumede backed the Bill. 
While Ngwenya argued that individuals should hold the right to land, Holomisa stated that the 
legal land right ought to be communal, in the title of a relevant traditional authority: “Not to 
                                                 
225 The Law Commission changed the name of the process in 1998. Instead of using the word indigenous law, 
one now started to use the term customary law.  
226 South African Law Commission, Project 90, Customary Law: Administration of Estates, Discussion Paper 95, 
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do so would amount the further erosion of the role of traditional leaders in the life of our 
people, and would serve to cut the ties between the land, the people and their ancestors who 
bequeathed the land to us”.227  The Bill will however probably not be amended before the 
Department of Provincial and Local Affairs have tabled a complete white paper report on the 
Role of Traditional Leaders.   
 
On the subject of judicial authority, the government’s political will to provide for a 
clarification of the customary law and courts position in the future seemed to be hesitating. In 
the beginning the government focused on reforming aspects of the customary law of which 
were regarded as incompatible with the constitution. Thus it also indirectly approved of 
customary law. Not until late 1998 however, did the government attempt to start a process of 
specifying the judicial role of traditional leaders. A process still not finished, but at the list of 
“soon-to-be-presented-in-parliament” laws at the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs. The Bill on Succession in Customary Law and the Bill concerning conflicts of law, 
the Application of Customary Law Bill, share the same fate. 
       
The government has also initiated law reforms, which influenced the process, though they 
were not directly on the topic. The most important one of these were the “Promotion of 
equality and prevention of unfair discrimination Act of No. 4, 2000”. This Act states that the 
new democracy “requires the eradication of social and economic inequalities, especially those 
who are systemic in nature, which were generated in history by colonialism, apartheid and 
patriarchy…” It does not mention legal institutions, but it does expose the liberal view of the 
government, and a specification of the importance of equality and non-discrimination in 
society.   
 
For the record, I can also mention that there are other interesting pieces of initiated 
legislations relating to cultural recognition that do not have specific influence on traditional 
leaders. There is an initiated process of legislation on Islamic Marriages and related issues.228 
A process has also started to establish a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the 
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities. This commission was established 
in the constitution as a concession to vocals of Afrikaner rights.  In August 2001, the Minister 
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for Provincial and Local Government tabled legislation to establish this Commission and 
regulate its powers. The bill is now discussed in the affected Parliamentary committees. The 
Afrikaner Volkstaat Council is however repealed by an Act of the 23rd of November 2001.229 
The establishment of a Volkstaat Council was recognised by the interim constitution but 
failed to be entrenched in the final constitution. Internal conflicts and the government’s 
attitude towards it made the process complicated.    
  
5.2.5 Traditional authority by 2001  
 
If one is to find any pattern in the political will of the government, there seems to be two 
different features that they needed to adjust to. The constitution entrenched a conditional 
recognition of the traditional authorities. The fact that it was “conditioned” implied a need for 
reforming traditional institutions and customs into a more liberal vision of universal rights. 
The fact that it was “recognised” signified that traditional leaders ought to be given a function 
and role in the new Democratic order. As illustrated in Figure 5.1 the first law enacted after 
the signing of the constitution, is the law of establishing a council of traditional leaders. This 
gives a clarification of power, but it is not a reform due to reforming tradition. Nhlapo, as 
mentioned in chapter 5.2.1, has argued that the establishment of the houses were delayed, and 
one might suggest that it was not established as a direct result of the government’s initiative. 
One might rather believe that forces outside the government pushed on for an enactment of 
this Act. The remuneration Act established that traditional leaders in and outside the houses 
were to achieve allowances. This implies that one does regard the traditional leaders as still 
having a function as other public office bearers such as the presidency, ministers etc. 
  
However, the traditional leaders were remunerated by the state prior to this Act, and it might 
have caused problems to take away the income of a group of people recognised by the 
constitution. The next Bill enacted is the Customary Marriage Bill, which highly was initiated 
by the government, and this act is aimed at reforming the customary traditions into a more 
liberal vision. A suggestion might be that the reformation process was more in line with the 
ideas of the government than the clarification of roles and functions, particularly when one 
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Figure 5.1: The status of important initiated legislations concerning traditional 
authority  
Stage in 
process 
Initiated reforms Reforming 
of traditions 
Clarification of 
power 
Council of Traditional Leaders Act 1997 No Yes 
Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act, 1998 No Yes 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 Yes Yes 
Local Government: Municipal Structure Act 1998 Yes No 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment 
Act 1999 Yes No 
Local Government: Cross-boundary Municipalities Act 
2000 No Yes 
 
Legislated 
National House of Traditional Leaders Amendment Act 
2000 No Yes 
Initiated Bill Bill Local Government: Municipal Structures Second 
Amendment Bill 2000 No Yes 
White Papers  A Discussion Document towards White Paper on 
Traditional Leadership and Institutions, 11 April 2000 Yes Yes 
Traditional Courts Bill Yes Yes 
Succession in Customary Law Bill Yes No 
Application of Customary Law Bill230 Yes Yes 
Bills at  
the table of  
Department  
of Justice 
 
 
Communal Land Rights Bill No231 Yes 
 
notices that the three Acts on governmental structure and boundaries do not mention the role 
of traditional leaders at local level. In 2000, two years later, an Act on Cross-Boundaries was 
enacted. This Act mentions several communities that need to be restructured, and hence in 
line with the borders of some traditional communities. This Act represents that the earlier acts 
on local government did not address the question of the clarification of traditional leaders 
authority at local level in a very specific manner, and a public debate was needed to put 
forward a clarification what happened to the power of traditional leaders if their communities 
were divided by different municipal borders.  
 
As figure 5.1 also signifies, there are quite a few bills which have not been tabled in 
parliament, and also some has been withdrawn because of the need for further investigation. 
Both the Bill on Local Government: Municipal Structures Second Amendment and the 
Succession in Customary Law Bill, has been introduced to parliament, but withdrawn. The 
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Law. 
231 By February 2002 it seems like it is not going to limit the authority of traditional leaders. 
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first Bill aimed at clarifying the role and functions of traditional leaders was withdrawn 
because it did not to a sufficient degree accommodate the traditional leaders, who rejected it. 
A consequence of this is that the role and functions of the traditional leaders in the municipal 
councils established after the 2000, is still very unclear. See box 5.1 and 5.2 on page in 
chapter 5.2.1.   
 
The Succession bill was in line with the government’s campaign of reforming traditional 
customs. The withdrawing of this bill is close to a watershed in the process on reforming 
traditional customs. In an interview Nhlapo argued that the government rushed this bill since 
they were “very keen to enact as much fundamental and radical legislation as possible before 
the elections.”232 The Bill consisted on very sensitive subjects for traditional leaders, and it 
was passed by the cabinet and presented in the public hearings of parliament when the 
consulting by the law commission had just started. The traditional leaders became very hostile 
towards it. It was withdrawn both because it entailed principles that still required negotiations, 
and because the government was afraid that the hostility might upset the process of passing 
the Bill on customary marriages. Nhlapo has argued that it might be more the way the process 
had turned, than the principles in the Bill, that opposed the traditional leaders: “One 
interesting feature was that many chiefs were not opposed to the principles of the Bill in some 
ways. They said; ‘The last time we saw that project was when the Law Commission asked for 
our views on it.’ Open-ended questions in the Issue Paper. ‘We have just started to take these 
questions and recommendations to our people, and now all of a sudden we see the discussions 
have reached the parliament. We do not like that!’ So it was withdrawn.”233 
 
After this Bill was withdrawn, no Bills aimed at reforming the traditional customs and 
institutions have been passed by the parliament. They are all, as we can see in figure 5.1, still 
at the table of the justice department. In 2000 the researchers at the section of traditional 
affairs was moved from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to the 
Department of Provincial and Local Affairs. By this the white paper on traditional leaders and 
institutions, which aim at clarifying traditional leaders role and functions in society, also 
moved with it. This gives an impression of a change in governmental attitude towards the 
process. Until late 1998 the government exposed a political will to reform the institutions and 
customs of traditional communities into a more liberal notion. After 1999 it seems like all 
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Bills initiated are of a more practical kind, which aims at clarifying the role of traditional 
leaders especially in the political system, but also in the judicial. It is thus interesting to see 
what happens after the white paper on traditional leaders and institutions are finished. Is the 
aim of the government to only seek clarifications of some practical aspects of the traditional 
authorities, before it once again turns to questions of reforming the institutions and customs in 
line with the constitution? Or was this endeavour nothing more than initiatives inspired by a 
normative constitutional process?    
 
However, to put this discussion in to a wider perspective one can use quantitative measures. 
Out of 551 new Acts amended from the opening 1996 to the closing 2001 of parliament, five 
Acts directly mention traditional leaders role and functions. One Act regards judicial 
authority, The Customary Marriage Act. Two Acts regards legislative powers of traditional 
leaders in consultative organs, The Council of Traditional Leaders Act and National House of 
Traditional Leaders Amendment Act. One Act regards executive powers, since it settles the 
right of traditional leaders to achieve allowances for their holding of public offices, The 
Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act. One Act is an amendment of an earlier restriction 
of power, the Cross-boundary Municipal Amendment act. At least six Bills are initiated which 
intends to specify the powers of traditional leaders and customary law, however, these Bills 
will probably not be tabled in parliament before the white paper on traditional leaders and 
institutions are finished.  
 
5.3 What influenced the political will? 
 
As a conclusion to the empirical discussion of this paper, it might be interesting to point at 
some tentative explanations of what have influenced the process of implementing the 
traditional recognition entrenched in the constitution. I have decided to divide the process into 
three different periods, and try to explain which aspects that affected the process. First, here is 
the process from 1996 until late 1998, which represents the period of reforming traditional 
institutions and customs. The second period represent the watershed of the process in late 
1998, why did a change occur in the government’s action? The third period represents a will 
to clarify the traditional leaders roles and functions from late 1998 until 2001.  
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5.3.1 The venture of reform 1996 to 1998 
 
As a liberation movement the ANC had always stressed the right to be equal, and it severely 
stressed the value of non-racism and non-sexism. Traditional institutions and customs to some 
extent represent both these two features. The women’s league inside the ANC stressed that the 
traditional recognition was conditioned by the constitution, and in order to find their place in 
the new free South Africa, the traditional authorities needed to adapt to this. The process of 
recognising customary marriages became a unique process in the South African system, since 
the government initiated a free and fair consulting process where everyone could participate.   
 
The official customary law had remained virtually unchanged since the Black Administration 
Act in 1927, and its vision of women did not represent liberal values of equality. The Law 
Commission embarked on a new approach of consulting in law making reform. The new 
vision was “if you are going to make laws, you have to make them with the people, not just 
for the people”.234 On the process of recognising customary marriages, the Law Commission 
arranged different workshops from early 1996 until 1998. By doing this people from the 
traditional communities were invited to participate in the reforming of their institutions and 
customs. A very interesting product of this process was that the debate between traditional 
leaders and especially younger women, often representing women’s NGO’s, did mark out 
some interesting nuances in the old dichotomised tradition vs. feminism debate. Through 
these debates it became obvious that women did not necessarily want to abolish the traditional 
authorities, they more insisted on reforming them. This was not due to the constitutional 
protection of them, but as with many men, women identified themselves with these cultural 
traditions.  
 
Mbatha has argued that the reform process needed to be understood in a context. Which 
meant that the customary law had been denied to develop along with the people’s wish 
because of Apartheid legislation. For instance, though people entered into western marriages, 
they did still pay lobola (bride wealth). This did represent a wish to identify with African 
culture and tradition, but also an interest for the property consequences in western law. Since 
women were denied the right to property in customary law, they did not agree to marry under 
it. She further argues: “It is very important that the law should draw from what people are 
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doing in practice. In practise people are complaining about marriage accordance to both 
customary law and western law. And why do they complain? Because neither is based on 
their culture as they know it.”235 
 
The challenges for customary law as it was introduced in workshops pointed at other 
implications than those one had addressed from an intellectual and academic viewpoint. As 
Mbatha in the case of paying lobola “Older women said that they would like to keep the 
tradition of lobola to continue. Younger people were saying that they did share the sentiments, 
but faced with the problem of unemployment they could not afford it. So at the end of the day 
the issue was whether the practice was one thing that one could afford.” Ngema rather 
focused on the importance of discussing the patriarchal features of certain practise “Like 
lobola for instance, it was something a family was given as ‘thank you for haven taken care of 
this woman’. It was not regarded as a price. With the generations this have changed, and now 
it is more like if someone pays the lobola to your parents, it is like your price. It was not like 
this in the old days. Now they are saying that you are my property. I have paid for you. We 
cannot say that lobola most be taken away, but something need to change…” The hope was 
then that one by consultation and discussions would be able to eradicate the discriminating 
features of traditional institutions and customs. Consultation was regarded as important since 
if the reforms were to have any consequences people needed to understand why these reforms 
were introduced. 
 
Oomen had argued that this consultation process was too urban, and that since they were city 
people, they did not to a sufficient degree have an idea of what were going on in the rural 
areas. She has argued that when information is needed on life in traditional authority areas, 
policy-makers generally turn to the Houses of Traditional Leaders, or to other organisations 
that represent them. The consequence of this is that these “traditional leaders, just like many 
of the anthropologists consulted by government, have an interest in painting a conservative 
picture of culture, one in which traditional leadership is immensely important.”236 This might 
be a vital point to notice, since if one is consulting with traditional leaders they do have a 
tendency to overestimate the importance of traditional culture and custom in day-to-day life. 
Nhlapo has argued that these consultations had another important function than that of asking 
of people’s advises in a law-making process. The consultations were also educational, as a 
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means to teach people, and then particularly the traditional leaders, about liberal values.    
 
This period then seems to be influenced by the normative debates stirred by the transition to 
democracy. In 4.3.2 I argued that the women’s position in parliament was one of the reasons 
why the power of traditional authorities had diminished between the interim and the signing 
of the final constitution. After the constitution was signed, it seems like the women 
represented a force behind the reformation of the traditional institutions. These forces 
concentrated on the judicial authorities and did not seem very interested in the clarification of 
traditional leaders role and functions. The ANC MP, Pregs Govender, who chaired the Joint 
Standing Committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life & Status Women, roused a 
public debate by arranging workshops around the country, sometimes together with the Law 
Commission. It seems like the recognition of marriage law became one of the key topics for 
the women delegations, together with questions like domestic violence, maintenance and 
labour laws.  
 
An enactment of the recognition of customary marriages Bill represented a symbol of the 
powers of the women’s movement, and due to its consultative aspect it might also have been 
an important Act for the government in illustrating the fairness and openness of the new 
political system. The female MP’s influence might be important, because a Bill on the 
Conflicts of Law, which was initiated at the same time, has not yet been tabled in parliament. 
However, this bill might also have reflected a new aspect of influence which up until this time 
had not been as visual, the need to actually clarify the role and function of the traditional 
authorities. Before settling how to reform these institutions, it became apparent that it was 
important to address the questions: What are these institutions? Was there a point in 
reforming traditions and institutions that one actually tried to do away with?     
 
5.3.2 The watershed of 1998 
 
1998 somehow marks a watershed in the process, since the government from having focused 
on the importance of reforming the traditional institutions and customs, started to embrace a 
more pragmatic strategy of clarifying the roles and functions of traditional authorities. It was 
the year when the Recognition of Customary Marriage Bill was enacted, but a few months 
earlier the government had started auditing traditional leadership in an effort to develop a  
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Box 5.3: Speech by Bantu Holomisa in Umtata, Eastern Cape, in his speech at the 1-year 
celebration of UDM, September 1998.  
You will remember that I mentioned that the UDM is the political home of all South Africans. It is in that spirit 
that Traditional leaders and Religious leaders feature so prominently in our activities. These leaders are in their 
own respective ways guardians of that values that we espouse in our vision and mission. The centrality of their 
role in the UDM is reflected in their involvement in all our structures. 
 
coherent and new government policy on the issue. When the crises between the traditional 
leaders and the government raised by the government’s effort to rush the process of enacting a 
bill on succession, it seems like the government even further started to denote the importance 
of clarifying the traditional leaders role. At least in initiations, though it might not have been 
followed by political action. An aspect, which might have affected this, was that when the 
traditional leaders voiced their hostility towards the bill, a rejection also supported by the 
women’s movements, they knew that they soon could play their old joker, their ability to 
mobilise votes in the elections. In chapter 4.3.3 I argued that the traditional leaders’ expected 
ability to mobilise votes, made them a strategic alliance. ANC hooked up with Contralesa, 
which has its most predominant foundation in the Northern Province. After the elections ANC 
received 91.6 percent of the total vote in the provincial elections. ANC also managed to get a 
high percent of votes in other rural areas.  
 
Except the reluctant establishment of the Councils of traditional leaders, the government had 
not been doing much in clarifying the role and functions of traditional leaders. As for instance 
when the structures of the new local government were enacted, the houses had not been 
consulted. Though the new government wanted to get as many fundamental laws as possible 
enacted, they also wanted to secure the opportunity to get two-thirds of the votes. It they 
gained a two-thirds majority this enabled them to change principles entrenched in the 
constitution. The need for the ANC to address the traditional leaders became more important 
since a new party entered the scene. In the 1994 elections ANC had been almost the only 
alternative for the regular African voters. IFP was strictly based in KwaZulu-Natal and PAC 
was regarded as too limited. In 1997 a new party was formed, the United Democratic Party 
(UDM). The UDM aimed at challenging ANC’s position, and in their 1999 election campaign 
they tried to woo the chiefs, by pointing to the inefficiency of ANC to deliver on their 
promises regarding traditional leaders. UDM was an alliance between prior ANC MP Bantu 
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Table 5.1: 1999 election results for the National Assembly by provinces237
 EASTERN 
CAPE 
FREE 
STATE 
GAUTENG KWAZULU 
NATAL 
MPUMA-
LANGA 
NORTH. 
CAPE 
NORTH. 
PROVINCE 
NORTH 
WEST 
WESTERN 
CAPE 
ACDP 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.9 3.1
AEB 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2
ANC 73.9 81.0 68.2 39.8 85.3 64.6 89.3 80.5 42.6
AZAPO 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1
DP 6.4 5.9 17.7 9.8 5.0 5.8 1.7 3.7 14.2
FA 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6
IFP 0.3 0.5 3.5 40.5 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2
MF 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
NNP 3.3 5.0 3.9 4.0 2.4 22.5 1.7 2.4 34.4
PAC 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.5
UCDP 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 7.5 0.1
UDM 12.9 1.7 2.2 1.3 1.4 0.9 2.6 1.4 3.1
VF/FF 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.2 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.2 0,7
Other 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
Holomisa238 and former Minister for the NP Roelf Meyer. The party was announced as a non-
racial opposition to the ANC, and argued that they wanted to focus more on pragmatic 
questions than ideological. As pointed out in Figure 4.5 Bantu Holomisa is of royal origin, 
and it was anticipated that he would get support from the traditional communities in Eastern 
Cape, because of his position and the party’s more conservative and practical orientation. The 
party also started to talk directly to traditional leaders in their speeches, where they pointed at 
the importance of traditional leaders involvement in politics, see Box 5.3.  
 
ANC MP and leader of Contralesa Patekile Holomisa had announced in Mail & Guardian in 
October 1997 that he planned to cut ties with the ANC and join the UDM. He said that his 
organisation “felt betrayed by the ANC government “ and now had to consider seeking new 
political alliances.239 The constant threat of the UDM might have influenced the ANC ‘s will 
to initiate reforms aimed at clarifying traditional leaders functions and role in the political 
system. When the relationship between the government and the traditional leaders was further 
strained by the government’s policies and procedures in regard to the process of enacting the 
Succession Bill, this situation was brought to a climax. As presented in 5.2.2 the government 
according to judicial authority launched a more pragmatic reform on traditional courts and 
                                                 
237 The electoral Institute of Southern Africa. 
238 Expelled by the ANC in 1996 due to some economic and personal feuds with Stella Sigcau in the former 
Transkei Government.  
239 Mbhele, Wally Betrayed chiefs cut ANC ties, Mail & Guradian, the 3rd of October, 1997.  
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Table 5.2: Difference in ANC election results for the Provincial Legislation 1994 and 
1999240
ANC Vote % 
1994 elections 1999 elections +/- 
Gauteng 57.5 67.9 +10.3 
Eastern Cape 84.4 73.8 -10.6 
Northern Province 91.6 88.3 - 3.3 
North West 83.3 79.0 - 4.3 
Mpumalanga 80.7 84.9 + 4.2 
Free State 76.7 80.8 + 4.1 
Northern Cape 49.7 64.3 +14.6 
KwaZulu Natal 32.2 39.4 + 7.2 
Western Cape 33.0 42.1 + 9.1 
Total 62.7 66.4 +3.7 
 
raditional leaders’ judicial roles. On political authority it started the Status Quo Report 
investigations, which intended to end in the white paper on traditional leaders functions in the 
democracy. In other words, less ideological and more pragmatic, aimed at clarifying not just 
reform traditional institutions and customs.  
 
As Table 5.1 reveals the UDM managed to get 12.9 percent of the votes in the provincial 
elections in the Eastern Cape in 1999. The UDM thus became the largest party in opposition 
in this province. The ANC managed to get 73.9 percent of the vote, which is normally 
considered a nice result, but as Table 5.2 illustrates this is 10.3 percent less than in the last 
election in Eastern Cape. Only one year earlier there were indications of a much lower ANC 
support, so probably they were able to win back some trust in initiating a new strategy. For 
instance, Patekila Holomisa decided to keep his associations with the ANC. According to 
Table 5.1 the United Christian Democratic Party received 7.5 of the votes in the North West. 
This is an interesting feature since this is a Christian Regionalist party, which is the earlier 
Bophuthatswana homeland leader Mangope’s Party. Both in the Eastern Cape and the North 
West some percentages of the votes moved to more conservative parties, who voiced their 
sentiments for traditional leaders.   
 
However, Table 5.2 demonstrates that the ANC increased its total vote with 3.7% in the 1999 
elections. If one adds the provincial result, the result suggests that the ANC had 
                                                 
240 The Electorate Institute of Southern Africa. 
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Table 5.3: National election results 1999241
PARTY % Votes Seats 
ACDP 1.4 228.975 6 
AEB 0.3 46.292 1 
ANC 66.4 10.601.330 266 
AZAPO 0.2 27.257 1 
DP 9.6 1.527.337 38 
FA 0.5 86.704 2 
IFP 8.6 1.371.477 34 
MF 0.3 48.277 1 
NNP 6.9 1.098.215 28 
PAC 0.7 113.125 3 
UCDP 0.8 125.280 3 
UDM 3.4 546.790 14 
FF/VF 0.8 127.217 3 
Other 0.2 28.866 0 
Total 100 15.977.142 400 
 
strengthened its position. In the old ANC bastion, Northern Province, Table 5.2 illustrates that 
ANC lost 3.3 percent of the votes. ANC strengthened its position in urban provinces, such as 
the Gauteng and Western Cape. This suggests a tendency of the ANC getting more trust in 
urban areas, while loosing some of its former firm grip on rural areas. As table 5.1 reveals, 
even though Mongopes party, the UCDP, got 7.5 percent of the vote, the ANC lost only 4.3 
percent of support compared with 1999. UCDP had not taken votes only from the ANC.   
 
The national election results presented in Table 5.3 indicates that there are more parties 
represented in parliament after the 1999 elections. An important element in this regard is that 
many of these new parties have some kind of cultural foundation. Even tough UDM was a 
non-racial party, they did try to mobilise votes due to the ANC “betrayal” of traditional 
leaders. UCDP is a “Bophuthatswana” regionalist party. Azanian People’s Organisation 
(AZAPO) is a Black Consciousness party. Minority Front (MF) is a Muslim party, mainly 
Indian, which gets most of their votes in KwaZulu-Natal. FF/VF was the only representative 
of the Afrikaner Right in 1994. In 1999 the Afrikaner Einheidsbeweging (AEB) also became 
represented in parliament. The Federal Alliance (FA) is regarded as Populist Party, and 
stresses the importance of strong traditional authorities to crack down on crime in rural areas. 
IFP lost about 10% of their share of the vote in KwaZulu-Natal compared with the 1994  
                                                 
241 The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. 
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Figure 5.2: Visualisation of 1994 and 1999 elections result  
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elections.  
 
According to Table 5.3 the New National Party was not the main opposition party after the 
1999 national elections. There are probably two main reasons for this. First, they might have 
lost some votes due to their legacy as the former Apartheid party. The earlier Liberal Party, 
now the Democratic Party, is the main opposition party, and Figure 5.2 visualises that this 
party had increased its share of the votes most since 1994. On the other hand, some voters 
might have turned against the National Party because they gave into too much in the 
negotiations. These voters have probably turned to AEB and FA. But these parties might have 
gotten more support on behalf of the FF/VF.   
 
After the 1999 elections ANC entrenched its position as the majority party. Table 5.2 
suggests volatility in the electorate by province. The ANC has lost some of its extremely 
predominant role in rural areas such as Eastern Cape and Northern Province. These are also 
according to Nhlapo the houses with strongest Houses of Traditional Leaders. ANC gained 
support in urban provinces such as Western Cape and Gauteng. The Democratic Party, which 
is the party with the highest increase in its percent of votes, is as mentioned in chapter 4, see 
the discussions of Figure 4.2 and 4.3, also a party with liberal notions, and in many ways 
sceptical towards cultural rights. It thus seemed like most of the voters viewed liberal ideas as 
important, while the old vocals of a political system based on cultural cleavages, have less 
support and have been further fragmented. Did the election result again put the reforming 
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forces on the agenda, or did the ANC maintain on its more pragmatic strategy aimed at 
clarifying the role of traditional leaders? And if so, what influenced these choices? 
 
5.3.3 In search for practical solutions 1998 - 2001 
 
Though the 1999 elections illustrated that ANC was not necessarily vulnerable to the 
traditional leaders ability to mobilise vote, the following events did not give an impression of 
a will in the ANC to return to their approach based on reforming of illiberal aspects of 
traditional customs and institutions. This approach more resembled their vision of traditional 
leaders and institutions up to the point when they obtained political power, why did they not 
return to the process of reforming traditional authorities? 
 
The first aspect that might have had an effect is the centre-periphery aspect introduced in 
chapter 4.3.1. It became obvious that the ANC had not addressed the reality of rural South 
Africa in a sufficient manner in its first years of governance. Even the consulting process in 
regard to the reforming of the customary law was predominantly held at provincial level. The 
traditional houses at provincial level seemed to work more or less, and it is important to 
emphasise that the former “independent” and “semi-independent” institutional structures 
could be used as a foundations for the new Houses. In regard to a workshop held on the 
process of recognising customary marriages, Nhlapo argued in an interview in 1999:  
 
“It was a rush. I think we just rushed, and we was criticised for that. Another thing we were criticised for 
was that it was all in the urban areas (…). We never attended at a single village meeting. Asking questions 
like, do you think culture should be a secondary right, and so on. In fact I have a feeling that consulting 
like this is never going to happen because of time limits. We just have to bear it in mind, try to think what 
kinds of different views there are.”  
   
When the rural area was not addressed in a sufficient manner this might be a consequence of 
both 1) that they did not have the political will to put the clarification of the rural leader 
conflicts at the top of their agenda, something which had resulted in conflicts and a political 
vacuum. 2) They did not have satisfactory institutional means to make this possible. The prior 
governments had neglected the institutional developments in rural, traditional areas. The 
doings of these areas were regarded as “tribal affairs” outside the interest of the apartheid 
government, as long as they did not activate themselves politically. Institutional bodies at  
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Box 5.4: An illustration of rightist populist rhetoric on traditional leaders: Political 
Manifesto of the Federal Alliance 
 
The Reality - The ANC through their civic associations undermined the authority of traditional and natural 
leaders. Various ANC leaders rejected traditionalism as archaic and claimed that traditional leaders do not have a 
place in a modern society. The ANC's eagerness to destroy ethnicity contributed to the undermining of 
traditional leaders. The so-called rural local councils denied the existence of traditional leaders and their 
influence in their communities. This had a direct influence on the youth in the rural areas rejecting the discipline 
and authority of traditionalism. The subsequent result of this is the growing crime and lawlessness in the rural 
areas.  
Effective governance - by the FEDERAL ALLIANCE will acknowledge and promote the role and authority of 
traditional leaders. The FEDERAL ALLIANCE accepts and acknowledges that traditional leaders are the 
legitimate trustees of tribal land and must therefore be involved in each and every decision relating to their land 
as well as the inhabitants of this land and must be remunerated for their services. The FEDERAL ALLIANCE 
will promote the role of the Provincial Councils for Traditional Leaders and will give them the necessary 
authority. The role of traditional and natural leaders in interpreting and executing indigenous law will be 
accepted and promoted by the FEDERAL ALLIANCE and in this we will assist in compiling and codifying the 
applicable indigenous law. 
 
local level were as an outcome of this scarce. The planning of the local elections was an 
illustration of how the rural areas somehow had been neglected. Though one had established 
community councils in local areas, no one had addressed the question of what exactly the 
position of the traditional leaders was in these areas. Due to this, the ANC needed to stick to 
the process of clarifying the traditional leaders role and functions, since the traditional leaders 
now seemed to find themselves in limbo. At national and provincial level, this would only 
have implied less power to the traditional leaders. At local level this meant that nobody knew 
who were to do what. An illustrating picture often used is that there were ‘two bulls in a 
kraal’242: trying to get attention, do their duties and perform the power they were meant to 
possess, with all the conflicts and confusion this might bring.  
 
This event not only denotes that the government had problems with grasping the challenges of 
the rural area, it was probably also affected by the aspect presented in 4.3.2 regarding the 
problem of making the traditional institutions compatible with elected local bodies. The ANC 
might have found themselves in a situation where they out of liberal democratic reasons did 
not want to grant the traditional leaders a significant political power. At the other hand the 
                                                 
242 See Oomen 2000. 
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traditional leaders were not satisfied with only possessing symbolic authority and the power to 
“facilitate the gathering of firewood”, see Box 5.1 function N. If they were to have some role 
and functions in the future society this was regarded as an insult. The ANC was by far a 
centralist government that disliked delegating power. It must therefore have been an 
inconvenient situation to be at the wheel of the process of recognising traditional authorities, 
which so many required. Many conservative and right wing parties for instance back the 
process of recognising traditional leaders. This is not without reasons. If the traditional leaders 
gain some kind of self-governmental rights, this paves the way for other groups to once again 
stress the importance of regionalism. Box 5.4, which presents the Federal Alliance political 
manifest, sheds light on the old notion that the “tribal” Africans need a firm hand of authority 
to be able to function as “civilised”. Secondly, the will to grant them political authority might 
be addressed out of the idea that this will fragment the political power of the ANC. Seen from 
this point of view the process was deemed to be fumbling.  
 
When ANC thus stays on these roads, it might also be influenced by the fact that they want to 
be understood as “the broad church”.243 And consequently, a broad church wants to include 
several opinions and aspirations. Nhlapo argues that the leadership is as a product of this, 
“most concerned with how to balance between many different issues. One of the issues, which 
has been proved difficult, is the issue of custom”. The organisation has at the one hand a lot of 
intellectuals, “who think the whole idea of African traditions has been overtaken by time, 
feudal anachronism that should not be part of a democratic consociation.” But as argued 
previously, they still have a lot of support in rural areas, often due to mobilisation by 
traditional leaders. In regard to the change in the ANC attitude towards the rural areas Nhlapo  
 has argued:  
 
“This urban alliance [intellectuals and women delegation] did not like traditions and traditional 
leadership, and they seemed to be winning. I suspect, however, that somebody disobeyed with this 
strategy towards the rural areas. Nobody in Africa has with the intentions to abolish the traditional 
leadership and customary law, has reached something else that disaster (…). Okay, how can I put this 
carefully? I think that among the people gathered in parliament, the ones who belong to the ANC, there 
are no enmities to pro-African culture. I think the debate always will continue, but I am saying that it is 
no universal agreement on that it is time for African culture to pass. So in the broad church again, there 
are those who with a very strong language, who will stand up in the parliament and speak Xhosa, 
because the people who speak Afrikaans or English offend them. It is a mixture of representatives from 
                                                 
243 Nhlapo in interview 1999. 
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South African black people. South African black people in general are not necessarily eager to 
modernise African culture.”244  
 
This was argued prior to the conflicts stirred by the local government but it does illustrate that 
some of the reasons why the ANC seems to have problems in finding a coherent policy 
against the challenges of traditional institutions and customs. On the one hand, it is important 
to remember that the government, thus heavily dominated by the ANC, is a coalition. IFP, still 
has a few of the ministers, and to keep the IFP inside, the ANC even though not internally 
divided on the subject, must as a part of this coalition compromise on intellectual views on 
traditional customs and institutions. On the other hand, the ANC likes to be in charge of the 
political transformation of South Africa, and will hesitate in delegating any political power. 
So why should the ANC be commanded by the wish of some traditional leaders?  
 
To sum up this discussion, I have argued that the constitution entrenched a conditioned 
recognition of traditional authorities. The fact that it was “conditioned” implies a need to 
reform traditional authorities. The fact that it was “recognised” implies a need to reforming 
traditional institutions and customs into a liberal vision of universal rights. In the wake of the 
entrenchment of the new liberal constitution, the ANC first embarked on a process of 
reforming traditional customs and traditions. This process was due to both the principles of 
ANC as one knew them prior to the transition, and more important, this was an effect of a 
strong women delegation within the ANC, who had the transformation of discriminating 
features of customary law as one of their predominate key topics. The initiated bills at this 
point seems to be inspired by the intentions of making the customary law compatible with 
liberal notions.  
 
Secondly, in 1998, there seems to have been something that influenced the governments 
approach towards traditional authorities, and they initiated a process where clarification of the 
traditional leaders functions and roles were put on the agenda. I have suggested that one of the 
main reasons for this was the anticipated power of the traditional leaders to mobilise the rural 
electorate. New parties as the UDM entered the scene and challenged the ANC’s reforming 
approach towards the traditional leaders. However, the ANC strengthened their position as the 
largest party in these elections, though there seems to have been some volatility in the 
electorate due to the results of the provinces. The ANC seems to have lost some votes in the 
                                                 
244 Ibid.  
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rural areas, but gained votes in urban areas.   
 
Thirdly, the ANC after this period stays on the path of clarifying traditional leaders’ functions 
and roles, though it does not seem like they are able to deliver any political action on the 
initiated bills. The local elections created great controversies in the political landscape in 
2000. It became apparent that the ANC had not sufficiently addressed the challenges of dual 
political “powers” in local, traditional communities, and as argued in chapter 4.3.1 it seems 
like centre-periphery aspect in South African politics had influenced the government’s ability 
to deliver a coherent institutional, political structure. The ability to deliver is due to either 
political will or institutional means.  
 
The institutional means at local level are not particularly developed. Prior to the transition the 
Apartheid government had neglected political structures on the local level. Its approach was 
rather to use control mechanisms constructed by the establishing of the “semi-independent ” 
and “independent” homeland governments. With the establishing of a wall-to-wall local 
government, there were few institutional structures to rely on. This illustrates that there were 
few institutional means, and the question required efficient political action to be solved. So 
why was the ANC not able to deliver efficient political action? 
 
The ANC is a broad church. Their effort to take diverging considerations into account 
influences the question. The ANC is even in a coalition with the IFP, which is the most 
ethnical based party in South Africa, and they also wants to accommodate intellectuals and 
women delegates opposed by the traditional authorities. Thus this gives the ANC a will to 
deliver, but on the contrary this also might result in a reluctant delegation of political power to 
cultural groups. In other words, this is a thorny issue in a political scene where the opposition 
parties are in favour of federalism. And thus political action is hesitating.  
 
5.3.4 Legitimacy of traditional authorities 
 
Afrobarometer has newly released some results from a survey on Popular Attitudes to 
Democracy, Selected African Countries, 1999 – 2001. South Africa is on of the twelve 
selected countries, but the question related to the legitimacy of traditional leaders does not 
give any clear answers to the sentiments of the inhabitant’s attitude towards traditional 
leaders. In Table 5.4 I have presented the results from five countries in regard to questions of  
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Table 5.4: Rejection of non-democratic alternatives, percentages of national samples.245
 
 South Africa Botswana Lesotho Zambia Zimbabwe 
Military Rule 75 85 70 95 80
One Party State 56 78 51 80 74
Traditional Leaders 64 74 59 80 63
All Alternatives 41 61 34 69 49
 N=2200 N=1200 N=1177 N=1198 N=1200
 
peoples sentiments towards “non-democratic alternatives”. 64% of the South African sample 
rejects the traditional leaders as a non-democratic alternative. It is however difficult to know 
how many percent of the respondents that have any relationship with traditional leaders 
actually in their day-to-day lives. The percent of rejection might increase if the people asked 
did not live in traditional communities.  
 
More important, though one might reject traditional leaders as a regime, in line with a 
rejection of a military rule, this does not necessarily indicate that the people asked totally 
disapprove of traditional authorities. People might still think that traditional leaders ought to 
have a function and role in local governments. They also might approve of traditional Houses 
at national and provincial level. They also might think that customary law is to operate in a 
plural law system. The results from the Afrobarometer survey does not take into account the 
complexity of the issues related to traditional authorities. Traditional authorities do not 
necessarily negate democracy. The question is what their role is to be in a democracy. For 
instance, people who do not approve of military rule might approve of the need for a strong 
military. In my opinion it is therefore difficult to decide whether the traditional authorities still 
have legitimacy in the people.  
 
Another test of legitimacy is to read people’s political sentiments from election results. If one 
look at Table 5.5 I have presented results from all local and national elections in the period 
1994 until 2000. As one can see ANC do have a vast majority of the votes, though their 
support is slightly less in local elections than in national election. The most interesting feature 
in accordance to election and legitimacy is that the voter turnouts in local elections are much 
lower than in national elections.246 This is a tendency that South Africa shares with almost all 
democratic countries, but in South Africa the difference is almost about 40 percent. In the 
                                                 
245 Afrobarometer, Popular Attitudes to Democracy, Selected African Countries, 1999 – 2001. 
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Table 5.5: Comparing national and local election results by party share and voter 
turnout247
 1994 National 1995/96 Local 1999 National 2000 Local 
ACDP 0.5 0.8 1.4 1.2
AEB - - 0.3 -
ANC 62.7 58.2 66.4 59.4
AZAPO - - 0.2 0.3
DP 1.7 13.5 9.6 -
FA - - 0.5 -
IFP 10.5 8.7 8.6 9.1
MF - - 0.3 0.3
(N)NP 20.4 18.0 0.8 -
PAC 1.6 1.2 0.7 1.3
UCDP - - 0.8 1.0
UDM - - 3.4 2.6
FF/VF 2.2 2.7 0.8 0.1
DA(NNP/DP/FA)* - - - 22.1
Other 0.7 3.0 0.2 2.0
Total 100 100 100 100
Voter turnout 87.0 48.0 89.3 48.0
(*DA= Democratic Alliance. This was an alliance between the DP, NNP and FA, but the alliance split again in 
2001) 
national elections of 1994, the voter turnout was estimated to 87 percent and in 1999 the voter 
turnout was 89.3 percent. In both the local elections in 1995/96 and the local elections in 
2000, the voter turnout was 48 percent. These numbers might reveal that the people do not 
view the government structures at local level as clear and efficient, but it might also reveal 
that they do not possess enough political power to make them interesting. Due to this, it is 
important to emphasise that there does not seem to exist any difference in voter turnout in 
regard to provinces with or without traditional authorities. According to numbers presented by 
the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa the provinces with lowest voter turnout were 
Gauteng and Northern Province with about 43 percent. The highest voter turnouts were in 
Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Western Cape with about 56 percent voter turnout. 
Unfortunately I do not have any statistical data, which compare the voter turnout between 
constituencies with or without traditional authorities.  
 
It is apparent that the government needs to sort out both the structure of local governments 
and also sort out what the powers of traditional authorities are to be in the future. For the 
                                                                                                                                                        
246 All numbers are from The Electorate Institute of Southern Africa, Southern Africa local government 
elections. 
247 Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. 
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moment one can argue that in regard to the question of traditional authorities in the rural 
areas, there seem to be what is known as the ‘Two Bulls in a Kraal’ problem. In regard to the 
judicial authorities, there does not exist any explicit design for how the plural law system is to 
function in areas where there are both traditional courts and magistrate courts. The process of 
clarifying this is initiated, but at the moment no legislation is enacted. In regard to political 
authorities, there are no explicit designs for what is to be the traditional leaders function and 
role in the local governments. The process of clarifying this is initiated, but at the moment no 
legislation is enacted. In both cases there seem to be two bulls constantly fighting each other 
in the same arena, but the matador is reluctant to enter.   
  
5.4 Summing up the process with an analysis of the theoretical debate 
 
While chapter four intended to sort out the political preferences of the diverging parts of the 
negotiations prior to the new constitution, this chapter has illustrated which dilemmas that 
might occur when one is to implement constitutional principles. In chapter 4.5 I argued that 
the principles entrenched in the new constitution had most similarities with Rawls’ 
perspective on the accommodation of difference in a liberal democracy. The cultural 
accommodation of traditional authorities was to be subject to both the legislative and other 
constitutional principles, and they ought to be viewed as individual rights, not group rights.  
   
As I have described in this chapter the recognition of traditional authorities had two features 
that seem to be contradicting when they are to be implemented. First, Rawls’ idea of a priority 
of rights made the recognition of traditional leaders conditioned. Since many aspects of the 
traditional practices and customs did not to a sufficient degree secure the individual right to be 
equal, these traditional institutions needed to be reformed. On the contrary, the recognition of 
traditional authorities also required that one clarified their role in the future democracy. If one 
analyse the process of implementing the constitutional principle, there is a pattern that reveals 
a tendency of the government to initiate reforms addressing illiberal features of customary 
law. The customary law is a legal system primarily designed to try cases between litigants in 
private disputes, and the government wanted to make an effort to make it compatible with the 
new constitutional principles. In chapter 2.3.2 I wrote that one of the main criticisms of Rawls 
due to his strategy of accommodating difference, is that he view culture as a phenomenon that 
is to be relegated to the private sphere. As mentioned he does not view culture as something 
that ought to influence public structures.  
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 In the South African case this might have influenced the government’s problem with 
clarifying their attitude towards traditional leaders political authority. As I have described in 
this chapter the government seemed to hesitate in finding a place for the traditional leaders in 
the political structure. The traditional leaders, on the other hand, addressed this need for 
clarification several times. Particularly after 1998, they did not give an impression of wanting 
to go behind a ‘Veil of Ignorance’ to eradicate their position in the public sphere. They 
wanted to enjoy political authority as well as symbolic and judicial. When traditional leaders 
to a further and further degree voiced these claims, the process of accommodating traditional 
authorities became postponed. There are several promises of solving this dilemma through the 
government’s official statements and initiated legislation, but few promises have resulted in 
political action.  
 
One of the most important reasons for this was that in order to meet the requirements of the 
constitution one needed to establish in all communities: 1) both democratic and traditional 
political authorities. 2) Both common and customary law structures. The constitution requires 
that freedom of choice is to answer the delineation problem, not territories, since group rights 
were not granted traditional communities. This requires both double judicial and political 
facilities in rural traditional communities. This was a far-reaching endeavour to embark on. 
But why was these constitutional obligations not addressed to a sufficient degree? Why did 
the “Two Bulls in a Kraal” problem occur instead? As I wrote in chapter 2.3.1 Rawls 
occupation with difference was inspired by the urge to settle conflicts in a divided cultural 
society, but it do not seem like this strategy settled the conflict between diverging ways of life 
in the South African context.   
 
The dilemma this empirical research uncovers is that there are three prerequisites in Rawls’ 
theoretical perspectives that must exist to make the strategy work in a multicultural society. 
First, all participants need to acknowledge the liberal visions of society. In societies with deep 
cultural cleavages this is not necessarily the case. When the traditional authorities felt by-
passed by the government, they started to be sceptical to a further reform of their traditions.  
Secondly, the theories also presume that ethical questions are the most predominant 
considerations in politics. It is in the South African case obvious that other aspects than those 
of ethical considerations influenced political actions. Thirdly, the theoretical perspectives do 
not address whether there exists sufficient institutional means to implement the ethical 
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considerations. As in South Africa, many groups that claim accommodation for their 
difference are cultures on the periphery of a state centred society. In many cases one not only 
needed to change institutions, one also needed to create them. When neither of these 
prerequisites were present to a necessarily degree, the government had problems with 
providing adequate mechanisms to meet the constitutional obligations. 
 
Would these dilemmas have occurred if one had offered the traditional leaders group rights? 
Counterfactual questions are always difficult to answer, but it might have been a less 
conflicting approach, if that is an aim in regard to the question of difference. As argued in 
2.4.1 Kymlicka mentioned some policies that could be addressed to protect a group against 
the larger society. Some of these rights are initiated in South Africa, for instance the right to 
education in your own language, the right to establish newspaper, radio channels in your 
home language etc. see chapter 2.4.1. The problem is that if group rights were given in the 
case of South Africa, these might have been granted groups who wanted to prevent individual 
members from detaching themselves from traditional practises and customs. For instance the 
workshops initiated by the government exposed that there were a danger of intra-group 
oppression in traditional communities, particularly in terms of women’s status in the societies’ 
structures. The problem of intra-group inequalities was thus present, and it was important to 
secure the right to equality by addressing these features of traditional communities. 
Kymlicka’s effort to make cultural minority groups more visible might have ended in a total 
invisibility of the sub-groups of these communities. By entrenching a strategy similar to 
Rawls suggestions, traditional communities got double attention. First, by the government’s 
attempt to reform illiberal intra-group inequalities. Two, they became visible as an effect of 
traditional leaders entering the public debate to voice their constitutional recognition.  
 
Though Taylor’s strategy somehow seems to provoke the same dilemmas as those of 
Kymlicka, it is however important to understand his stressing of identity. Because though one 
might disapprove of the illiberal aspects of traditional practises, one should not view non-
liberal societies as nothing more than annoyances in the quest of stabilisation and 
modernisation. To understand the government’s reluctant actions towards traditional 
authorities, it is important to stress that the government is to be neutral to the good, and this 
also mean that one need to respect traditional communities at the same level as one respect 
urban communities. It is important that the wish to also pay traditional communities dignity 
and to acknowledge that there are other conceptions of the “good” than those developed in 
 153
western countries influenced the government. When ANC is to be the broad church it is to 
recognise members with diverging visions of the good. The problem is that this consideration 
seems to get in to conflicts with other issues that the ANC was to address.  
 
Habermas’ suggestion, which emphasises free deliberations in a society, is a good point of 
departure to solve conflicts between illiberal aspects of cultural practices and the rights of the 
individuals to be equal. The people need to be the author of what binds them, and as I 
discussed earlier there seemed to be a valuable dialogue between traditional leaders, 
governmental agents and women activists in the aftermaths of the constitutions. Idealistically 
a transition would be an excellent occasion for discussing the further existence of traditions, 
since one then are negotiating between different constitutional principles. The problem is that 
the societies in which transitions take place are seldom stable, something that is a prerequisite 
for free deliberation. Often it is a great achievement that a few key agents talks, how can one 
then open for a discourse were all are to discuss their particular interests? In the aftermaths of 
a constitutional bargaining one might start consulting the people and ask for their advises, but 
the discussions are predetermined by the constitutional principles, which then is always the 
“best argument”. When the best argument already is settled, the consequence might be that 
the participants are view the consultation as illegitimate. Since they are not the authors of 
what binds them see chapter 2.3.3. This might have occurred in the “break down” of talks 
aimed at reforming traditional traditions.    
 
 154
6. Conclusion 
 
The object of this research has been to analyse the dilemmas that might occur when one 
introduces liberal strategies for accommodating difference in a society with deep cultural 
cleavages. My aim in this regard was to sort out the dilemmas that occurred in the process of 
recognising difference in post-Apartheid South Africa. The South African constitution of 
1996 to a certain extent recognised traditional African authorities. Why did these authorities 
achieve accommodation of their difference? Which dilemmas did this recognition generate in 
the implementation of the constitutional principles? 
 
A presumption for this research is that I view issues connected to the traditional authorities as 
relevant and important in an analysis of the establishment of a liberal democracy in South 
Africa. There have been few studies on the traditional authorities role and functions in African 
new democracies, and by this analysis I intend to present the multifaceted issues connected to 
traditional authorities from a liberal perspective. The survey from the Afrobarometer 
illustrates how few findings one might achieve if one does not take into account the 
complexity of these structures. It is important to not think of traditional authorities as a regime 
that negates democracy, but as mechanisms that might operate at different levels of the 
political set up and in the legal system within a democracy. Because of this I regarded it as 
important to do an in depth study of a single case, where I used multiple sources of evidence 
to make inquiries about this phenomenon in order to understand the case on its own premises. 
By employing this strategy I uncovered some of the reasons why traditional authorities tend to 
exist together with democratic structures in South Africa and why they also managed to be 
recognised in the constitution. Even though they generate many dilemmas seen form a liberal 
point of view.  
 
6.1. The Dilemmas 
 
The dilemmas presented have relevance on two different stages in the process of 
accommodating difference. The first is connected with the principles established in the 
constitutions. At this stage different solutions are discussed, and one establishes principles 
based on the preferences of the diverging negotiators. These outcomes provide certain 
requirements that need to be fulfilled in the next stage. This second stage is the 
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implementation of the established principles. At this stage one can analyse whether the 
requirements from the first stage is followed with political action aimed at implementing the 
constitutional principles.  
 
6.1.1 Stage 1: Dilemmas connected to constitutional negotiation 
 
In regard to traditional authorities there were three main dilemmas connected to the 
recognition of these institutions and customs in the liberal constitution of 1996.  
 
1.Traditional authorities were not compatible with the right to equality. The customary law 
system did not to a sufficient degree secure the right to equality in neither the case of criminal 
nor civil jurisdiction. In criminal case the traditional courts do not have mechanisms that 
secure the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain silent or to be represented by a 
legal practitioner. For instance in civil cases the women have no proprietary or contractual 
capacity. The compositions of the traditional courts also have mechanisms that view women 
as minors in legal questions.  
 
2.Recognition of traditional customs and practices might force an identity upon members of 
rural traditional communities. The legacy of the past had made many South Africans 
sceptical of policies aimed at accommodating difference. The earlier governments had 
equated “African” identity with the structures and customs of “Bantu tribes”. As the 
traditional authorities had functioned as the earlier government’s administrative apparatus in 
rural African areas, many opposed recognition of these authorities in a free, democratic 
society where all were to be equal no matter which “cultural group” they had belonged to 
under Apartheid.   
 
3.Traditional authorities were not compatible with democratic structures and principles. The 
democratic structure is based on elected offices accountable to the population it governs. 
Traditional leaders are appointed due to the lineage to their forefathers. Since all people that 
bear offices consisting of political power need to be accountable to their people in a 
democratic society, it is difficult to provide for a political role and functions of traditional 
leaders. From a liberal democratic perspective these authorities only ought to be consulted, in 
line with other associations in the civil society, in matters connected to them.  
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These three aspects imply that it is difficult to recognise traditional leaders in a liberal 
democracy since they have illiberal elements conflicting with the individual’s right to 
equality. Why then were these authorities recognised in the new constitution of 1996? I have 
presented three main aspects that influenced the outcome of the constitution.  
 
The centre-periphery aspect indicates that these institutions were to such a high degree 
incorporated in the rural society, that it would create severe practical problems to actually 
abolish them. ANC and the NP were the main negotiators in the transition, and both parties 
were urban centred. There were no statistical evidence on how many people who were living 
under traditional authorities, and due to the main negotiation parties predominant urban 
structures, they did not have any indication of what were the rural sentiments towards these 
institutions. 
 
The ethical aspect indicates that there were sentiments of recognising institutions 
discriminated in the past. Both in the present and the past formal and informal ties existed 
between the ANC and the traditional leaders. When the ANC embarked on a reconciliation 
path rather than a revolutionary struggle, they invited “progressive” traditional leaders to be a 
part of the democratic forces. As other Africans the traditional leaders had also been 
discriminated in the past, though many have been accused of using their position to secure 
self-interests.    
 
The strategic aspect indicates that one assumed that the traditional leaders enjoyed a great 
potential in mobilising electoral support. This made them an important ally in the new 
democratic society. The traditional leaders announced their “block vote” slogan, which 
promised that traditional leaders were able to mobilise whole communities in support for their 
allied parties. In the first election in 1994, it seemed like they managed to deliver on their 
promises. In the Northern Province, where ANC’s alliance with traditional leaders was strong, 
the ANC’s electoral share was 91.6 percent of the votes. It is difficult to know how much this 
alliance influenced the elections, but it did at least give an impression of the traditional 
leaders ability to mobilise support.  
 
When these three aspects influenced the outcome and made the traditional authorities 
recognised as the only specific mentioned cultural institution, the three dilemmas presented 
made the accommodation of traditional authorities conditioned. Due to their illiberal features 
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it was difficult to grant them any group specific rights in accordance with Kymlicka and 
Taylor’s suggestions. Habermas’ strategy somewhat presupposes an open, deliberative 
society, and the constitutional negotiations were predominantly bilateral talks behind closed 
doors. At this stage it was difficult to have a free and open debate when diverging groups of 
the population agitated for civil revolts. It thus became Rawls’ strategy that had most 
similarities with the outcome of the negotiations. The recognition of traditional authorities is 
in accordance with Rawls idea of a priority of rights, where this specified recognition was 
both subject to the democratic political set up and other constitutional principle, such as the 
right to equality. But the recognition was to be held by the individuals, not by groups. This 
vision on cultural differences implies that culture is a right that individuals share, but cultural 
differences are not to be mirrored in the political structures.  
 
In regard to Taylor and Kymlicka it is important to stress that group rights have a different 
connotation in South Africa then in many western countries. Taylor has stressed that 
difference ought to be the essence of a democracy. Consequentially, particularities are not to 
be glossed over and assimilated to a majority identity. Kymlica has also expressed the 
importance of recognising different groups in a heterogonous society. The South African 
experience illustrates that one in cases with deep cultural differences might rather view what 
it is that unite people as the essence rather than what it is that makes people different. This 
might imply that a cherishing of diversity requires a strong state foundation in order to make 
the diverging cultures coexist. Particularly in cases where the economic cleavages coincide 
with cultural cleavages it might be important for the new government to not delegate too 
much power to the cultural groups which are best off. Conversely it might be important to not 
leave cultural groups with scarce economic resources outside a system of redistribution due to 
their difference.  
 
In South Africa the legacy of Apartheid was always omnipresent. The traditional authorities 
and vocals of Afrikaner rights had first claimed the right to self-government due to their 
difference. When special Afrikaner rights were rejected, this was because few others than the 
Afrikaners themselves viewed this group as marginalized or disadvantaged, as Kymlicka 
stresses are prerequisites for group rights. Neither were they viewed as a culture bordering on 
extinction. This case then reveals that it is often not desirable for the key negotiator to 
delegate power to cultural groups in cases with deep cultural cleavages. From a liberal point 
of view it is however interesting that in a constitution with a Rawlesian concern for the 
 158
individual entrenched, one recognised traditional authorities. The traditional authorities were 
not granted group rights, but they were given a guarantee of the state to accept their existence. 
Which inevitably means that their ways of life and visions of the good is to be recognised. 
This implies that it was not an on-the-surface difference that was regarded as significant, but a 
difference that did not fulfil the democratic requirements of how institutions are to take form 
in a democracy. This illustrates that it is not necessarily a connection between those the 
negotiators think should be recognised and those that are suitably liberal from a liberal 
perspective. 
 
ANC had opposed most attempts to mirror the South African diversity in the new political set 
up, and culture was something people should have the right to enjoy as long as it was 
compatible with the universal rights entrenched in the constitution. The problem was that this 
strategy gives few political solutions for how one where to accommodate claims of political 
participation from illiberal authorities. How was the recognition of traditional authorities to be 
enforced? To use Habermas’ term, the traditional leaders possessed a “better argument” in the 
negotiations, were the traditional leaders able to voice their concerns in the implementation 
process?  
 
6.1.2 Stage 2: Dilemmas of implementing a conditioned recognition  
 
Rawls has been criticised for regarding culture as a phenomenon that is to be relegated to the 
private sphere. As mentioned he does not view culture as something that ought to influence 
public structures. If one analyses the process of implementing constitutional principles, there 
is a pattern that reveals a tendency of the government to initiate reforms addressing illiberal 
features of customary law. Customary law is a legal system primarily designed to try cases 
between litigants in private disputes, and the government wanted to make an effort to make it 
compatible with the new constitutional right to equality. The other matter that needed to be 
sorted out was a clarification of traditional leaders role in the democracy. While the 
government lingered in initiating this process, the traditional leaders themselves insisted on a 
clarification. And they were not interested in going behind a ‘Veil of Ignorance’ to eradicate 
their position in the public sphere. They wanted to enjoy political as well as symbolic and 
judicial authority. When these claims were to a further and further degree voiced by 
traditional leaders, the process of accommodating traditional authorities became postponed. 
There are several promises of solving this dilemma through the government’s official 
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statements and initiated legislation, but few promises have resulted in political action. 
Cultural recognition resulted in a claim for political authority, but the government did not 
want to delegate significant political power to traditional leaders. The attempts to settle their 
functions as “… facilitating the gathering firewood” and “Officiating the opening and closing 
ceremonies of municipal council” were an insult to traditional leaders, and not what they had 
in mind.   
 
The analysis of official governmental statements and initiated legislation reveal that there are 
at least three prerequisites for implementing Rawls liberal strategies for accommodating 
difference in a democracy. These prerequisites are:  
 
1.All participants need to acknowledge the liberal democracy’s visions of society. The 
recognised cultures must approve of the process of reforming their traditions and practices, in 
order to make them compatible with the liberal notion of society. This also necessitates an 
acceptance of the notion that their cultural practises are only to take place in the private 
sphere. Though the traditional leaders in South Africa in the beginning were willing to discuss 
the illiberal features of their practices, they were also interested in being a part of the political 
set-up. When the consulting process seems to have achieved less legitimacy from 1998, seen 
from Habermas’ perspective, this illustrates that the people living in the traditional 
communities did not feel that they were the authors “of what bind them”. The best argument 
was already settled in the constitutional principles.  
 
2.Ethical questions are not necessarily the most predominant consideration in politics. This 
argument has three effects on the South African case. First, the traditional leaders were an 
important ally, and though their anticipated ability to mobilise votes are not sufficiently 
proved, it was a weapon they could use to be accommodated. Secondly, dilemmas regarding 
the role of traditional authorities are only one aspect to be considered in a sea of matters that 
deserves attention. The inability to deliver political action in this regard might have been even 
influenced further since the ANC wants to be regarded as a “broad church”. The ANC desired 
to take into consideration the sentiments and preferences of their members, which includes 
intellectuals, women activists and traditional leaders. Third, recognising traditional leaders 
political authority indicates a delegation of the government’s power. ANC have always 
stressed the importance of having a firm grip on the wheel in the process of transforming 
society, and were not interested in a fragmentation of their centralised power.  
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 3.Sufficient institutional means need to be available to implement the ethical considerations. 
As in South Africa, many groups that claim to be accommodated for their difference are 
cultures that are at the periphery of a state centred society. In South Africa there was a 
distance between the centralised democratic national arena and the rural communities. The 
Apartheid governments’ policies in regard to traditional rural communities, were that as long 
as they paid their duties and did not establish political organisations, the traditional leaders 
could do as they wanted. The infrastructure both in terms of political institutions and other 
institutional facilities are not developed to the same standard as those in the rest of the 
country. It is therefore a dilemma, that in order to fulfil the obligations of the constitutional 
principles, these less developed areas need to be provided with double judicial and 
governmental facilities. This is of course not an easy endeavour to embark on, and it requires 
being the most predominant priority of the government if it aims at fulfilling the constitutional 
obligations.    
 
When none of these prerequisites have been present to a sufficient degree in the South African 
process of accommodating difference, it has resulted in a dilemma that is often referred to as 
the problem of ‘Two Bulls in a Kraal’. The traditional leaders were not interested in only 
playing a role as symbolic figureheads in the private sphere, at the same time democratic 
structures were to be established on all levels of society. This implies that the government in 
order to meet the constitutional obligation sought to find rules for how both traditional 
authorities and local government can coexist in rural areas. It also necessitates rules for how 
common law and customary law are to be applied in traditional communities, and how these 
can be harmonised in order to meet the constitutional obligations. The government seems 
reluctant to solve the problems generated by this dilemma, and it has lead to a process where 
the government postpones their decisions to the future. Being a matador is a risky venture, so 
why not await your entrance until the bulls have settled their differences and solved their 
disputes?  
 
The dilemma generated by the implementation of the constitutional recognition was that it is 
not as easy to get rid of the past as one often has a vision of prior to the transition. On the one 
hand, there were practical problems connected with creating a “post” society. On the other 
hand, all societies have traditions, and it is not something one suddenly rejects with the advent 
of a new political regime. Taylor has argued that one cannot equate universalism with 
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sameness, and he therefore argues that one must value people’s distinctions. The South 
African experience has illustrated that culture does not equate with ethnicity. Culture entails 
more than just the ethnical label given you by birth. More important culture entails traditions, 
and traditions are capable of changing and should not be understood as static, since this might 
result in policies which treat groups of peoples as monoliths incapable of change. To not 
recognise tradition as a group right, does not denote a need for wholesale rejection of 
tradition, but perhaps a need for challenging traditions to see which might be valuable to 
preserve. The South African experience does not necessarily only challenge the African 
traditions to be more liberal, it might also challenge the liberal tradition to adapt to new 
circumstances. Because ethical considerations always have a practical side, and this might 
twist the intended outcome of the process. 
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Appendix 1: Selected chapters from the interim and the final constitution 
 
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 
Assented to 25 January 1994 
Date of Commencement: 27 April 1994 
 
Chapter 3. Fundamental Rights 
 
7 Application  
(1) This Chapter shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at all levels of government.  
(2) This Chapter shall apply to all law in force and all administrative decisions taken and acts performed during 
the period of operation of this Constitution.  
(3) Juristic persons shall be entitled to the rights contained in this Chapter where, and to the extent that, the 
nature of the rights permits.  
(4)(a) When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to 
in paragraph (b) shall be entitled to apply to a competent court of law for appropriate relief, which may include a 
declaration of rights.  
(b) The relief referred to in paragraph (a) may be sought by-  
(i) a person acting in his or her own interest;  
(ii) an association acting in the interest of its members;  
(iii) a person acting on behalf of another person who is not in a position to seek such relief in his or her own 
name;  
(iv) a person acting as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of persons; or  
(v) a person acting in the public interest.  
8 Equality  
(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law.  
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating from the 
generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language.  
(3) (a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of 
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of rights  
in land before the commencement of this Constitution under any law which would have been inconsistent with 
subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at the time of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim 
restitution of such rights subject to and in accordance with sections 121, 122 and 123.  
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) shall be presumed to be 
sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established.  
9 Life  
Every person shall have the right to life.  
10 Human dignity  
Every person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity.  
11 Freedom and security of the person  
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which shall include the right not to 
be detained without trial.  
(2) No person shall be subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person 
be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
12 Servitude and forced labour  
No person shall be subject to servitude or forced labour.  
13 Privacy  
Every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to 
searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private 
communications.  
14 Religion, belief and opinion  
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(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, which shall 
include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.  
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious observances may be conducted at state or 
state-aided institutions under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose, provided that such 
religious observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them is free and voluntary.  
(3) Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation recognising-  
(a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and  
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures.  
15 Freedom of expression  
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the 
press and other media, and the freedom of artistic creativity and scientific research.  
(2) All media financed by or under the control of the state shall be regulated in a manner which ensures 
impartiality and the expression of a diversity of opinion.  
16 Assembly, demonstration and petition  
Every person shall have the right to assemble and demonstrate with others peacefully and unarmed, and to 
present petitions.  
17 Freedom of association  
Every person shall have the right to freedom of association.  
18 Freedom of movement  
Every person shall have the right to freedom of movement anywhere within the national territory.  
19 Residence  
Every person shall have the right freely to choose his or her place of residence anywhere in the national territory.  
20 Citizens' rights  
Every citizen shall have the right to enter, remain in and leave the Republic, and no citizen shall without 
justification be deprived of his or her citizenship.  
21 Political rights  
(1) Every citizen shall have the right-  
(a) to form, to participate in the activities of and to recruit members for a political party;  
(b) to campaign for a political party or cause; and  
(c) freely to make political choices.  
(2) Every citizen shall have the right to vote, to do so in secret and to stand for election to public office.  
22 Access to court Every person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, 
where appropriate, another independent and impartial forum.  
23 Access to information Every person shall have the right of access to all information held by the state or any 
of its organs at any level of government in so far as such information is required for the exercise or protection of 
any of his or her rights.  
24 Administrative justice Every person shall have the right to-  
(a) lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or threatened;  
(b) procedurally fair administrative action where any of his or her rights or legitimate expectations is affected or 
threatened;  
(c) be furnished with reasons in writing for administrative action which affects any of his or her rights or 
interests unless the reasons for such action have been made public; and  
(d) administrative action which is justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where any of his or her rights 
is affected or threatened.  
25 Detained, arrested and accused persons  
(1) Every person who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, shall have the right-  
(a) to be informed promptly in a language which he or she understands of the reason for his or her detention;  
(b) to be detained under conditions consonant with human dignity, which shall include at least the provision of 
adequate nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense;  
(c) to consult with a legal practitioner of his or her choice, to be informed of this right promptly and, where 
substantial injustice would otherwise result, to be provided with the services of a legal practitioner by the state;  
(d) to be given the opportunity to communicate with, and to be visited by, his or her spouse or partner, next-of-
kin, religious counsellor and a medical practitioner of his or her choice; and  
(e) to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention in person before a court of law and to be released if such 
detention is unlawful.  
(2) Every person arrested for the alleged commission of an offence shall, in addition to the rights which he or she 
has as a detained person, have the right-  
(a) promptly to be informed, in a language which he or she understands, that he or she has the right to remain 
silent and to be warned of the consequences of making any statement;  
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(b) as soon as it is reasonably possible, but not later than 48 hours after the arrest or, if the said period of 48 
hours expires outside ordinary court hours or on a day which is not a court day, the first court day after such 
expiry, to be brought before an ordinary court of law and to be charged or to be informed of the reason for his or 
her further detention, failing which he or she shall be entitled to be released;  
(c) not to be compelled to make a confession or admission which could be used in evidence against him or her; 
and  
(d) to be released from detention with or without bail, unless the interests of justice require otherwise.  
(3) Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall include the right-  
(a) to a public trial before an ordinary court of law within a reasonable time after having been charged;  
(b) to be informed with sufficient particularity of the charge;  
(c) to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial;  
(d) to adduce and challenge evidence, and not to be a compellable witness against himself or herself;  
(e) to be represented by a legal practitioner of his or her choice or, where substantial injustice would otherwise 
result, to be provided with legal representation at state expense, and to be informed of these rights;  
(f) not to be convicted of an offence in respect of any act or omission which was not an offence at the time it was 
committed, and not to be sentenced to a more severe punishment than that which was applicable when the 
offence was committed;  
(g) not to be tried again for any offence of which he or she has previously been convicted or acquitted;  
(h) to have recourse by way of appeal or review To a higher court than the court of first instance;  
(i) to be tried in a language which he or she understands or, failing this, to have the proceedings interpreted to 
him or her; and  
(j) to be sentenced within a reasonable time after conviction.  
26 Economic activity  
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere 
in the national territory.  
(2) Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or the improvement of the 
quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, basic conditions of employment, fair labour 
practices or equal opportunity for all, provided such measures are justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality.  
27 Labour relations  
(1) Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices.  
(2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the right to form and 
join employers' organisations.  
(3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively.  
(4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining.  
(5) Employers' recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired, subject to 
section 33 (1).  
28 Property  
(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of 
the rights permits, to dispose of such rights.  
(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in accordance with a law.  
(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such 
expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of agreed 
compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such period as may be 
determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant factors, including, in the case 
of the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition, its 
market value, the value of the investments in it by those affected and the interests of those affected.  
29 Environment  
Every person shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental to his or her health or well-being.  
30 Children  
(1) Every child shall have the right-  
(a) to a name and nationality as from birth;  
(b) to parental care;  
(c) to security, basic nutrition and basic health and social services;  
(d) not to be subject to neglect or abuse; and  
(e) not to be subject to exploitative labour practices nor to be required or permitted to perform work which is 
hazardous or harmful to his or her education, health or well-being.  
(2) Every child who is in detention shall, in addition to the rights which he or she has in terms of section 25, have 
the right to be detained under conditions and to be treated in a manner that takes account of his or her age.  
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(3) For the purpose of this section a child shall mean a person under the age of 18 years and in all matters 
concerning such child his or her best interest shall be paramount.  
31 Language and culture Every person shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural 
life of his or her choice.  
32 Education Every person shall have the right-  
(a) to basic education and to equal access to educational institutions;  
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably practicable; and  
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, 
provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race.  
33 Limitation  
(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that such 
limitation-  
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is-  
(i) reasonable; and  
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and  
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that any limitation to-  
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or  
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to free and fair political 
activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary.  
(2) Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other provision of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of 
the common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this Chapter.  
(3) The entrenchment of the rights in terms of this Chapter shall not be construed as denying the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation to the extent that 
they are not inconsistent with this Chapter.  
(4) This Chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons 
other than those bound in terms of section 7 (1).  
(5) (a) The provisions of a law in force at the commencement of this Constitution promoting fair employment 
practices, orderly and equitable collective bargaining and the regulation of industrial action shall remain of full 
force and effect until repealed or amended by the legislature.  
(b) If a proposed enactment amending or repealing a law referred to in paragraph (a) deals with a matter in 
respect of which the National Manpower Commission, referred to in section 2A of the Labour Relations Act, 
1956 (Act 28 of 1956), or any other similar body which may replace the Commission, is competent in terms of a 
law then in force to consider and make recommendations, such proposed enactment shall not be introduced in 
Parliament unless the said Commission or such other body has been given an opportunity to consider the 
proposed enactment and to make recommendations with regard thereto.  
34 State of emergency and suspension  
(1) A state of emergency shall be proclaimed prospectively under an Act of Parliament, and shall be declared 
only where the security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder or at a 
time of national disaster, and if the declaration of a state of emergency is necessary to restore peace or order.  
(2) The declaration of a state of emergency and any action taken, including any regulation enacted, in 
consequence thereof, shall be of force for a period of not more than 21 days, unless it is extended for a period of 
not longer than three months, or consecutive periods of not longer than three months at a time, by resolution of 
the National Assembly adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of all its members.  
(3) Any superior court shall be competent to enquire into the validity of a declaration of a state of emergency, 
any extension thereof, and any action taken, including any regulation enacted, under such declaration.  
(4) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be suspended only in consequence of the declaration of a state of 
emergency, and only to the extent necessary to restore peace or order.  
(5) Neither any law which provides for the declaration of a state of emergency, nor any action taken, including 
any regulation enacted, in consequence thereof, shall permit or authorise-  
(a) the creation of retrospective crimes;  
(b) the indemnification of the state or of persons acting under its authority for unlawful actions during the state 
of emergency; or  
(c) the suspension of this section, and sections 7, 8 (2), 9, 10, 11 (2), 12, 14, 27 (1) and (2), 30 (1) (d) and (e) and 
(2) and 33 (1) and (2).  
(6) Where a person is detained under a state of emergency the detention shall be subject to the following 
conditions:  
(a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee shall be notified of the detention as soon as is reasonably 
possible;  
(b) the names of all detainees and a reference to the measures in terms of which they are  
being detained shall be published in the Gazette within five days of their detention;  
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(c) when rights entrenched in section 11 or 25 have been suspended-  
(i) the detention of a detainee shall, as soon as it is reasonably possible but not later than 10 days after his or her 
detention, be reviewed by a court of law, and the court shall order the release of the detainee if it is satisfied that 
the detention is not necessary to restore peace or order;  
(ii) a detainee shall at any stage after the expiry of a period of 10 days after a review in terms of subparagraph (i) 
be entitled to apply to a court of law for a further review of his or her detention, and the court shall order the 
release of the detainee if it is satisfied that the detention is no longer necessary to restore peace or order;  
(d) the detainee shall be entitled to appear before the court in person, to be represented by legal counsel, and to 
make representations against his or her continued detention;  
(e) the detainee shall be entitled at all reasonable times to have access to a legal representative of his or her 
choice;  
(f) the detainee shall be entitled at all times to have access to a medical practitioner of his or her choice; and  
(g) the state shall for the purpose of a review referred to in paragraph (c) (i) or (ii) submit written reasons to 
justify the detention or further detention of the detainee to the court, and shall furnish the detainee with such 
reasons not later than two days before the review.  
(7) If a court of law, having found the grounds for a detainee's detention unjustified, orders his or her release, 
such a person shall not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state shows good cause to a court of 
law prior to such re-detention.  
35 Interpretation  
(1) In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law.  
(2) No law which limits any of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, shall be constitutionally invalid solely by 
reason of the fact that the wording used prima facie exceeds the limits imposed in this Chapter, provided such a 
law is reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation which does not exceed such limits, in which event 
such law shall be construed as having a meaning in accordance with the said more restricted interpretation.  
(3) In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law and customary law, 
a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter.  
 
Chapter 11. Traditional Authorities 
 
181: Recognition of traditional authorities and indigenous law 
(1) A traditional authority which observes a system of indigenous law and is recognised by law immediately 
before the commencement of this Constitution, shall continue as such an authority and continue to exercise and 
perform the powers and functions vested in it in accordance with the applicable laws and customs, subject to any 
amendment or repeal of such laws and customs by a competent authority.  
(2) Indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law.  
182 Traditional authorities and local government  
The traditional leader of a community observing a system of indigenous law and residing on land within the area 
of jurisdiction of an elected local government referred to in Chapter 10, shall ex officio be entitled to be a 
member of that local government, and shall be eligible to be elected to any office of such local government.  
183 Provincial House of Traditional Leaders  
(1)  
(a) The legislature of each province in which there are traditional authorities and their communities, shall 
establish a House of Traditional Leaders consisting of representatives elected or nominated by such authorities in 
the province.  
(b) Draft legislation providing, subject to this Chapter, for the establishment, the composition, the election or 
nomination of representatives, and the powers and functions of a House contemplated in paragraph (a), and for 
procedures applicable to the exercise and performance of such powers and functions, and for any other matters 
incidental to the establishment and functioning of such a House, shall be introduced in a provincial legislature 
not later than six months after the election of the first Premier of such province in terms of this Constitution.  
(c) The traditional authorities resident in a province shall before the introduction of draft legislation referred to in 
paragraph (b), be consulted, in a manner determined by resolution of the provincial legislature, to establish their 
views on the content of such legislation.  
(2)  
(a) A House referred to in subsection (1) (a), shall be entitled to advise and make proposals to the provincial 
legislature or government in respect of matters relating to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions 
and customs of traditional communities within the province.  
 167
(b) Any provincial Bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or such traditions and customs, or 
any other matters having a bearing thereon, shall be referred by the Speaker of the provincial legislature to the 
House for its comments before the Bill is passed by such legislature.  
(c) The House shall, within 30 days as from the date of such referral, indicate by written notification to the 
provincial legislature its support for or opposition to the Bill, together with any comments it wishes to make.  
(d) If the House indicates in terms of paragraph (c) that it is opposed to the Bill, the provincial legislature shall 
not pass the Bill before a period of 30 days as from the date of receipt by the Speaker of such written notification 
has lapsed.  
(e) If the House fails to indicate within the period prescribed by paragraph (c) whether it supports or opposes the 
Bill, the provincial legislature may proceed with the Bill.  
184 Council of Traditional Leaders  
(1) There is hereby established a Council of Traditional Leaders consisting of a chairperson and 19 
representatives elected by traditional authorities in the Republic.  
(2) The Chairperson and members of the Council shall be elected by an electoral college constituted by the 
members of the Houses of Traditional Leaders referred to in section 183.  
(3)  
(a) Draft legislation providing, subject to this Chapter, for the composition, the election of representatives and 
the powers and functions of the Council established by subsection (1), and for procedures applicable to the 
exercise and performance of such powers and functions, and for any other matters incidental to the establishment 
and functioning of the Council, shall be introduced in Parliament not later than six months as from the 
commencement of this Constitution.  
(b) Section 183 (1) (c) shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of draft legislation referred to in paragraph (a) of 
this subsection, and in such application a reference therein to a provincial legislature shall be construed as a 
reference to Parliament.  
(4) The Council shall, in addition to any other powers and functions assigned to it by any other law, be 
competent-  
(a)to advise and make recommendations to the national government with regard to any matter pertaining to 
traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs of traditional communities anywhere in the 
Republic, or any other matters having a bearing thereon; and  
(b)at the request of the President, to advise him or her on any matter of national interest.  
(5) (a) Any parliamentary Bill pertaining to traditional authorities, indigenous law or the traditions and customs 
of traditional communities or any other matters having a bearing thereon, shall, after having been passed by the 
House in which it was introduced but before it is passed by the other House, be referred by the Secretary to 
Parliament to the Council for its comments.  
(b) The Council shall, within 30 days as from the date of such referral, indicate by written notification to the 
Secretary to Parliament its support for or opposition to the Bill, together with any comments it wishes to make.  
(c) If the Council indicates in terms of paragraph (b) its opposition to the Bill, the other House shall not pass the 
Bill before a period of 30 days as from the date of receipt by the said Secretary of such written notification has 
lapsed.  
(d) If the Council fails to indicate within the period prescribed by paragraph (b) whether it supports or opposes 
the Bill, Parliament may proceed with the Bill.  
 
 
Chapter 11 A, A Volkstaat Council 
 [Chapter 11A inserted by s. 9 of Act 2 of 1994.]  
 
184A Provision for establishment of Volkstaat Council  
(1) The establishment of a Volkstaat Council is hereby authorised.  
(2) The Council shall consist of 20 members elected by members of Parliament who support the establishment of 
a Volkstaat for those who want it.  
(3) The Council shall conduct its affairs according to rules made by the  
184B Functions of Council  
(1) The Council shall serve as a constitutional mechanism to enable proponents of the idea of a Volkstaat to 
constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a Volkstaat, and shall for this purpose be competent-  
(a)to gather, process and make available information with regard to possible boundaries, powers and functions 
and legislative, executive and other structures of such a Volkstaat, its suggested constitutional relationship with 
government at national and provincial level, and any other matter directly relevant to the establishment of such a 
Volkstaat;  
(b)to make feasibility and other relevant studies with regard to the matters referred to in paragraph (a);  
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(c)to submit representations and recommendations to the Constitutional Assembly and the Commission on 
Provincial Government with regard to the possible establishment of a Volkstaat and any matter in connection 
therewith; and  
(d)to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.  
(2) The procedures to be followed by the Council in the performance of its functions under subsection (1), shall 
be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.  
(3) The procedures provided for in this Constitution with regard to the finalisation of provincial boundaries, shall 
not be construed as precluding the establishment of such a Volkstaat, and in the event of the acceptance of the 
concept of a Volkstaat, alternative provision shall be made by an Act of Parliament for the finalisation of the 
boundaries of any affected province or provinces. [S. 184B inserted by s. 9 of Act 2 of 1994.]  
 
 
31 Language and culture Every person shall have the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural 
life of his or her choice.  
 
 
 
Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996  
As adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly 
 
Chapter 2. Bill of Rights  
 
Rights  
7. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in 
our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill.  
Application  
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state.  
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, 
taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.  
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a 
court   
in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent 
that legislation does not give effect to that right; and  
may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 
36(1).  
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights 
and the nature of that juristic person.  
Equality  
9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of 
subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair.  
Human dignity  
10. Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.  
Life  
11. Everyone has the right to life.  
Freedom and security of the person  
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12. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right   
not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;  
not to be detained without trial;  
to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources;  
not to be tortured in any way; and  
not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.  
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right   
to make decisions concerning reproduction;  
to security in and control over their body; and  
not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.  
Slavery, servitude and forced labour  
13. No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.  
Privacy  
14. Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have   
their person or home searched;  
their property searched;  
their possessions seized; or  
the privacy of their communications infringed.  
Freedom of religion, belief and opinion  
15. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.  
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that   
those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities;  
they are conducted on an equitable basis; and  
attendance at them is free and voluntary.  
(3)  
This section does not prevent legislation recognising   
 
marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; or  
systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.  
Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the 
Constitution.  
Freedom of expression  
16. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes   
freedom of the press and other media;  
freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;  
freedom of artistic creativity; and  
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.  
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to   
propaganda for war;  
incitement of imminent violence; or  
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause 
harm.  
Assembly, demonstration, picket and petition  
17. Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present 
petitions.  
Freedom of association  
18. Everyone has the right to freedom of association.  
Political rights  
19. (1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right   
to form a political party;  
to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and  
to campaign for a political party or cause.  
(2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body established in terms of 
the Constitution.  
(3) Every adult citizen has the right   
to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution, and to do so in secret; and  
to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.  
Citizenship  
20. No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.  
Freedom of movement and residence  
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21. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.  
(2) Everyone has the right to leave the Republic.  
(3) Every citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside anywhere in, the Republic.  
(4) Every citizen has the right to a passport.  
Freedom of trade, occupation and profession  
22. Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, 
occupation or profession may be regulated by law.  
Labour relations  
23. (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.  
(2) Every worker has the right   
to form and join a trade union;  
to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and  
to strike.  
(3) Every employer has the right   
to form and join an employers' organisation; and  
to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation.  
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right   
to determine its own administration, programmes and activities;  
to organise; and  
to form and join a federation.  
(5) Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. 
National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit 
a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1).  
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements contained in collective agreements. To the 
extent that the legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1).  
Environment  
24. Everyone has the right   
to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and  
to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that   
 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
promote conservation; and  
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
and social development.  
Property  
25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application   
for a public purpose or in the public interest; and  
subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been 
agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.  
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting 
an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances, including   
the current use of the property;  
the history of the acquisition and use of the property;  
the market value of the property;  
the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and  
the purpose of the expropriation.  
(4) For the purposes of this section   
the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable 
access to all South Africa's natural resources; and  
property is not limited to land.  
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.  
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress.  
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(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property 
or to equitable redress.  
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, 
water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure 
from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).  
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).  
Housing  
26. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.  
Health care, food, water and social security  
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to   
health care services, including reproductive health care;  
sufficient food and water; and  
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.  
Children  
28. (1) Every child has the right   
to a name and a nationality from birth;  
to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment;  
to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;  
to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;  
to be protected from exploitative labour practices;  
not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that   
 
are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or  
place at risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social 
development;  
not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under 
sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to 
be   
 
kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and  
treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child's age;  
to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting 
the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and  
not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict.  
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.  
(3) In this section "child" means a person under the age of 18 years.  
Education  
29. (1) Everyone has the right   
to a basic education, including adult basic education; and  
to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and 
accessible.  
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public 
educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, 
and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single 
medium institutions, taking into account   
equity;  
practicability; and  
the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.  
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions 
that   
do not discriminate on the basis of race;  
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are registered with the state; and  
maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational institutions.  
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions.  
Language and culture  
30. Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one 
exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.  
Cultural, religious and linguistic communities  
31. (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other 
members of that community   
to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and  
to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of 
Rights.  
Access to information  
32. (1) Everyone has the right of access to   
any information held by the state; and  
any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights.  
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable measures to 
alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.  
Just administrative action  
33. (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons.  
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must   
provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial 
tribunal;  
impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and  
promote an efficient administration.  
Access to courts  
34. Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.  
Arrested, detained and accused persons  
35. (1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right   
to remain silent;  
to be informed promptly   
 
of the right to remain silent; and  
of the consequences of not remaining silent;  
not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against that person;  
to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, but not later than   
 
48 hours after the arrest; or  
the end of the first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours 
or on a day which is not an ordinary court day;  
at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be charged or to be informed of the reason for the detention 
to continue, or to be released; and  
to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions.  
(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right   
to be informed promptly of the reason for being detained;  
to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be 
released;  
to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at 
state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment; and  
to communicate with, and be visited by, that person's   
 
spouse or partner;  
next of kin;  
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chosen religious counsellor; and  
chosen medical practitioner.  
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right   
to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;  
to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;  
to a public trial before an ordinary court;  
to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;  
to be present when being tried;  
to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings;  
to adduce and challenge evidence;  
not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;  
to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings 
interpreted in that language;  
not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the 
time it was committed or omitted;  
not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either 
acquitted or convicted;  
to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has 
been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and  
of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.  
(4) Whenever this section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a 
language that the person understands.  
(5) Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission 
of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.  
Limitation of rights  
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including   
the nature of the right;  
the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
the nature and extent of the limitation;  
the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
States of emergency  
37. (1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when   
the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public 
emergency; and  
the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.  
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of 
that declaration, may be effective only   
prospectively; and  
for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration, unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the 
declaration. The Assembly may extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a 
time. The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a 
majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a resolution adopted with a 
supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph 
may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.  
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of   
a declaration of a state of emergency;  
any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or  
any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.  
(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may derogate from the Bill 
of Rights only to the extent that   
the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and  
the legislation   
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is consistent with the Republic's obligations under international law applicable to states of emergency;  
conforms to subsection (5); and  
is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.  
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other 
action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise   
indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act;  
any derogation from this section; or  
any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent 
indicated opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.  
 
 
 
 
Table of Non-Derogable Rights  
 
1  
Section 
Number 
2  
Section Title 
3  
Extent to which the right is protected 
9 Equality With respect to unfair discrimination solely on the 
grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, sex 
religion or language 
10 Human Dignity Entirely 
11 Life Entirely 
12 Freedom and 
Security of the 
person 
With respect to subsections (1)(d) and (e) and (2)(c). 
13 Slavery, servitude 
and forced labour 
With respect to slavery and servitude 
28 Children With respect to:  
subsection (1)(d) and (e);  
the rights in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of subsection 
(1)(g); and  
subsection 1(i) in respect of children of 15 years and 
younger  
35 Arrested, detained 
and accused 
persons 
With respect to:  
subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) and (2)(d);  
the rights in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), 
excluding paragraph (d)  
subsection (4); and  
subsection (5) with respect to the exclusion of evidence 
if the admission of that evidence would render the trial 
unfair.  
 
(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights resulting from a 
declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must be observed:  
An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as reasonably possible, and 
informed that the person has been detained.  
A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days of the person being detained, 
stating the detainee's name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that 
person has been detained.  
The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a medical practitioner.  
The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time by, a legal representative.  
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A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the date the 
person was detained, and the court must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to 
restore peace and order.  
A detainee who is not released in terms of a review under paragraph (e), or who is not released in terms of a 
review under this paragraph, may apply to a court for a further review of the detention at any time after 10 days 
have passed since the previous review, and the court must release the detainee unless it is still necessary to 
continue the detention to restore peace and order.  
The detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering the detention, to be represented 
by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to make representations against continued detention.  
The state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of the detainee, and must 
give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days before the court reviews the detention.  
(7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first 
shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person.  
(8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are detained in 
consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead, the state must comply with the standards binding on the 
Republic under international humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.  
Enforcement of rights  
38. Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of 
Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of 
rights. The persons who may approach a court are -  
anyone acting in their own interest;  
anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;  
anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;  
anyone acting in the public interest; and  
an association acting in the interest of its members.  
Interpretation of Bill of Rights  
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum   
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom;  
must consider international law; and  
may consider foreign law.  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or 
conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.  
 
Chapter 12. Traditional Leaders  
 
Recognition  
211. (1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are recognised, 
subject to the Constitution.  
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable 
legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs.  
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law.  
Role of traditional leaders  
212. (1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on 
matters affecting local communities.  
(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law and the 
customs of communities observing a system of customary law   
national or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders; and  
national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders.  
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